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Abstract 
The question of international capital market integration or segmentation has become 
an important issue for international investors and for companies seeking to source 
their capital internationally. Previous research has suggested that international listing 
represents one effective way to mitigate the effects of international market 
segmentation. Segmentation is caused by various types of barriers to international 
investment as restrictions on portfolio investment, liquidity, and a poor institutional 
environment. Previous studies have shown that liquidity, the size of the investor 
base, and market segmentation influence the cost of capital. Hence, an international 
listing may reduce a firm's cost of capital, if it increases the size of the investor base, 
leads to an increase in the liquidity of a firm's stock, and reduces international market 
segmentation. 
The objective of this study is to examine whether an international listing on the 
London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has 
an impact on the cost of capital of firms. The main focus of this study is to investigate 
if the decision to raise equity capital with the listing affects liquidity and market 
integration. The purpose of the thesis is fourfold: (1) to investigate whether foreign 
firms that list on NYSE or NASDAQ experience more positive wealth effects in the 
pre-listing period and a stronger decline in expected returns in the post-listing period 
than London listings; (2) to compare changes in the liquidity of stocks when they 
become internationally listed on one of the three major global stock exchanges, the 
London Stock Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and NASDAQ; (3) 
to examine the effect of alternative international equity offering methods on liquidity 
14 
and its subsequent impact on the cost of capital; (4) to investigate the transfer of 
pricing information for non-US companies that conducted a simultaneous initial 
public offering on the NYSE and on their domestic stock exchange. 
We find that foreign firms that list on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ 
experience positive abnormal returns prior to their US listing, and a decline in 
expected returns in the post-listing period. On the contrary, foreign firms that list on 
the London Stock Exchange do not experience any significant changes. This 
suggests that the benefits associated with a US listing are higher, since foreign firms 
make themselves more accessible for US investors by complying with the stringent 
disclosure requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These 
benefits may even be higher for emerging market firms which use their ADR listing to 
raise equity capital. Although emerging market firms may try to time their issues to 
take advantage of some form of "emerging market sentiment", the evidence is only 
weak. The finding of substantial positive returns of the ADR price for firms that 
upgrade their previously OTC-traded ADR programme to a listing are rather an 
indication of the benefits experienced with a listing. 
The results show that the liquidity of stocks which list on the London Stock 
Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ increases subsequent to 
the listing. However, firms listing on NYSE appear to experience the strongest 
abnormal volume effects. In addition to the persistent long-term impact on liquidity, 
we also document significant short-term trading volume effects of international 
listings. Our comparison of international listings and control firms matched by 
nationality, firm size, and industry confirms our finding that internationally listed firms 
experience an increase in liquidity. This study also provides evidence that 80 percent 
of our sample firms, which obtained a "full" ADR listing on NYSE or NASDAQ, 
15 
experience an increase in their total order flow. Moreover, the US order flow of 
NYSE-listed firms is higher than in their pre-listing domestic market for 83 percent of 
our sample firms. 
The results provide evidence that non-US firms which conduct a public offerings in 
the US have lower bid-ask spreads than private placements. Our sample consists of 
231 international equity offerings from 33 countries world-wide; 86 companies 
conducted a public offering on NYSE or NASDAQ, and 145 companies raised capital 
in the private placement market. We find that the decision between a public offering 
or a private placement under Rule 144 A has an impact on the cost of capital of a 
firm. Our cost-benefit analysis shows that the benefits of a public offering outweigh 
the cost advantage of private placements. We provide empirical evidence that the 
interaction between the domestic and the foreign stock market leads to lower bid-ask 
spreads for internationally listed firms. The investigation of the determinants of 
domestic and foreign trading volume indicates that international listing increases the 
total trading volume. Trading volume on the foreign stock exchange appears to be 
strongly influenced by the percentage of equity issued in the foreign market. 
In contrast to previous studies that examine "normal" cross-listings, our results show 
that in many cases NYSE prices seem to lead domestic prices. This result is 
particularly pronounced for emerging market shares whose domestic markets often 
appear to be pure satellites of the NYSE market. Our results also show a higher 
speed of convergence between ADRs and underlying shares for developed market 
firms implying that arbitrage is undertaken more quickly. A comparative order flow 
analysis provides consistent evidence since a great number of firms experience a 
higher trading activity on the NYSE than on their domestic market. While previous 
evidence suggests that ADR IPOs are less underpriced than US IPOs, our results do 
16 
not indicate any differences. Moreover, initial returns of emerging market and 
developed market IPOs do not seem to differ. 
17 
1. Chapter: Introduction 
Recent years have seen a strong trend towards globalisation of capital markets. The 
finance literature has suggested that international capital market integration is 
beneficial for companies and investors. Globalisation has taken the form of foreign 
portfolio or direct investment, mergers with foreign firms, and cross-listing on foreign 
stock exchanges. International listings enable investors to diversify their portfolios 
with foreign stocks. On the other hand they provide firms with the opportunity to 
source their capital globally, reduce their cost of capital, and increase shareholder 
value. 
The cost of capital is influenced by a number of factors. In addition to the factors 
suggested by the CAPM, the literature has shown that liquidity, investor recognition, 
and international market segmentation influence the cost of capital of a firm. Since 
international listing may have an impact on these three factors, it may affect the cost 
of capital. If international listing leads to a reduction in the cost of capital, this may 
explain the decision of firms to obtain a listing on a foreign stock exchange with more 
stringent listing requirements than its home exchange. Similar to research on 
domestic exchange listings, previous literature has examined changes in expected 
returns and liquidity from the pre- to the post-listing period. Previous studies have 
also investigated certain features of internationally listed companies to shed more 
light on their motives. 
Studies investigating whether international listing reduces international market 
segmentation, and hence expected returns, have examined the behaviour of stock 
returns in the pre- and the post-listing period. Their results, however, have not been 
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unanimous. Differences seem to exist across companies from different countries and 
between stock exchanges. Moreover, post-listing period returns appear to resemble 
the negative long-run performance of new issues and domestic exchange listings. 
While the international listing literature interprets this stock return behaviour as being 
consistent with a decline in expected returns, the new issues literature postulates 
investor sentiment as the causal factor. Hence, market conditions may also be of 
importance for international listings. In particular, when taking into account that a 
great number of firms have used their international listing to raise capital in recent 
years. Firms have tapped international markets to conduct initial public offerings 
(IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings alike which were structured as global equity 
offerings. 
The importance of liquidity for pricing financial assets is backed up by a great 
number of empirical studies. The market microstructure literature examines the 
factors influencing liquidity in various contexts. These studies have shown that 
events as, for example, domestic exchange listings, changes in the index list, and 
derivatives trading have an impact on liquidity. Research that examines changes in 
liquidity from the pre- to the post-listing period for international listings provides more 
or less consistent results. Using different measures of liquidity as bid-ask spreads, 
trading volume, and depth, most studies find that international listing increases the 
liquidity of a stock. Although previous theoretical and empirical research has shown 
that international listing offers liquidity benefits for companies, differences across the 
three main stock exchanges for international listings 
- 
London, NASDAQ, and NYSE 
- 
have not been examined. Since a listing can also involve substantial costs for a 
company, the choice of a particular stock exchange bears important management 
19 
implications from a cost-benefit perspective. If one stock exchange offers higher 
liquidity benefits than other exchanges this could outweigh the higher costs of listing. 
The growth of international investment in recent years has also raised questions 
concerning the linkage and dynamic interaction of international markets. Previous 
studies that examine the interdependence of international stock markets provide 
evidence that information shocks are transmitted rapidly between markets. The issue 
of price interactions is of particular importance for ADRs (American Depositary 
Receipts), which are the main vehicle to list foreign shares on an US exchange, and 
their underlying shares on the listing firm's home exchange. The possibility for 
investors to simultaneously trade almost identical assets in two different markets 
raises important questions concerning the degree of integration of internationally 
cross-listed stocks. Moreover, it bears managerial implications for the disclosure of 
information to the market and the communication with shareholders in multiple 
markets. 
Therefore, there is a need to undertake empirical analysis that compares the impact 
of international listing on the London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the New York 
Stock Exchange on the factors of the cost of capital as international market 
segmentation, investor recognition, and liquidity. 
1.1 The objective of the study 
Previous studies have shown the impact of international listing on market 
segmentation, investor recognition, and liquidity. It has often been argued that listing 
gives firms greater access to foreign capital markets, and thus enables them to raise 
capital more cheaply. However, the influence of institutional characteristics on the 
20 
above specified factors and the link to the capital raising activity of firms has not 
been examined. Therefore, the objective of this study is to examine whether an 
international listing on the London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, or the New York 
Stock Exchange has an impact on the cost of capital of firms. In particular, we aim to 
investigate if the decision to raise equity capital with the listing affects liquidity and 
market integration. The general aim of the study is fourfold: 
Firstly, to examine whether US listings experience more positive wealth effects in the 
pre-listing period and a stronger decline in expected returns in the post-listing period, 
since foreign firms face higher barriers to access the US market than the UK market. 
We investigate whether emerging market firms that raise equity capital with their 
listing experience stronger benefits than developed market firms because they are 
more segmented from the US market. Moreover, we also aim to assess if the 
performance of ADR listings is subject to market conditions. 
Secondly, to compare the impact on liquidity for London, NASDAQ, and NYSE 
listings and to examine differences in the magnitude of this impact for public offerings 
and introductions. To shed more light on the motives of firms to obtain an 
international cross-listing, we compare our sample firms to control sample firms 
matched by nationality, industry, and size. We also examine whether an ADR listing 
on NYSE or NASDAQ increases the total order flow of internationally listed firms. 
Thirdly, to investigate the effect of alternative international equity offering methods 
on liquidity and its subsequent implications for the cost of capital. We also aim to 
provide some evidence why public offerings have lower bid-ask spreads than private 
placements. 
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Fourthly, to test the effectiveness of the market in transferring information for 
emerging and developed market companies that conducted a simultaneous initial 
public offering on the NYSE and on their domestic stock exchange. We analyse the 
speed of adjustment between ADR prices and underlying share prices which allows 
important inferences concerning the integration of both markets. First day returns 
and issue day trading volume is also analysed. 
The samples used for testing these four issues are different. In general, the sample 
of internationally listed firms comprises all foreign firms that obtained a listing on the 
London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the NYSE during the period from January 
1980 to December 1994. To construct a control sample, we match listed firms by 
nationality, size, and industry. The sample of international equity offerings includes 
all issues from non-US firms with an US tranche between 1984 and 1994. The global 
IPO sample comprises all firms that conducted an IPO of ADRs on the NYSE 
between 1991 and July 1994, and were not publicly traded in their home market prior 
to their offering. Information concerning a firm's listing status and their date of listing 
is provided by the London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the New York Stock 
Exchange. Data on international equity offerings is obtained from two data sources: ' 
a) the ADR data base of The Bank of New York, and b) Omnibase, a data base for 
international securities issues from Security Data Company (SDC). Stock price and 
trading volume data is collected from Datastream. 
1.2 Limitations of the study 
A number of limitations may be identified in this empirical work: 
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1) The analysis of wealth effects of international listings in Chapter 6 uses the actual 
listing dates as the point of reference since the date of the listing announcement is 
not available. 
2) Data unavailability has been one of the major problems of this study. Since this 
project has involved companies from many different international countries, it was 
found that very often not sufficient historical price data was available. Since many 
companies only listed in 1994, not all companies have data for the same length of 
time. Moreover, Datastream does not provide volume data for *certain countries. In 
addition, the data on IPOs was limited since we lacked offering prices and the 
offering size in the domestic market. These problems have partly limited the sample 
size and the sample period used in this study. 
The data unavailability has also caused some methodological limitations. Previous 
research has highlighted the importance of the book-to-market factor for asset 
pricing. A great number of studies measuring the long-run performance of new 
issues have taken account of this finding and attempted to control for it. However, 
this adjustment was not possible in Chapter 6 due to data limitations and the lack of 
comparability for international companies from different countries. 
3) There has been no attempt to control for confounding effects that may have 
influenced the listing decision in one particular market. Companies could have listed 
in the US and the UK to assist their foreign business activities. These include, for 
example, to obtain a higher profile for the firm's products, to build up manufacturing 
facilities, to finance subsidiaries, or to facilitate acquisitions in the foreign country. 
4) The fact that the analysis draws from the existence of institutional differences 
between the US and the UK market represents a potential limitation of the study. 
23 
Although these differences prevailed throughout the sample period, a question 
arises: would the findings be irrelevant if the SEC relaxed their stringent 
requirements? However, we believe the differences in the institutional framework are 
only one factor that determines differences in the wealth effect and liquidity across 
the US and UK market upon international listing. If the current regulations ceased to 
exist, this would even provide an opportunity to discriminate the "regulatory effect" 
from the pure "liquidity effect", due to differences in the trading systems, or from 
other market imperfections, as settlement problems or poor custodial services in 
emerging markets. 
1.3 Overview of the study 
Chapter 2 discusses the different types and methods of international listing. The 
discussion of the type of foreign shares explains the special characteristics of ADRs. 
Moreover, it also highlights the relevance of international listing by providing 
evidence on recent trends in the area of international listing. 
Chapter 3 examines the structure of the international equities market. It explores 
differences in the institutional framework that governs the issuance and trading of 
foreign equities in the US and UK. While the UK approach of regulating foreign 
securities is based on mutual recognition, the US insists on national treatment for 
foreign firms. This represents a particular hurdle for foreign companies seeking to 
access the US capital market. This chapter also discusses the current state of the 
primary market and the secondary market. The key institutional issues provide 
important implications for our subsequent empirical analysis. 
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Chapter 4 reviews the existing literature that related to the effect of international 
listing on the cost of capital. Particular attention is paid to the factors of the cost of 
capital which have modified the original CAPM framework and have been shown to 
be of relevance for international listings. The link between international listing and the 
impact of international market segmentation on the cost of capital is investigated by 
examining the stock price behaviour of listings in the pre- and the post-listing period. 
Inferences are also made by reviewing the long-run performance literature of new 
issues and domestic exchange listings. 
Chapter 5 discusses that stream of the literature related to the motivation of 
companies to list internationally. The most widely examined motive has been the 
liquidity proposition which arises from the literature investigating the factors of the 
cost of capital, as presented in the previous chapter. The review discusses the 
relationship between listing and liquidity in a wider context extending it to different 
forms of listing and liquidity-related factors. It also reviews a number of studies that 
explore the importance of financial disclosure levels on the listing decision and the 
size of the company. Important implications concerning the timing of listings arise 
from the equity issue literature. Other factors that have been put forward by previous 
research are foreign business activity and geographical proximity. It also summarises 
the implications of the previous literature, as discussed in this chapter and the 
previous chapter, for further research and identifies the areas that will be 
investigated in this study. 
Chapter 6 provides empirical evidence on the impact of international market 
segmentation and market conditions on the stock price behaviour of listings. Event 
study methodology is used to examine the effects of the different institutional 
framework prevailing in the US and the UK on stock returns in the pre- and post- 
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listing period. It also explores differences in the price reaction for developed and 
emerging market firms. The benefits of a listing may be higher for emerging market 
firms because they face higher barriers in accessing the US market. Since a great 
number of studies have shown that the performance of new issues is subject to 
market conditions, we also examine timing-related explanations using two proxies for 
market conditions. The examination of listing day abnormal returns for firms that 
upgraded their OTC-traded ADR programme to a listing provides an indication of the 
benefits experienced with a listing. 
Chapter 7 examines the implications of the decision to list on the London Stock 
Exchange, NASDAQ, and the NYSE and on the liquidity of listed firms. It tests the 
hypothesis that firms listing on an US exchange experience larger liquidity benefits 
than London listings. Moreover, it examines whether firms that conduct a public 
offering exhibit larger benefits than introductions. The comparison to nationality-, 
industry-, and size-matched firms verifies our results and provides evidence on the 
motives of firms to list internationally. The order flow effects of ADR listings are also 
discussed. 
Further evidence of the impact of listing on liquidity is provided in Chapter 8. A 
number of alternative international equity offering methods are examined and 
evaluated in a cost-benefit framework. We measure differences in liquidity by 
comparing bid-ask spreads of public offerings and private placements of non-US 
firms whose international equity offering included an US tranche. Bid-ask spreads 
are calculated from transaction returns taking account of portfolio autocorrelation. 
Moreover, we control differences in bid-ask spreads for other factors influencing 
them. Using the framework provided by the liquidity literature, this chapter also 
analyses the liquidity impact on the cost of capital and quantifies the trade-offs. 
26 
Chapter 9 examines price interactions of cross-border initial public offerings (IPOs) 
for developed and emerging market firms. The review of previous literature has 
provided evidence of the linkage and dynamic interaction of various international 
markets. Studies on international cross-listings have shown that the domestic market 
exerts the price leadership. Since the prices of ADRs and underlying shares, which 
have been simultaneously offered on NYSE and in the domestic market, are 
expected to interact, we employ the theory of cointegration and the Garbade and 
Silber approach to test their relationship. The speed of price convergence between 
the ADR market and the underlying share market provides evidence on the degree of 
integration between the domestic market and the NYSE. It also allows inferences 
concerning differences in transaction costs between both markets. Similar to the IPO 
literature, first day returns and first day trading activity is investigated. 
The final chapter presents the main conclusions derived from the previous analysis. 
It also provides suggestions for further research in the area of international listings. 
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2. Chapter: Aspects of international listing 
The benefits of international diversification are now widely acknowledged by 
investors. The discussion has shifted to the issue of how to invest in foreign assets 
and to remove the remaining barriers still dividing financial markets. The integration 
of capital markets is of importance to international investors and to companies 
seeking to source their capital internationally. Previous research suggests that 
companies can reduce their cost of capital if existing barriers of investment are 
dismantled and diversification opportunities for foreign investors are increased. 
The importance of international equity investment has substantially increased over 
time. The amount of US investment in foreign shares has constantly grown from 
US$100bn in 1991 to US$320bn in 19951. The value of foreign shares traded on US 
exchanges has increased from US$80bn in 1991 to US$270bn in 19952, and the 
London Stock Exchange reports a turnover in foreign equities of £395bn in 19953. 
The figures highlight two key issues that are of importance in the international 
equities area: 
" 
Trading in international equities 
" 
International equity offerings 
International listing is suggested as one effective way to mitigate the effects of 
international market segmentation. The aim of this research is to assess the 
relevance of international listing for integrating capital markets and its implications for 
1 These figures are taken from a Financial Times survey on "Accessing the US capital markets" which cites a study 
by Technimetrics. 
2 See Footnote 1. 
3 These figures are provided by the London Stock Exchange, Quality of Markets department Fact Service. 
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investors and companies. Our focus is on foreign companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ). In the 
following, the institutional background and the listing activity in recent years across 0 
the three major exchanges for foreign listings is compared. 
The general term "international listing" describes the case of a company that officially 
lists its shares on a stock exchange not located in its country of incorporation. To 
examine the implications of international listings more profoundly, additional aspects 
have to be taken into consideration. International listings can be further categorised 
according to the type of listing and the method of listing. The type of listing takes 
account of the position of the individual stock exchange in the process of information 
disclosure, and possible interaction effects for securities traded simultaneously on a 
number of stock exchanges. The method of listing describes the way of accessing a 
foreign capital market which can be done with or without raising capital. 
2.1 Types of international listing 
In the "normal" case, a company has its primary listing on its domestic stock 
exchange and obtains a secondary or dual listing on a foreign stock exchange. This 
case can be referred to as an international dual listing4 (or international cross-listing) 
and represents the major form of listing activity. 
The case that a company is not listed on its domestic exchange but only on a foreign 
stock exchange is referred to as international primary listing. In this case, the 
° Examples are a German or French company either listed on the London or the New York Stock Exchange. A 
further example would be a British company that is listed in London and on NYSE or NASDAQ. 
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company must comply with all the listing requirements of the foreign stock exchange 
as the foreign stock exchange is the primary listing location. A primary listing was 
obtained by 14 companies in London, 23 companies in New York, and 11 companies 
on NASDAQ during the period of 1980-1994. 
The term "unlisted securities" applies to all securities that are only listed on their 
domestic exchange but not officially admitted to a foreign stock exchange. In this 
sense, foreign securities whose prices are quoted outside their domestic market on a 
trading system are "unlisted securities , 5. The decisive distinction between a listing 
and a quotation is the active involvement of the company in the listing process. 
Whereas a quotation is initiated by market participants' desire to trade in a foreign 
stock, a listing reflects the company's intention to access a foreign capital market 
and to comply with the disclosure requirements. 
2.2 Methods of international listing 
An international listing can be carried out by bringing existing shares to listing 
(introduction) without raising any new capital or by offering new shares to the public 
(public offering). In the UK, an introduction does not involve the raising of new cash 
which corresponds to a public listing, or often referred to as Level-two programme6, 
in the US. If the listing on the foreign stock exchange is linked with raising new 
capital we refer to a public offering7, or also referred to as a Level-three programme 
in the case of ADRs. A further distinction can be made whether the shares were 
5 This differentiation also implies that foreign companies quoted on SEAQ International, the quotation system of the 
London Stock Exchange, must be seen as unlisted although special provisions apply for companies to be included in 
SEAQ I. A further discussion of this issue will follow. 
6 The mechanics of ADRs will be described under 2.3.1. Depositary Receipts. 
7 The listing rules of the London Stock Exchange distinguish between different marketing methods of bringing new 
shares to listing: Introduction, placing, offer for sale or subscription or a combination of those methods. However, 
these distinction is of more importance for domestic offerings. Thus, we will only distinguish whether the listing 
involves raising new capital (public offering) or not (introduction). 
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listed in their home market prior to the international offering. If a company has not 
been listed previously in its domestic market or elsewhere this will be called an 
international IPO (initial public offering). Very often international IPOs are sold 
simultaneously in a number of different markets. 
2.3 Types of foreign shares 
With respect to the type of foreign shares firms have two options. They can either list 
ordinary shares or issue depositary receipts. Companies that listed in London have 
traditionally done so by using the same type of shares traded on their domestic 
exchange. This contrasts with the approach used by foreign companies listing on an 
US exchange which issue depositary receipts8. Since the beginning of the 90's a 
discussion has evolved what may be the most suitable market structure for trading 
foreign equities. Cochrane (1994) argues that side-by-side trading of ordinary shares 
(on the domestic exchange) and of ADRs may not be the right trading environment 
to guarantee a high degree of liquidity. However, it may be argued that depositary 
receipts, at least for the time being, have appeared to be the more successful tool for 
foreign investors. This may also be reflected in the decision of the London Stock 
Exchange in August 1994 to publish new rules for listing depositary receipts. Any 
new company listed on a recognised stock exchange in its own country is now 
allowed to have its depositary receipts traded in London9. Depositary receipts could 
previously only be listed if the underlying shares were also listed in London. 
8 Velli (1994) argues (Panel I discussion of Symposium "Entering the US Securities Markets: Opportunities and 
Risks for Foreign Companies") that non-US companies do not really have a choice 
- 
they must use ADRs. There 
have only been a few foreign companies that listed their shares directly by using shell companies in Bermuda. 
9 For a more detailed discussion of this approach which distinguishes recognised and not recognised exchanges see 
3.1.1.2 
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2.3.1 Depositary Receipts 
Depositary receipts are negotiable certificates issued by an US commercial bank, the 
depositary. Nowadays, different terms are used for depositary receipts but there is 
no difference between a Global Depositary Receipt (GDR), an European Depositary 
Receipt, or an American Depositary Receipt (ADR). They all work in the same way. 
In the following "ADR" will be used instead of the other terms, since the first 
instruments were formally termed "American Depositary Receipts". The historical 
evolution of ADRs is described by Nanda, Owers, and Feng (1996) who argue that 
the introduction of these instruments was a response to the conditions of World War 
I. The problems of British property rights and physical hazards of transporting stock 
certificates to the US during the conflict led to arrangements whereby instruments 
would be issued in New York backed by a Trust in Europe. 
ADRs are created by depositing the underlying shares with a branch or a 
correspondent of the depositary bank in the issuer's home country, known as the 
custodian bank. The custodian bank is also the record holder of the ADRs and 
performs a number of services such as collecting dividends in the paying currency 
and paying to ADR holders in dollars. ADR holders perform their rights through the 
depositary. Their rights include receiving dividends, voting, or exchanging ADRs for 
the underlying shares. Hence a mechanism for the flow of shares into and out of the 
US is provided. The depositary charges a fee for issuing and cancelling ADRs. This 
fee is the major source of income for the depositary bank which benefits from 
increased trading between the domestic market, where the underlying shares are 
traded, and the ADR market in the US. The fact that new ADRs can be issued by 
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depositing underlying shares or existing ADRs can be converted into underlying 
shares at any time helps to secure equal pricing in both markets1° 
The popularity of ADRs stems from certain technical advantages for US 
shareholders. ADRs are in registered form. This facilitates the transfer of ownership 0 
because it is done in accordance with US laws and procedures. In the event of the 
death of a shareholder the estate need not to go through probate in a foreign court 
system. Moreover, a lot of US pension funds and investment managers legally must 
invest in ADRs because they are not permitted in holding foreign securities. 
However, ADRs are seen as US securities under US law. 
Velli (1994) names three major cost advantages from an US investor's viewpoint: 
Custody fees are avoided because the buying of ADRs is settled and cleared in the 
United States. Conversion of dividends is done by the depositary which usually gets 
a better rate for converting this large sum of money than retail investors would get for 
smaller amounts. The third advantage is "failed trade financing". The likelihood of a 
failed delivery on the settlement date, resulting in a failed trade, is substantially 
reduced because ADRs settle according to US principles. This saves a lot of money 
because investors do not have to finance this positions. 
ADRs can also be distinguished in unsponsored and sponsored ADR programmes. 
The focal point is involvement of the company of the underlying shares in the issuing 
process. Unsponsored ADR programmes are initiated by broker-dealers or 
depositary banks if they perceive a sufficient market interest to trade in foreign 
equities. If the company does not object to establish an ADR programme it is 
requested by the initiators to ask for an exemption from registration under the 1934 
10 According to Velli (1994), those types of transactions account for about ten to fifteen percent of the total trading 
volume in ADRs. This shows the significance of arbitraging between the different markets. 
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Act. In an unsponsored ADR programme the depositary files a registration statement 
on Form F-6. The depositary has no legal relationship with the company. However, 
unsponsored ADRs can only be traded in the so-called pink sheet market, an illiquid 
segment of the OTC-market. In the course of this study unsponsored ADR 
programmes will not be considered since the issuing company is not involved in the 
decision process. Moreover, they have become obsolete and only three new 
programmes have been established since 198311 
Sponsored ADR programmes are supported by the company. The company appoints 
a single depositary and enters into a deposit agreement with it. Sponsored ADRs 
must be registered on Form F-6 under the 1933 Act. The company is a signatory to 
the registration statement. If the ADR programme is established in connection with a 
public offering or a listing exactly the same registration rules apply as described 
above. ADRs registered with the SEC qualify as listed US securities for US pension 
funds. Thus, ADRs are the only vehicle available to a great number of US pension 
funds and investment managers to gain access to international capital markets. 
Many pension funds are forbidden by their charter to invest directly in foreign equities 
or are required to take physical possession of securities. 
Three different types of sponsored ADR programmes exist. Level I ADRs cannot be 
listed on a stock exchange since they are not fully registered with the SEC. Level I 
ADRs represent the biggest category of ADRs with approximately 1450 ADRs 
trading in the US as of December, 1995 (see Nanda, Owers, and Feng, 1996). 
However, they will not be considered in our analysis since they are not listed ADRs. 
Level II ADRs are listed on an US stock exchange and are very similar to 
introductions in the UK market, since no capital is raised with the listing. In the case 
11 See Velli (1994). 
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of Level III ADRs, companies decide to raise capital with their programme; they can 
be categorised into public offerings and private placements. 
2.3.2 Ordinary shares 
A company that decides to list ordinary shares on the foreign stock exchange lists 
exactly the same type of shares as listed on its domestic stock exchange on the 
foreign stock exchange. Only, the price of the shares is quoted in the currency of the 
foreign stock exchange. 
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2.4 Recent trends of international listing 
Table 2.1. shows the number of listed foreign companies and their aggregated 
market capitalisation on the London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the New York 
Stock Exchange. Moreover, the figures of each exchange are also compared to the 
number of listed domestic firms and their combined market capitalisation. 
Table 2.1. 
Comparison of foreign and domestic listings on the London Stock Exchange, 
NASDAQ, and the New York Stock Exchangea 
This table shows the number of listed companies and their aggregated market 
capitalisation at 29.12.1995. 
Number of listed companies Market capitalisation (£bn) 
Stock Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic 
Exchange 
London 525 2078 2357.00 900.33 
NASDAQ 361 5122 46.70 793.88 
New York 247 2675 165.02 3873.75 
aSource: London Stock Exchange, Quality of Markets department Fact Service. 
It can be seen that London (525 companies) lists more foreign firms than NYSE (247 
companies) and NASDAQ (361 companies). This compares to 2078 UK firms on the 
London Stock Exchange, 2675. US firms on NYSE, and 5122 US firms on NASDAQ. 
Hence, London has a far higher percentage of foreign firms to domestic firms 
indicating the relative importance of the foreign equities market. The figures 
comparing the market capitalisation provide similar results. The aggregated market 
capitalisation of foreign firms in London is far higher than on NYSE and NASDAQ, 
and it also exceeds the combined market capitalisation of UK firms. However, these 
figures partly reflect the large number of listed US firms on the London Stock 
Exchange whose total market capitalisation is fully taken account of in the figures. 
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Nevertheless, these figures provide ample evidence of the size and the significance 
of the three markets under consideration. 
Table 2.2. 
Number of new listings on the London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the 
New York Stock Exchange by yeara 
This table shows the number of new listings from 1984-1995 by year. 
Year London NASDAQb New York 
1984 75 4 4 
1985 15 1 1 
1986 26 2 6 
1987 31 7 14 
1988 20 1 10 
1989 30 5 13 
1990 19 2 8 
1991 10 
- 
11 
1992 68 15 
1993 3 14 36 
1994 12 27 (11 c) 52 
1995 38 63 (1 Oc) 35 
aSource: London Stock Exchange, Quality of Markets department Fact Service, London Stock 
Exchange Quarterly (1984-1994), NASDAQ, and New York Stock Exchange. 
bThe number of new listings from 1984-93 comprises only companies that listed ADRs. The years 
1994 and 1995 show all new listings with the number of ADR listings in brackets. 
cThis figure only includes ADRs listed before September 1995. 
Table 2.2. shows the number of new listings on the London Stock Exchange, 
NASDAQ, and NYSE over the period 1984-1995 for each year. It can be seen that 
approximately 60 percent of all foreign firms that decided to list on NYSE obtained 
their listing within the last five years. The evidence for NASDAQ provides a similar 
trend. However, these figures contrast with the figures for London listings where the 
listing activity seemed to have declined rapidly in the early 90's12,13 Only in 1995, the 
trend appears to have become reversed since the London Stock Exchange permitted 
the listing of Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs). The London Stock Exchange now 
12 The new listings peaked in 1984 when the London Stock Exchange announced to abolish the automatic 
acceptance of US companies listed on an US exchange. Many US companies were worried of a closed "fortress" 
Europe and decided to list their stocks before the changes became effective. This partly explains the high number of 
US companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
13 However, these figures also conceal the trend of a decreasing absolute number of foreign companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange as the number of cancellations has exceeded the number of new listings. For more 
information, see publications of the London Stock Exchange. 
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includes GDRs in their number of new listings, although GDRs cannot be seen as a 
"full" listing. The listing process is very similar to that for eurobonds and warrants. 
According to figures of the London Stock Exchange 27 depositary receipts have 
been listed between August 1994 and December 199514: 8 from India, 1 from 
Argentina, 3 from Taiwan, 8 from the Republic of South Korea, 3 from South Africa, 1 
from the Czech Republic, 1 from Poland, and 2 from the Republic of Indonesia. 
Table 2.3. 
Number of new listings on the London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the New 
York Stock Exchange by method of listing and yeara 
This table shows the number of new listings on the London Stock Exchange, 
NASDAQ, and the New York Stock Exchange from 1984-1994. This table splits new 
listings into two groups: introductions and public offerings. In an introduction the 
company does not raise new cash with its listing. In a public offering the company 
raises new funds with its listing. 
London NASDAQb New York 
Introduction Public Introduction Public Introduction Public 
offering' offering offering 
1984 
- 
1988 155 6(6) 87 24 11 
1989 28 2 32 7 6 
1990 19 
- 
2- 4 4 
1991 9- (1) 
-- 
4 7 
1992 6- 35 3 12 
1993 21 4 10 5 31 
1994 65 (1) 65 15 37 
'Source: London Stock Exchange, Quality of Markets department Fact Service, London Stock 
Exchange Quarterly (1984-1994), NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange, and the ADR data base of the 
Bank of New York. 
bThe number of new listings on NASDAQ comprises only companies that listed ADRs. 
`The figure in brackets shows the number of placings which are a special form of raising capital in the 
London market. 
The trend towards an US listing, which occurred in the beginning of the 90's, is also 
corroborated when comparing the number of new listings by their method of listing 
(see Table 2.3. ). While London listings accessed the market using an introduction, 
the majority of US listings raised capital with their listing (public offering). For 
14 See London Stock Exchange, Fact Book 1996. 
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example, 31 companies conducted a public offering on NYSE in 1993, and 37 
companies in 1994. Table 2.4. reveals another difference between NYSE and 
London listings in recent years. A large number of new NYSE listings during the last 
five years has come from emerging markets (56 companies) while the majority of 
London listings during that period have been developed market firms. It also appears 
that emerging market firms opted for a NYSE listing instead of listing on NASDAQ 
since a NYSE listing may offer a higher prestige. 
Table 2.4. 
Number of new listings on the London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the 
New York Stock Exchange from 1990-1994a 
This table shows the number of new listings from emerging and developed 
markets over the period 1990-1994. 
London NASDAQb New York 
Emerging 75 56 
market firmst 
Developed 43 30 66 
market firms 
aSource: London Stock Exchange Quarterly (1984-1994), NASDAQ, and New York Stock 
Exchange. 
bThe number of new listings includes only companies that listed ADRs. 
`Included are firms from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Korea, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, and Venezuela. 
Table 2.5. provides the most recent evidence of trends in the area of international 
listings and highlights again the significance of international listing. Although the 
London Stock Exchange provides detailed comparative data only for 1995, other 
sources indicate that this trend (see Table 2.3. ) could also be observed in the 
previous years. The main implications, however, are very similar as discussed 
previously. Although London lists 38 new companies raising £6.18bn, which exceeds 
the money raised by UK companies (£2.76bn), foreign companies raised more 
capital in the US. A comparison with the amount raised by US firms on NYSE 
(£19.49bn) and NASDAQ (£10.76bn) confirms the importance of global public 
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offerings, since foreign firms raised £41.65bn on NYSE and £16.10bn on NASDAQ. 
This shows that the new issue market for foreign firms has even become more 
significant than the US domestic market. The fact that US institutional investors have 
substantially increased their holdings in foreign equities over the last few years 
explains to some degree the large amounts raised in the US by foreign companies. 
Table 2.5. 
Comparison of foreign and domestic equity raising activity on the London 
Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the New York Stock Exchange in 1995a 
This table shows the number of newly listed domestic and foreign companies and the 
aggregated amount of equity capital raised by them in 1995. 
Number of new companies Total equity capital raised 
(£bn) 
Stock Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic 
Exchange 
London 38 190 6.18 2.76 
NASDAQ 63 413 16.10 10.76 
New York 35 140 41.65 19.49 
aSource: London Stock Exchange, Quality of Markets department Fact Service. 
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3. Chapter: Structure of the international equities market 
The structure of the market in international equities has been subject to significant 
changes in recent years. Several factors have contributed to the changes and a clear 
structure has not yet emerged. The development has mainly been influenced by the 
relaxation of regulatory barriers and technological innovation since the mid-1980s. 
The change was spurred by the emergence of faster communication systems which 
linked the then fragmented domestic markets and have created an almost global 
secondary market. The pace of change has been less rapid in transforming the 
primary market which is still more impeded by legal regulations. Nevertheless, the 
strong increase in international equity offerings, as documented above, has been 
fuelled by the wave of privatisations all over the world and a re-discovery of so called 
"emerging markets". 
The structure of the international equities market is still determined by differing legal 
regulations across markets. In the following the US approach will be compared with 
the UK approach for regulating foreign securities. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the current state of the primary and secondary trading markets in 
foreign companies in the US and the UK. 
3.1 Free market vs. regulatory approach 
The approaches towards regulating activities in foreign securities differ substantially 
between the two major markets for foreign equities, the US and the UK. 
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The basic structure of securities regulation in the US is set by the Securities Act of 
1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities Act of 1934 (1934 Act). The main principle of the 
US approach is the requirement for all foreign companies seeking to make use of the 
US capital market to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
The registration requirement contrasts with the UK regulatory environment as set out 
in the Financial Services Act of 1986 (FSA) which generally permits trading and 
marketing of listed and unlisted foreign securities. The FSA is based on the principle 
of mutual recognition derived from the EC legislative framework for securities 
markets operations. The principle of mutual recognition acknowledges the validity of 
other countries' laws, regulations, and standards as long as certain minimum 
standards are met. In the case of unlisted foreign securities, the FSA takes into 
account the company's compliance with the regulations on its place of primary listing, 
usually the company's domestic stock exchange. 
The liberal UK approach is in stark contrast with US securities regulations which do 
not permit trading and marketing of unregistered securities. This has implications for 
US investors and foreign companies. While US investors are forced to buy foreign 
stocks abroad, foreign companies cannot access the US capital market unless they 
register with the SEC. But a SEC registration, which is a prerequisite for a listing on 
an US exchange, requires foreign companies to disclose the same detailed 
information as to be provided by US companies. Breeden (1994) argues that national 
treatment in the issue of regulating securities is the only way to maintain a high 
safety for US investors. The SEC's main argument against relaxing the regulations 
for foreign companies is that foreign companies would gain an advantage in raising 
capital compared to their US competitors. 
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Breeden (1994) also points out that lowering quality standards for information 
disclosure is only a policy in search for higher short term profits. The waiving of rules 
may induce more foreign companies to list their stock in the short term but harm the 
quality of the US capital market in the long run because a listing on an US exchange 
is seen as a high quality product. Thus, the insistence on stringent rules is more 
beneficial in the long run as more companies will eventually be willing to comply with 
the US regulations because the benefits are bigger. 
Furthermore, the SEC believes that high standards of transparency in financial 
reporting enhance market efficiency15. Especially, the standard of financial 
statements presents a major problem for foreign companies which are subject to 
different accounting principles in their home countries. 
3.1.1 UK regulatory framework 
The Securities and Investment Board (SIB) which has the responsibility for 
implementing and supervising the provisions of the Financial Services Act can 
delegate power to develop rules to other organisations. The London Stock Exchange 
has been assigned two functions which shaped the structure of the London market in 
foreign equities. 
Under Section 142 of the FSA (Financial Services Act 1986) the London Stock 
Exchange is the competent authority16 for issuing and maintaining listing rules. 
However, it has also been given the function as a provider of a marketplace as an 
Recognised Investment Exchange (RIE) by the SIB. Therefore, it is responsible to 
15 See also Breeden (1994), p. 88. 
16 See Atkinson (1992). 
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provide a proper and orderly market for investors. In its second function, the Stock 
Exchange is authorised to set up and alter its own rules as long as it satisfies the SIB 
that its rules and procedures promote the proper conduct of business, ensure the 
optimum price transparency, and develop liquidity in the market. This second 
function has especially influenced the market in unlisted foreign securities. 
3.1.1.1 Admission to Stock Exchange Official List ("Listing") 
Foreign companies that seek to obtain a listing on the London Stock Exchange have 
to provide a prospectus, known as listing particulars, and have to comply with the 
continuing obligations relating to foreign companies. The requirements for foreign 
companies have mainly been influenced by the EC Directives concerning listing 
standards throughout the community. 
Impact of EC Directives on listing rules 
Until 1984 the relationship between the Stock Exchange and companies applying for 
listing was a matter of private law. In 1985, however, more statutory listing rules 
were implemented by directly incorporating the three EC Directives (Admission to 
Listing Directive, Listing Particulars Directive and, Interim Reports Directive) into UK 
law. The three EC Directives were originally intended to produce standard listing 
requirements throughout Europe. The admission to one Member State exchange 
would have entitled a company to have the same securities listed on any other 
Member State exchange. However, this intention was abandoned and the directives 
were seen as a means of harmonising the minimum requirements for listing. The 
authorities of the Member States were left free to impose more stringent or additional 
requirements. In 1990, the Mutual Recognition of Listing Particulars Directive came 
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into effect in EC member states and was implemented in the UK in 1991. It states 
that listing particulars which have been approved in one member state must be 
recognised in another member state, only subject to some qualifications. 
Listing particulars 
Offers to the public of securities normally require a formally registered document 
containing information on the company. The regulations concerning listing particulars 
for overseas companies are directly derived from the EC Listing Particulars Directive, 
as described above. 
While European companies can qualify for the EC Mutual Recognition Provisions, 
other overseas companies have to produce listing particulars as required from UK 
companies. However, the stock exchange takes account of companies' reporting and 
filing obligations in their country of primary listing. Therefore, the exchange may 
authorise the omission of certain information if the company is listed on an overseas 
exchange of internationally accepted standard. 
The latest amendment of the EC Directive proposes to grant partial or complete 
exemption from the obligation to publish listing particulars for companies admitted to 
official stock exchange listing in another member state. These provisions are aimed 
at companies of high quality and international standing, of which information is widely 
circulated and available. The member exchanges are allowed to establish certain 
minimum quantitative criteria for companies but are also encouraged to grant similar 
treatment to smaller companies. 
Continuing obligations 
The provisions for continuing obligations relate to companies which have a primary 
listing on another recognised exchange. Companies must immediately release 
45 
material information which might affect the price and the market activity of the 
securities. The London Stock Exchange must be notified at the same time as the 
information is made available to the company's domestic exchange. Annual reports 
including financial statements must be sent to all UK shareholders within six months 
of the end of the financial year. The required standard of the financial information to 
be provided will be discussed below. 
3.1.1.2 Unlisted securities 
The term "unlisted securities" applies to all securities not admitted to the Official List 
of the Stock Exchange. Therefore, it also includes shares of international companies 
listed on a foreign stock exchange but not in London. 
But the Financial Services Act 1986 introduces the concept of an approved 
exchange which is subsequently applied to security offerings and trading in foreign 
securities. Under Section 40 of the FSA, a foreign stock exchange can obtain a 
Designated Investment Exchange (DIE) status from the SIB. The DIE status 
indicates that securities listed on such an exchange are suitable for marketing to UK 
investors. The rules for DIEs correspond to the requirements of the SIB for 
Recognised Stock Exchanges (RIE) as stated in Schedule 4 of the Act. 
Securities cannot be advertised unless a prospectus containing information about the 
securities has been delivered. The content and the form of such a prospectus are 
similar to the requirements of the listing particulars. A prospectus is required for 
primary and for secondary offers. However, a prospectus is not required for a 
secondary offer if a prospectus has been delivered for the same securities within the 
previous six months. The duty to prepare a prospectus derives from the fact whether 
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an advertisement is made for the offered securities. The term "advertisement" is 
broadly defined and covers circulars and announcements in all forms of advertising 
media. It also covers information shown on Reuters and other electronic screens. 
Several exemptions exist, in particular, where the advertisement is only directed to 
qualified business investors or firms authorised under the FSA. This means that 
private placements to selected business investors are completely unregulated. 
However, this does not apply for private offers to high net worth individuals. 
Securities with DIE status 
The prospectus rules are relaxed for companies listed on an approved exchange 
because companies only have to provide information as required by the approved 
exchange. Hence, the prospectus of a foreign company that is listed on a DIE must 
only comply with the domestic law of the issuing company. This allows foreign 
securities that are listed on an approved exchange to be quoted on SEAQ 
International without any specific UK documentation. An issuer can be exempt from 
having to prepare a prospectus if a similar document has been produced within the 
ast 12 months and no significant changes have occurred since. 
Securities without DIE status 
Companies listed on a foreign stock exchange without DIE status have to comply 
with the full prospectus requirements as described above. They may have to produce 
two sets of documents satisfying their domestic and the UK requirements as no 
relaxation is granted to them. The provisions, however, are flexible enough to allow 
varying requirements according to the offer. 
To cater for the increased demand in "emerging markets' " equities, the London 
Stock Exchange launched a "Developing Markets Sector" in September 1992 " 
17 See Davis (1994). 
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Securities, which would otherwise not be eligible, are approved on an individual basis 
by the London Stock Exchange. The companies have to satisfy three provisions: 
Firstly, they must have a primary listing on a member or corresponding member 
stock exchange of the FIBV18. Secondly, two market makers must be willing to quote 
prices for a minimum period of three months. Thirdly, one member firm of the 
exchange must act as a contact between the London Stock Exchange and the 
issuing company. The member firm must also certify that the company has effective 
arrangements for the timely disclosure of company news. 
Rules for depositary receipts 
In August 1994, the London Stock Exchange published new rules to promote the 
listing of depositary receipts. They form an extension of the policy adopted by the 
London Stock Exchange. Listed depositary receipts are automatically eligible for 
SEAQ International if at least two market makers are willing to make quotes. The 
rules take account of the fact that the market is dominated by sophisticated 
institutional investors. The issuing firm has to appoint a listing agent who must be 
authorised by UK or European regulations to participate in securities issues. The 
listing agent forms the link between the exchange and the company. The financial 
information to be provided, however, does neither need to be prepared in 
accordance with international accounting standards nor to be consolidated. 
18 Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs 
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3.1.2 Regulation of foreign securities in the US 
The US securities regulations are designed to protect US investors by forcing 
companies, whose securities are offered publicly or traded in the securities markets, 
to disclose material facts. This so called "full disclosure" approach is administered by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an independent regulatory agency 
of the federal government. The basic structure of securities regulation is set by the 
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 
The 1933 Act regulates the distribution of securities and requires all securities to be 
offered or sold to register with the SEC. The 1934 Act regulates the secondary 
market. All securities which are traded on a national exchange or NASDAQ or are 
otherwise widely held in the US must register under the 1934 Act. The same 
principles of registration apply to securities issued as American Depositary Receipts 
(ADRs). The majority of foreign securities listed on an US exchange is in the form of 
ADRs since they facilitate to convert bearer shares into registered shares which is 
the typical form of holding shares in the US. However, to enable institutional 
investors to take part in private placements of foreign issues, the SEC amended its 
regulations and created a possibility for specially qualified investors to invest in 
unregistered foreign securities. 
3.1.2.1 SEC registration of securities 
In 1982, the SEC integrated the disclosure requirements under both acts because 
the information to be disclosed by foreign companies is almost identical. Therefore, it 
is possible to use information filed under the 1934 Act for the requirements under the 
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1933 Act because both acts refer to the same substantive requirements as set out in 
Regulation S-K19 and Regulation S-X20. This integrated system leads to efficiencies21 
for companies having been in the system for some time and seeking to raise capital. 
Regulation of Public Offerings: 1933 Act 
The registration under the 1933 Act is accomplished by filing a registration 
statement, which is then declared effective by the SEC. These registration 
statements are called F-Forms and prescribe the form and the content of the 
information to be provided by a foreign issuer on an item by item basis. The required 
information is much more comprehensive than in other countries and home country 
documentation cannot be used. In general, the registration statement consists of two 
parts, the prospectus and other technical information. 
The main problem for foreign issuers arises from the requirement to produce a 
prospectus according to US standards. While the London Stock Exchange is willing 
to accept listing particulars produced under a different legislative regime, subject to 
certain qualifications, the SEC regulations are more stringent. They effectively 
require foreign companies to produce a separate prospectus with even further- 
reaching consequences. Companies that intend to conduct a public offering must 
fully reconcile their financial statements to US GAAP. A full reconciliation includes full 
segment reporting, pension data, and various supplemental information as to be 
provided in US financial statements. In particular, segment reporting may be onerous 
for foreign companies since it may involve information not previously disclosed. The 
19 Regulation S-K defines the form and content of the non-financial information which must be included in the 
registration statement. 
20 Regulation S-X defines the form and content of the financial statements to be provided by companies and may be 
of special relevance for a foreign company. 
2' As companies have to provide detailed information with their listing and on a half-yearly basis, this information can 
be used for a public offering at a later date. 
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implications for companies to provide reconciled financial statements will be 
discussed below. 
Regulation of Securities Trading: 1934 Act 
In principal, all companies whose equity securities are widely held within the US have 
to register with the SEC under the 1934 Act. This is, however, unreasonable for a 
foreign company with only a limited presence in the US securities markets. Thus, 
Rule 12g3-2(a) of the 1934 Act provides an exemption for foreign companies if they 
have less than 300 shareholders resident in the US, and do not have in effect a 
sponsored or unsponsored ADR programme. 
Rule 12g3-2(b) exempts companies with more than 300 US shareholders. This 
exemption applies to companies with a sponsored or unsponsored ADR programme 
but without a listing or quotation on an US exchange, if they supply the SEC with 
some information. These information should include copies of all documents that the 
company is required to publish in its home country, to file with a stock exchange, or 
to distribute to its shareholders. These documents must be accompanied by a brief 
English language summary. 
These exemptions do not apply to companies whose shares are listed on an US 
stock exchange or quoted on NASDAQ. Trading of listed or quoted securities is only 
permitted if they are registered under the 1934 Act. Foreign companies registering 
under the 1934 Act have to use Form 20-F. Form 20-F has a dual function for foreign 
companies because it serves as an initial registration statement for companies 
seeking a listing and as an annual reporting form which must be filed each year. 
Concerning the form and the content of the information to be filed under the 1934 
Act, the same principles apply as discussed under the 1933 Act. 
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3.1.2.2 Rules for unregistered foreign securities 
In 1990, the SEC amended the regulations for issuance and trading of securities 
which are not registered with the SEC. Under Rule 144A22 the holders are now 
allowed to resell privately placed securities to other QIBs (Qualified Institutional 
Buyers). A QIB is defined as an investor acting on his own account and having 
assets invested in securities of more than $100 million. Banks, savings and loan 
associations, and broker-dealers can also qualify as QIBs. The seller must ensure 
that the buyer of the securities has QIB status. 
Although these securities do not have to be registered with the SEC, foreign 
companies still have to comply with some conditions concerning the provision of 
information. The issuer must provide a very brief statement of the nature of its 
business, products, and services. It should also provide audited financial statements 
for the past two years but a reconciliation to US GAAP is not required. 
The Rule 144A market has been used for the sale of tranches of Euro or global 
equity offerings from multinational companies since hardly any additional 
documentation is required. Foreign issuers using the 144 A market are protected by 
Regulation S, which introduces a "safe harbour rule" (securities are not subject to 
SEC registration), if they comply with the following provisions: The issuing company 
must not make any direct selling efforts in the US and the sale or the resale must be 
an offshore transaction on a designated offshore exchange. From a technical pint of 
view this rule now allows to underwrite public placements and to resell the issue to 
qualified institutional buyers or to the home market. The resale was not possible 
22 See Jensen (1994). 
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under the private placement rules before 1990 since securities had to be held for a 
specified period of time. 
Trading in 144 A securities takes place on the PORTAL23 system which has been 
established by the NASD for trading unregistered securities. However, those foreign 
issues may have a limited liability since they trade over-the-counter (OTC) Electronic 
Bulletin Board market which has no volume reporting of real-time quotes. 
3.1.3 Standard of financial statements 
The standard of financial information to be provided by foreign companies presents 
one major regulatory barrier still dividing financial markets. The differences are due 
to varying generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) across countries. Two 
distinct regulatory approaches regarding the appropriate standard of financial 
information, that is requested from a foreign company, can be observed in the 
international area. 
One approach is pursued by the SEC which generally requires foreign companies to 
comply with US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). This means that a 
foreign issuer whose financial statements have been prepared according to non-US 
accounting principles must quantitatively reconcile its financial statement in all 
important particulars to US GAAP. This forces a foreign issuer to produce two sets of 
financial figures. 
23 The PORTAL (Private Offerings, Resales and Trading through Automated Linkages) system is a screen-based 
marketplace for secondary trading of unregistered securities, which are exempt from the registration requirements of 
the Securities Act pursuant to Rule 144A. 
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The second approach is based on acceptance of home-country accounting 
principles. This policy is pursued by the London Stock Exchange which accepts 
international accounting standards or specific national accounting standards. 
National accounting standards are accepted if the London Stock Exchange is 
satisfied that the accounts have been prepared and independently audited to a 
standard appropriate for a company of international standing and repute. Companies 
that are listed on another approved overseas stock exchange (or DIE exchange, see 
3.1.1.2) are exempted from the requirement to provide an independent accountants' 
report. 
The following part discusses the implications of the requirement of a quantitative 
reconciliation to US GAAP. The NYSE listing of Daimler Benz provides an 
opportunity to highlight the relevant issues and to discuss the problems from the 
perspective of a company. The second point introduces potential avenues of 
compromise to accept foreign listing standards under certain conditions, and 
discusses its implications in the light of market efficiency. 
3.1.3.1 A case of "full" reconciliation to US GAAP: Daimler Benz24 
The NYSE listing of Daimler Benz presents the most prominent case to date, and its 
implications have been widely discussed in the international financial press and 
academic literature. For example, Harris (1993) compares the financial statement of 
Daimler Benz under US GAAP and German GAAP. Radebaugh, Gebhardt, and 
Gray (1995) provide a full case study of Daimler's listing. Their study comprises an 
examination of the process of listing on NYSE, the major factors of Daimler's 
24 Daimler Benz is a German industrial conglomerate that listed their shares in form of ADRs on the NYSE in 
October 1993. 
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decision, key differences between US and German GAAP, and the impact of US 
GAAP on Daimler's reported earnings and shareholders' equity. 
The rules for a foreign company concerning the standard of the financial statements 
are virtually the same as for an US company. However, there are some concessions 
for companies whose financial statements have been prepared according to a 
comprehensive body of accounting principles in their home country. Their financial 
statements must be accompanied by a reconciliation to US GAAP. This requires that 
for each income statement net income must be reconciled to US GAAP and each 
material variation must be shown as a separate reconciling item. Material variations 
for balance sheet items must also be described and are usually shown as a 
reconciliation to US GAAP shareholders' equity. Form 20-F gives foreign companies 
an option concerning the reconciliation of net income and shareholders' equity to US 
GAAP. 
In general, full and partial reconciliation of financial statements can be distinguished. 
However, this option does not exist for companies that conduct a public offering. 
They have to fully reconcile their financial statements to US GAAP. The implications 
of a full reconciliation to US GAAP for US investors are discussed by Harris (1993). 
Radebaugh, Gebhardt, and Gray (1995) show that the US GAAP income and the 
German GAAP income for Daimler Benz varied significantly. While the US GAAP 
income was lower in 1992 and 1993, it was higher in 1991. Another numeric example 
highlights the problems: for the first half of 1993 Daimler Benz reported an after-tax 
profit of DM 168m under German accounting rules but according to US GAAP this 
turned into a loss of DM949m. Harris (1993) identifies some key differences between 
US and German GAAP: the accrual of all possible contingencies and business risks, 
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accounting for goodwill, pensions, revenue recognition for long-term contracts, 
foreign currency transactions and translation, and deferred taxation. 
However, these differences between individual accounting items can only be 
understood by considering the background and purpose of the financial reporting 
systems in both countries. Harris (1993) remarks that US financial reporting is 
geared towards providing shareholders with information about the financial position 
and activity of the firm. German companies, however, have traditionally used other 
sources of capital than equity markets, with banks and employees as the major 
suppliers of capital. Moreover, big German banks still hold major stakes in industrial 
companies25. The overriding objective of the financial reporting system is to preserve 
the capital of the firm, and there also is a tradition of conformity between financial 
and tax reporting. Thus, German companies generally try to minimise distributable 
earnings and to build up hidden reserves. Very often this policy coincides with the 
interests of the major shareholders since the banks are also the main providers of 
debt financing, and hence are interested in capital maintenance. 
3.1.3.2 Compromises of listing standards 
The issue of listing standards has generated an intensive debate among practitioners 
and academics alike. In the US, the discussion has focused on the question whether 
it is necessary to maintain the stringent regulations of the SEC, which claim to 
protect retail investors. Critics, however, have argued that this policy harms 
investors' interests and the pre-eminence of the US securities markets. 
25 Deutsche Bank used the US listing of Daimler Benz to reduce its stake of 28% to 24%. This was achieved via a 
secondary offering of Daimler Benz shares in the US market. 
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Cochrane (1994) argues that retail investors are not protected by the SEC policy 
since they can only invest in world-class foreign companies via the over-the-counter 
electronic bulletin where no financial information is provided to investors. On the 
other hand institutional investors are driven offshore which threatens the 
competitiveness of the US capital market. The main argument for waiving the need 
of a quantitative reconciliation is that the information about world-class issuers 
publicly available in their home countries is adequate to ensure efficient pricing and 
is fully impounded in their market price. Therefore, additional filings have no material 
impact on the price. 
It is argued26 that a quantitative reconciliation can convey an illusion of comparability 
which, in fact, does not exist. The diversity in GAAP is only one factor that differs 
across borders. A particular GAAP can only be understood in the context of other 
factors as tax policy, fiscal policy, regulatory objectives, managerial objectives, 
performance incentives, and other cultural aspects of the issuer's home country 
environment. To overcome these problems, three potential avenues of compromise 
have been discussed between experts of the SEC and the NYSE. 
The first proposal establishes quantitative criteria to distinguish "world class" foreign 
companies. The criteria comprise three tests: (1) The market capitalisation should be 
at least $1 bn. (2) The "investor following test" would require a listing on the London 
Stock Exchange or the Tokyo Stock Exchange in addition to its domestic listing. This 
test was designed to ensure wide market following beyond the home market and a 
wide dissemination of market information. (3) The "absence of US presence test" 
should show the absence of any large US investor following to alleviate any concern 
of unfairness to US companies. These "world class" companies would be allowed to 
26 Longstreth (1992) quotes an unpublished study by Lessard. 
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file independently-audited home-country financial statements and a written 
explanation of material differences between home-country accounting principles and 
US GAAP instead of a quantitative reconciliation to US GAAP. Breeden27 (1994) 
strongly opposes this proposal of the New York Stock Exchange and considers the 
pressure campaign for it as a mistake. 
The second proposal considers the establishment of a separate market segment 
limited to qualified investors. Foreign companies could get a separate US listing with 
non-US financial disclosure but without access to retail investors. 
The third proposal specifically focuses on accounting changes and develops four 
different paths. The first simply states that all foreign companies will change to US 
GAAP in the future and, hence, no change is needed. The second path proposes a 
relaxation of standards on a case-by-case basis on the ground of being "equivalent 
to" US GAAP. The third path is the mutual recognition of national accounting and 
disclosure statements based upon a certain minimum standard. At present only 
Canada and the US pursue the principle of mutual recognition since their accounting 
standards are very similar. The fourth path would be the recognition of the principles 
produced by the International Accounting Standards Committee ("IASC"). Although 
the SEC agreed in 1994 to accept cashflow statements drawn up in accordance with 
IASC rules28, further concessions seem to be unlikely. Mr Levitt, the chairman of the 
SEC, is quoted29: "I am committed to international standards but make no mistake 
about it: any nation that is expecting a sudden change to less demanding standards 
is making an error, because that will not be the case". 
27 Breeden is former chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
28The decision to allow foreign companies to present cashflow statements prepared in accordance with International 
Accounting Standard Number 7, rather than US standards was seen by the SEC as a "landmark step" (see also FT 
21 April 1994). 
29See Financial Times Survey, Accessing the US capital markets, 1 February 1996, p. 34. 
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3.1.4 Summary of differences between US and UK 
The major regulatory differences between the US and UK can be summarised as 
follows. Since UK regulation is based on the principle of mutual recognition, foreign 
companies can make full use of the UK capital market without specifically complying 
with UK law. In particular, the treatment of "unlisted foreign securities" is very flexible 
and tailored towards the needs of institutional market participants. This approach 
differs substantially from US regulations which are based on national treatment for 
foreign issuers. The compliance with US GAAP represents a particular hurdle for 
foreign companies to obtain a full listing on NYSE or NASDAQ. Although a 
discussion has started questioning the suitability of the regulations imposed by the 
SEC, significant changes still seem to be some time off. 
3.2 Primary markets 
Capital raising activity has increasingly become international in previous years. Many 
issues have included international tranches which took account of the increased 
interest of international investors to invest in foreign securities. Moreover, investment 
bankers have argued that global offerings improve the marketability of the offered 
shares leading to higher issuing prices. 
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3.2.1 Public offering or private placement 
The issuer has to decide whether it accesses the foreign market with a public 
offering or a private placement. A public offering in the US market requires the 
issuing company to obtain a listing on an US stock exchange. While this implies that 
companies must comply with specific regulations of the targeted market30, the 
requirements for private placements are less onerous. However, the benefits for 
companies making a public offering could exceed those for private placements 
because the company's profile is raised and its liquidity is increased. 
The decision between a private placement and a public offering in the US also has 
cost implications. Although precise estimates of the cost of raising equity depend on 
company specific factors, we provide some comparative figures for the gross 
underwriting spread and other direct expenses which make up the two components 
of the total direct cost of raising capital31. Other direct expenses include registration 
fees and printing, legal, and auditing costs and can be anywhere between 
US$500,000 to US$1 million for a public offering, because the registration process 
with the SEC involves high legal and accounting costs (Velli, 1994). Listing on the 
NYSE involves an initial fee of US$100,000 and an annual fee based on the number 
of shares listed. But the maximum annual fee to be paid by a company is limited to 
US$500,000. The cost for a private placement under Rule 144A is lower and runs 
between US$250,000 to US$500,000 for accounting and legal fees. In order to 
obtain some comparative estimates for gross underwriting spreads, we carried out 
some limited investigations using data of 37 public offerings and 20 private 
placements. Our results indicate that the gross underwriting spread for private 
30 As described above, companies making a public offering in the US have to register with the SEC under the 1934 
Act. 
3'For more details concerning the components of the costs of raising capital see Lee, Lochhead, and Ritter (1995) 
who examine this issue for US corporations raising capital in the domestic markets. 
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placements is 4.10% while the equivalent average spread for public offerings is 
4.62%. 
An additional factor to be considered in the choice of the method for an international 
offering is the time required to conduct a public offering or a private placement. This 
time constraint can become a very important cost factor if the market conditions for 
issuing equity deteriorate, possibly leading to higher indirect costs of raising capital. 
The time required differs markedly between the methods: it takes between 6 to 8 
months to conduct a public offerings but only 2 months to conduct a private 
placement. 
3.2.2 Issuing technique for global offerings: book building 
While in the UK new shares have traditionally been offered to the public at a fixed 
price, which is determined before the marketing period, international equity offerings 
have mainly been sold by "book-building". Stonham (1993) describes the book 
building technique for the Wellcome share offering which took place in 1992. Book 
building is based on the principle of setting the offer price according to the demand of 
the market. This information is collected from investors during an offer period where 
they can indicate the size and the price of their bids. The share price and the offer 
size are fixed at the end of this period. Stonham (1993) describes a number of 
advantages: (1) Price and offering size can be matched more accurately with 
demand; (2) Valuable information on the demand and the quality of each investor is 
obtained; (3) Price tension is created like in an auction; and (4) Pressure on the price 
in the after-market is reduced. 
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To control excess demand more effectively, a mechanism called overallotment 
option (or Greenshoe option) is used. Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1995) 
describe the common practice of investment banks which typically presell 115 
percent of the offering, and then stand ready to buy back the incremental 15 percent 
if demand is weak when some of the buyers immediately sell their shares. The 
advantage of such an option is that it can be used to satisfy excess demand in a 
rising market, or to reduce speculative demand in the market by buying back shares. 
3.3 Secondary trading markets 
The structure of the market in international equity trading has undergone dramatic 
changes since the mid 1980s and is still evolving. Fuelled by deregulation of capital 
markets around the world, privatisation, and technological innovation, recent years 
have seen a tremendous increase in cross-exchange trading32. The discussion of 
factors that influenced the development of foreign equity trading in London and the 
US is followed by highlighting the features of different trading systems. The last point 
discusses some statistical problems which inhibit the comparison of trading volume, 
and hence a benchmark of the "success" of stock exchanges in attracting trading in 
foreign equities. 
32 Howell and Cozzini (1991) distinguish cross-exchange trading and cross-border trading. Cross-exchange trading 
takes place when foreign securities are traded on a domestic exchange. Cross-border trading is when foreigners 
trade in domestic securities. 
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3.3.1 Development of international equities trading 
Table 3.1. gives an indication concerning the growth in trading foreign equities on the 
London Stock Exchange and in ADRs on US exchanges. The figures, however, need 
to be treated with care since differences in trade reporting do not allow 
straightforward intermarket comparisons of trading volume data (for a discussion, 
see 3.3.2). 
Table 3.1. 
Trading activity in foreign equities (London Stock Exchange) and in ADRs (NASDAQ and NYSE combined)a from 1991-1995. 
This table shows the trading volume by value from 1991-1995 for foreign equities 
on the London Stock Exchange and the combined volume in ADRs on NYSE and 
NASDAQ. 
Trading volume (£bn) Trading volume (US$bn) 
Year London ADRs on US exchanges 
1991 142 80 
1992 165 125 
1993 290 200 
1994 359 250 
1995 395 270 
aSource: London Stock Exchange, Quality of Markets department Fact Service, and FT Survey (1 
February 1996). 
According to Table 3.1., trading volume in London and in the US has increased 
substantially in the last five years. The trend appears to be similar for London, where 
the volume increased from £142bn in 1991 to £395bn in 1995, and for ADRs which 
increased from US$80bn in 1991 to US$270bn in 1995. Since the volume figures for 
London also include the turnover of foreign "unlisted securities" (see above), which 
are traded on SEAQ International33, London appears to handle a far higher trading 
volume than the US exchanges. Nevertheless, trading in foreign equities is a very 
33 The Economist (23 July 1994) writes that the trading volume as reported for SEAQ International may be vastly 
overstated. 
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important issue. Table 3.2. compares the size of the trading activity in foreign and in 
domestic shares on the London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and NYSE. In contrast 
to the US exchanges, the market in foreign equities in London exceeds the trading 
activity in UK stocks. 
Table 3.2. 
Foreign and domestic trading activity on the London Stock Exchange, 
NASDAQ, and the New York Stock Exchange in 1995a. 
This table shows the trading volume by value in 1995 for domestic and foreign 
companies. 
Trading volume (£bn) 
Stock Exchange Foreign Domestic 
London 395.39 323.17 
NASDAQ 65.18 1436.20 
New York 168.48 1817.29 
aSource: London Stock Exchange, Quality of Markets department Fact Service. 
The position of London as a place for trading foreign equities had been a 
continuation of the process which started during the late 1960's with the 
development of the eurodollar business. This enabled London to build up an 
infrastructure as an international capital market and attracted many foreign 
commercial banks, investment banks, and securities houses to come to London. At a 
time when many (European) domestic securities markets were inefficient or 
regulated, while the London Stock Exchange permitted trading in "unlisted securities" 
(as described above), SEAQ International the screen-based trading system for 
foreign equities was launched one year prior to Big Bang. According to figures of 
Worthington (1991), in the late 80's and beginning of 90's London had become the 
biggest foreign equity market in the world. It attracted a high percentage of home 
country domestic turnover of mainly European equity markets. In 1990, turnover on 
London's foreign equity market relative to the home exchange(s) averaged 54% for 
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Swedish shares, 51 % for Dutch shares, 26% for French shares, around 20% for 
Italian and Spanish shares, 29% for permanently traded Swiss shares, and 12% for 
German shares. Trading in individual stocks on SEAQ International often exceeded 
trading on the home exchange34. However, this trend has been reversed since many 
European markets overhauled their trading systems and managed to win back 
market share in their own domestic equities. 
The development of NYSE and NASDAQ as a trading centre for international 
equities is a more recent one. Although in 1978 approximately 390 companies had 
ADRs in the US, most of them were unsponsored (see Nanda, Owers, and Feng 
(1996)) and traded OTC. The growth in trading activity only started in the early 90's 
when demand for foreign equities increased, and companies subsequently decided 
to list their stock on a regulated exchange as NYSE or NASDAQ. 
3.3.2 Trading systems 
Technological progress has substantially contributed to the growth in international 
equity trading since the mid-1980s. The emergence of different trading systems has 
altered the market configuration and has given investors a choice to trade the same 
stock on alternative systems. The acknowledgement of liquidity as an important 
feature of financial assets has shifted the attention to the issue whether some trading 
systems provide better liquidity services than others. 
In general, trading systems are assessed by comparing their liquidity, transparency, 
and immediacy. A market is said to be more liquid than another if it achieves a better 
34 However, as discussed previously the comparison of trading figures 
had always been difficult, and a point of 
contention between exchanges. 
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price for a given size of trade, or a larger trade for a given price. Immediacy indicates 
the need to execute a trade within a given time period. Transparency is defined as 
the degree to which the current order flow is visible to the competing market 
professionals involved in setting prices35. A market can have delayed or immediate 
trade reporting, and the order flow can be reported on an individual or an aggregate 
basis. 
Generally, three alternative trading systems can be distinguished: a batch auction, a 
continuos auction, and a dealer market36. In a batch auction, orders are accumulated 
and transacted in batches when the stocks are called. All trades are executed at a 
common market clearing price. A batch auction is suitable for inactive securities 
because it minimises transaction and settlement costs37. Traditionally, batch auction 
systems have dominated as price-setting mechanisms and are still used in many 
markets for trading stocks of smaller companies. Examples are the daily batch 
auctions in Paris, New York, Tokyo, Milan and Madrid. 
However, actively traded securities require a continuos market which allows for 
immediate transactions and continuos price information throughout operating hours. 
In an electronic continuos auction, agents submit orders to a centralised system 
displaying investors' limit orders. Incoming market orders are automatically executed 
against the best limit orders. Transaction price and quantity are displayed on the 
screen. 
In a dealer market, designated market makers quote two-way prices at which they 
are willing to buy or sell. Trading takes place when a counterparty accepts the quote 
of the market maker. There are two major differences between a dealer (or quote- 
35 See Pagano and Roell (1996). 
36 See Pagano and Roell (1992). 
37 See Huang and Stoll (1992) 
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driven) market and an auction (or order-driven) market. In auction markets, public 
trade orders are directly matched against one another whereas the execution of 
orders in dealer markets always involves at least one market maker. Dealers in 
dealer markets do not know the price, size, and direction of orders executed by other 
dealers until these are reported to a central authority and displayed. 
In recent years, a great amount of research has been undertaken to examine the 
differences and the interaction between order-driven and quote-driven systems38 
The understanding of the differences has become an important issue from an 
economic and a regulatory perspective. However, conclusive evidence is not so easy 
to come by as the distinct trading mechanisms prevent a straightforward comparison 
of trading costs, trading volumes, or immediacy. In the following, the trading systems 
used by the London Stock Exchange, the NYSE, and NASDAQ will be described 
briefly. 
London 
SEAQ International is designed as a quote-driven system. Market-makers set bid 
and ask quotes via a screen-based system. Each stock has at least two or more 
designated market-makers which display prices continuously over a prescribed 
period of the day (the "mandatory quote period"). The quoted prices must be valid at 
least for a stated order size ("minimum marketable quantity") which is set by the 
London Stock Exchange for each country sector on SEAQ International. The 
execution of orders is done via the telephone whereby market-makers are obliged to 
execute incoming orders at the displayed prices. SEAQ International allows market- 
makers to change quotes and to report transactions. However, in contrast to SEAQ's 
38 Some results of previous empirical studies examining this issue are discussed in 5.1.1. 
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rules for domestic stocks39, SEAQ International does not require market makers to 
publish price and volume on individual trades. 
NYSE 
Similar to many other markets in the world, the NYSE operates a hybrid system 
which combines an auction and a dealer market40. It opens with an auction or batch 
market, and then switches to a dealer market. It is possible for members of the stock 
exchange to trade directly with each other (as in an auction market). However, they 
can also trade with the specialist who sets a bid-ask spread for the security since he 
acts as a dealer. The members on the NYSE can be categorised into four groups: (1) 
commission-house brokers who primarily handle public orders that originate off the 
exchange; (2) specialists who act as dealers, brokers, and auctioneers; (3) 
independent floor brokers who execute trades for other members and firms; and (4) 
registered competitive traders that primarily trade for their own account. 
In particular, the specialist can assume three roles: auctioneer, dealer, or broker. As 
an auctioneer he sets a fair opening price. As a dealer the specialist buys and sells 
for his own account. In his function as a broker he can commission orders. 
NASDAQ 
NASDAQ is also like SEAQ International a quote-driven system. However, Franks 
and Schaefer (1995) discuss some differences in the transparency between 
NASDAQ and SEAQ. On NASDAQ publication of trades typically occurs within 90 
seconds of the transaction taking place. However, a larger proportion of deals on 
NASDAQ are matched than on SEAQ41. Franks and Schaefer (1995) also examine a 
39 For more details on the price impact of different publication rules, see Gemmill (1996). 
40 See, for example, Lindsey and Schaede (1992) and Madhavan (1992). 
41 In a matched trade, the market maker finds the counterparty to a buy or sell order before the order is completed. 
In an inventoried deal, the market maker meets a 
buy or a sell order by adjusting his inventory. 
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sample of block trades of non-UK securities that trade on SEAQ International and 
NASDAQ. They find that the median share traded is ten times as much on SEAQ 
International than on NASDAQ. 
3.3.3 Statistical problems of trade reporting 
Turnover as measured by value is often used as a proxy for liquidity. Hence, liquidity 
of different markets in foreign equities could be compared by using trading volume. 
However, this approach is flawed as turnover data is influenced by trade reporting 
procedures and trade reporting is not homogenous across markets42. The 
differences in trade reporting across markets are due to the following factors: 
The first factor is that some exchanges allow trading in listed and unlisted securities 
(as the London Stock Exchange) while others do not permit trading in unlisted 
securities (e. g. the US stock exchanges). Therefore, comparing the trading volume in 
foreign equities on the London Stock Exchange with the US exchanges is difficult. 
Secondly, two categories of stock exchanges can be distinguished according to the 
scope of transactions included in their markets. The "Trading System View" markets 
only include transactions that take place on the exchange's trading floor or through 
its trading system. The "Regulated Environment View" markets include all 
transactions that are subject to supervision by the stock exchange authority. This 
means that statistics include all securities business done by regulated members. 
Thus, one and the same transaction could also be reported in another market. 
"Regulated Environment View" markets, e. g. as London, will always report higher 
42 Wells (1994) presents the results of a comparative study of differences in turnover statistics and trade reporting 
across European exchanges which was carried out by the 
"Economics and Statistics Sub-committee of the 
Federation of European Stock Exchanges". 
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trading volumes than "Trading System View" markets. London also has the largest 
number of foreign member firms of any market in the world. 
Thirdly, technical factors may cause differences in the recording of transactions. 
Some stock exchanges count both the sale and the purchase while others only count 
the sale or the purchase. 
3.4 Key issues and its implications for research 
The importance of investment in foreign securities has grown substantially in recent 
years. In particular, US investors have become more interested to diversify their 
portfolios with international equities. The internationalisation of US fund managers' 
portfolios is expected to continue in the years to come. While US funds have 
currently invested approximately 6 percent of their holdings in foreign equities, 
market sources forecast an increase to 20 percent over the next 10 years. On the 
other hand, this should generate sufficient interest from US investors to meet the 
demand of foreign firms for equity capital. A number of factors are expected to 
contribute to the continuing growth in international equity-financing: 
1. Privatisations have not been completed in many countries. For example, the initial 
public offering of German Telekom, which will be one of the biggest ever, will take 
place this November and will be followed by the sale of additional tranches in the 
future. Governments from Eastern Europe are expected to sell off more of their still 
state-owned assets. 
2. A strong increase is also predicted for European companies, in particular from 
countries whose domestic stock market capitalisation still appears to be low in 
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comparison to the size of the economy. Countries like France, Germany, Italy, and 
Spain are currently undergoing fundamental changes in attitude and embracing 
Anglo-Saxon concepts of "shareholder value". In the past, companies from these 
countries were reluctant to provide information to shareholders and banks were their 
major providers of funds. This trend will also be assisted by the special structure of 
firms in these countries, which are still traditional family businesses. To mitigate 
problems of succession, floating the company is increasingly seen as a resolution. 
3. Companies from emerging markets are expected to continue their capital raising 
activities. Strong demand may originate from South-East Asian companies and from 
Latin American companies. 
Taking into account the size and the future potential of the international primary 
market, questions arise concerning the importance of international listing for 
companies to raise equity capital. It also raises the question whether a listing on the 
London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, or on the NYSE gives the greatest access to 
international investors. The listing decision of a firm may also be influenced by the 
trading system of a stock exchange. This issue is of importance since some trading 
systems may offer better liquidity services than others. The choice of firms, however, 
is also influenced by the regulatory approach of each host market. The more 
stringent approach of the SEC in the US, which forces foreign firms to comply with 
US standards, may impose additional costs for foreign firms. To enable more foreign 
firms to obtain a listing on the NYSE, the NYSE has discussed several potential 
avenues of compromise with the SEC. Although the SEC has recently granted some 
concessions, it still appears to be adamant in requiring US treatment for foreign 
firms. However, future concessions for foreign issuers do not seem impossible any 
longer. 
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The battle of stock exchanges in attracting listings of foreign companies has 
intensified in recent years. This trend is likely to continue in the future with even 
some more players entering the competition. There are several projects to set up a 
pan-European market for smaller technology-oriented companies similar to 
NASDAQ. Some European stock exchanges have recently launched special markets 
for smaller companies (for example, AIM in the UK and Le Nouveau Marche in 
France) and others will follow soon (Belgian New Market in 1997 and Frankfurt 
(Germany) Neuer Markt in 1997). Moreover, in order to target foreign institutional 
investors, the "New Markets" of Belgium, France, and Germany plan to link up to 
form the nucleus of a pan-European exchange called "Euro. NM". To make the 
market more attractive for foreign investors, they plan to set up more stringent listing 
requirements than in the main market. For example, a German firm would be 
required to produce quarterly reports in German and English. This "Euro. NM" will be 
competing with EASDAQ (European Association of Securities Dealers), another pan- 
European project. EASDAQ is expected to open trading by late September this year 
and is modelled on NASDAQ. The exchange will be a quote-driven market but will 
also include an in-built periodic order-machting facility. The capital for EASDAQ is 
provided by approximately 40 shareholders which include insurance companies, 
pension funds, and banks. 
The interest of a number of European and US companies in obtaining a listing on 
EASDAQ confirms the trend towards international listings. This trend is likely to be 
motivated by the desire of firms to trade on a liquid market and to have an 
international shareholder base. However, the continuing growth in international 
listings will also raise many new questions whose answer is beyond the scope of this 
thesis: what are appropriate listing standards for smaller start-up firms?; what are 
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appropriate ways to regulate information disclosure across different markets?; how 
do different market structures interact? 
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4. Chapter: The effect of international listing on the cost of 
capital 
The discussion of the current structure of the international equities market has 
suggested that markets are not fully integrated, yet. This may create incentives for 
companies to overcome these barriers, and benefit from a reduction in market 
segmentation. Previous research on international market integration in general, and 
on international listing in particular, has argued that there is a link between 
international integration and the cost of capital of a firm. The review of the literature 
in this chapter is structured as follows. Section one outlines the framework for the 
cost of capital determination, while section two and three review the stream of the 
cross-listing literature which has tried to directly test the proposed implications on 
risk and return. Section four summarises the main implications of previous research. 
4.1 Determinants of the cost of capital 
4.1.1 The CAPM framework 
Since its origins (see, for example, the papers of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965)), the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has been the subject of much elaboration and 
extension. The CAPM states that the expected return on any asset is linearly related 
to its systematic risk (or beta) measured relative to the market portfolio of invested 
wealth. The most general implication of the equilibrium pricing model is that the 
market portfolio is ex-ante mean-variance efficient in the sense of Markowitz (1959). 
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4.1.2 Liquidity 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) examine the role of liquidity for asset pricing. They 
argue that illiquidity can be measured by the cost of immediate execution. Hence, an 
investor faces a trade-off: if he wants to transact he can either wait or trade 
immediately at the current bid or ask price. The spread between the quoted bid 
(purchase) and ask (offer) reflects the magnitude of the transaction costs faced by 
an investor. They examine stock returns, relative risk (ß), and bid-ask spreads of 
NYSE stocks over the period 1961-1980. Their results show that stocks with higher 
expected returns have higher bid-ask spreads and higher relative risk. Moreover, 
there is a clientele effect. This means that investors with longer holding periods 
select assets with higher spreads. They continue their analysis by taking account of 
firm size, however, their results are not altered. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1989) test an extension of the CAPM, as proposed by 
Merton (1987). He suggested that returns are an increasing function of their beta 
risk, residual risk, and size and a decreasing function of the public availability of 
information. The results confirm the A-M hypothesis that risk and illiquidity, as 
measured by the bid-ask spread, are the principal factors. The link between the bid- 
ask spread and Merton's (1987) model is formed by the number of investors which 
reflects the public availability of information about an asset. 
The relevance of the liquidity proposition for international listings is embedded in the 
studies of Amihud and Mendelson (1986,1988,1989) that listing on organised 
exchanges can be viewed as a liquidity-increasing investment. The costs of such an 
investment can be balanced against the added value produced by the higher liquidity 
of its securities. 
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4.1.3 Investor recognition 
Merton (1987) develops a two-period model of capital market equilibrium with 
incomplete information across investors. He adopts most of the standard CAPM- 
assumptions but relaxes the assumption of equal information across investors. Each 
investor only knows about a subset of the available securities and these subsets 
differ across investors. Thus, investors can only invest in securities of which they are 
aware. Merton's behavioural assumptions are based on the fact that investors' 
(individual and institutional) portfolios contain only a fraction of all world-wide traded 
securities. Also other factors such as market segmentation, taxes, transaction costs, 
and liquidity contribute to this observed behaviour. Further assumptions underlying 
the model include the standard frictionless-market conditions43 and risk averse 
investors which select their portfolios according to the Markowitz-Tobin mean- 
variance criterion applied to end-of-period wealth. 
However, the emphasis of this model is on the difference in the breadth of investor 
cognisance44. Hence, this model involves a special type of cost 
- 
the cost of making 
investors aware of the firm. Investors must pay a "set up" cost before they can 
receive information released by the firm45 
Merton's model is consistent with the Arbel-Carvell-Strebel theory46 of "generic or 
neglected" stocks which assumes that equilibrium expected returns on neglected 
43 These are no taxes, no transaction costs, and borrowing and shortselling without restriction. 
44 This model assumes that the quality of information is the same for all securities but the information is distributed 
differently across investors. Other differential-information models (Klein and Bawa (1977) and Barry and Brown 
ý1 9841985)), however, focus on the price effects of differences in the quality of information across investors. 
5 Usually, investors only follow a subset of the traded securities. Therefore, they are not able to receive public 
announcements of the firm unless they have set up a mechanism to receive information. This sources of information 
include stock market advisory services, brokerage houses, and professional portfolio managers. 
46 Arbel, Carvell and Strebel (1983) assume that the quality of information increases with the quantity of investors 
following the stock. 
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stocks are larger than on widely followed stocks because the quality of information is 
relatively low. 
Merton examines the effects of incomplete information on equilibrium asset prices 
and expected returns by aggregating the optimal portfolio choices for individual 
investors47. All investors face a "shadow cost" of not knowing about security k and 
this shadow cost Ok is measured in units of expected return. The equilibrium 
expected return on security k can be written as. 
Rk 
=R+ bkb + Ok 48 (3.1) 
where R is the equilibrium expected return on a security for the complete information 
case, 6 is the coefficient of aggregate risk aversion, and bk the exposure level of the 
common factor. The shadow cost of information Ak can also be written as: 
86 k 
xk 
qk 
(3.2) 
where ßk2 is the firm-specific component of security k's return, Xk is the value of firm 
k relative to the aggregate market value of traded securities, and qk is the size of firm 
k's investor base relative to the total number of investors. Equation (3.2) shows that 
the shadow cost of information decreases when the investor base increases. 
Merton uses comparative statics to further analyse cross-sectional differences 
among expected returns. Equations (3.1) and (3.2) show that four parameters cause 
differences in equilibrium expected returns: bk the exposure level of the common 
factor; Xk the relative size of the firm; 0k2 the firm-specific component of the firm's 
47 The optimal portfolio choice is formulated as the solution to a constrained maximisation problem representing the 
fact that not all investors can invest in security k. 
48 All investors choose the same exposure to a common-factor bk and have identical risk preferences ä. 
-ýk is the 
shadow cost of information. 
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return variance; and qk, the relative size of the investor base (i. e., degree of "investor 
recognition") for security k. Expected returns increase with larger common-factor 
exposure, larger firm-specific variance, and larger relative size and decrease with the 
relative size of the firm's investor base. 
Merton continues his analysis and examines the investment behaviour of an 
individual firm and the role of the firm in determining the size of its investor base. He 
assumes that the firm makes its decisions in the best interests of the current 
shareholders what is achieved by maximising the current market value of the firm. 
Therefore, if an increase in the relative size of the firm's investor base reduces the 
cost of capital, managers have an incentive to expand the investor base. This can be 
done by using expenditures to increase the visibility of the firm in the investment 
community49. Moreover, investors can also be ruled out to invest in some securities 
by prudent-investing laws and traditions as well as other regulatory constraints. 
Merton argues that these effects are captured by the model because investors act as 
they did not know about the firm. But managers can spend resources on expanding 
the firm's shareholder base and thus making the firm an eligible investment for these 
investors. Listing on a stock exchange represents one way to do so. Furthermore, he 
argues that if a company seeks to raise capital for new investments the benefits of a 
public offering exceed those of simply selling new shares to existing shareholders. 
49 Merton points out that standard financial-equilibrium models are based on the assumption that only new and 
meaningful information leads to a change in investor evaluation of the firm. However, this model provides a rationale 
for stock price reactions to widely-circulated reports about a firm which do not provide any new substantive reaction. 
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4.1.4 The influence of international market segmentation 
Segmentation of international capital markets is caused by various types of 
institutional trading barriers. Hartmann and Khambata (1993) examine 20 emerging 
stock markets and identify several barriers to ESM (emerging stock market) 
investment. These barriers include restrictions on portfolio investment (as limitations 
on access, repatriation restrictions, and withholding taxes), liquidity, and a poor 
institutional environment. They argue that the liquidity problem is especially acute in 
the case of large institutional investors which carry out block trades. Issues which are 
of particular importance concerning the institutional environment are unreliable and 
inaccurate accounting and market information. 
In order to mitigate these negative effects, firms can adopt corporate financial 
policies which undo the barriers faced by investors. Stapelton and Subrahmanyam 
(1977) suggest the following financial policies: (1) Foreign portfolio/ direct investment 
by firms; (2) Mergers with foreign firms; (3) Dual listing of the securities of the firm on 
foreign capital markets. 
While the approach of the theoretical models of Stapelton and Subrahmanyam 
(1977), Errunza and Losq (1985), Alexander, Eun, Janakiramanan (1987) differs, 
their implications are very similar. Stapelton and Subrahmanyam (1977) use 
numerical analysis to consider a situation in which capital markets were completely 
segmented before an international listing took place. Alexander, Eun, Janakiramanan 
(1987) derive a closed-form solution for asset pricing in this type of market. Errunza 
and Losq (1985) construct an analytical model of international asset pricing to 
represent the reality of a mildly segmented market but do not specifically address 
international listings. They all conclude that international market segmentation 
79 
depresses security prices and increases expected returns. Hence, if capital markets 
are not fully integrated one would expect stock prices to react to international listings 
because listings should result in structural changes in the equilibrium asset pricing 
relationship. Urias (1995) extends these findings and provides empirical evidence of 
the effects for emerging market firms. 
Stapelton and Subrahmanyam (1977) model an eight firm and twenty investor 
economy. All firms generate the same return at the end of a single period with an 
expected value µj of US$100,00050. The eight firms are assigned to four different risk 
classes according to their standard deviation. (c l= 25,000; 6j2= 30,000; aj3= 18,000; 
(3j4= 22,000. ) Each risk class represents one industry and comprises two firms. Firms 
(1; 5), (2; 6), (3; 7) and (4; 8) are each in the same industry and are correlated 0.9. 
Firms (1; 2; 5; 6) and (3; 4; 7; 8) can be viewed as being in the same sector of the 
economy and therefore have a correlation coefficient of 0.7. The correlation 
coefficient of the other firms is 0.1. The investors are assumed to have constant 
absolute risk aversion utility functions. Each investor has an initial wealth of 
US$17,000 and the market rate of interest is 8%. 
They proceed in providing numerical solutions for equilibrium security prices by 
modelling the tatonnement process towards equilibrium. Their analysis illustrates 
standard results51 of corporate finance for given perfect capital markets. In a next 
step, they investigate the effects on prices of various types of segmentation now 
assuming that four firms and ten investors are in one country (UK) and the remaining 
firms and investors in another (US). They distinguish four cases of market 
segmentation: 
50Returns can be interpreted as cash flows in a single period world, or as exogenously given market values plus 
dividends at the end of the period. 
5'They calculate security prices, betas, expected rate of returns for different cases (merger, leverage). 
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(1) Complete segmentation 
- 
but not very realistic. 
(2) A restriction on the amount of investment in foreign securities allowed for each 
individual. 
(3) A percentage premium or tax levied on investment in foreign securities. 
(4) A restriction on the aggregate amount of investment by one country's nationals in 
the other country. This aggregate restriction gives rise to a "dollar premium" of the 
type which UK investors have to pay on foreign portfolio investments. 
They obtain different results for the four cases of segmentation and for US and UK 
companies52: Total segmentation as assumed in case (1) decreases all stock prices 
but in particular those in the UK. The cost of capital rises substantially53 although 
betas within the market are hardly affected. Partial segmentation is assumed in case 
(2) where each UK investor is restricted to a US$5,000 investment in US stocks. This 
decreases the prices for the US stocks (down from US$84.34 to US$80.67) while UK 
stocks remain unaffected. Case (3) models the effect of a 10% tax on foreign 
investment by UK investors and shows similar results as case (2). Case (4) 
represents the case of UK foreign exchange restrictions on overseas investment 
which produces the dollar premium. The results are similar but a bit more extreme 
than in case (3). Another scenario assumes total segmentation of both markets. One 
US stock is allowed to list on an UK exchange. This leads to an increase in the price 
of that stock because the demand for this stock is now the sum of the demand from 
both markets. UK stocks remain depressed due to the covariance effect in the 
expanded market because the equilibrium prices reflect the covariance structure. 
The prices of the other US stocks increase, too. 
52The UK is assumed to have the riskiest stocks and the most risk averse investors. 
53Their analysis provides rates of return between 18-29% without segmentation but 61-82% with total segmentation. 
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To summarise their findings, they show that segmentation depresses security prices 
and increases expected returns. International listing increases the demand for and 
the price of the listed stock. The unlisted stocks remain depressed due to the 
covariance effect in the expanded market. 
Errunza and Losq (1985) develop a model with unequal access to equities54. The 
unrestricted investors can trade in all securities available while the restricted 
investors can only trade in a subset of securities. This creates two classes of 
securities: eligible and ineligible securities. In the case of the two-country capital 
market, where country 1 investors are restricted, country 2 investors are unrestricted, 
country 1 securities are eligible and country 2 securities are ineligible (for country 1 
investors). Errunza and Losq (1985) derive two propositions from their model in a 
mildly segmented market under certain conditions55 
Proposition 1: 
a) The eligible securities are priced as if the market was not segmented. 
b) The ineligible securities command a super risk premium which is proportional to 
the conditional market risk56 
c) The restricted investors cannot hold the ineligible securities and thus diversify their 
portfolio. Therefore, they hold the market portfolio of eligible securities plus a proxy 
of the market portfolio of ineligible securities which is supplied by the unrestricted 
investors57 
The magnitude of the super risk premium depends on the risk aversion coefficients 
of the unrestricted investors compared to the aggregate population of investors. The 
54But they do not address the issue of foreign listing in particular. 
55Unequal access to securities, perfect and frictionless capital markets, mean variance and normality. 
56The conditional market risk is defined as the conditional covariance between its return and the return on the market 
portfolio of all ineligible securities. 
7The unrestricted investors act as financial intermediaries and provide diversification services. 
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risk premium is assumed to increase as the risk aversion of the unrestricted 
investors increases. For equilibrium to prevail the super risk premium must exist, as 
an inducement for unrestricted investors to hold the ineligible securities and supply 
them to the restricted investors as a diversification portfolio. 
Proposition 2: 
The unconditional market risk of any security is proportional to its beta coefficient 
and the conditional market risk of any ineligible security is a linear function of 0 and y 
coefficients. 
According to their model, restricted securities should command a super risk premium 
proportional to the differential risk aversion and the conditional market risk. The 
required return of unrestricted securities should not be affected by the incidence of 
mild segmentation. Their cross-sectional tests result in some tentative support for 
their expectations of a mildly segmented market58 
In order to capture the effects of a firm's listing decision on a segmented capital 
market, Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1987) derive a closed-form solution for 
this asset-pricing problem analytically. Their model assumes two countries, the 
domestic country and the foreign country. The capital markets are completely 
segmented with the exception of one domestic security that is dually listed in the 
foreign country59. While the aggregate demand for the pure domestic securities is 
determined by summing demand from domestic investors, the aggregate demand of 
the dually listed security is determined by the demand from investors of both 
58A more recent study by Errunza, Losq, and Padmanabhan (1992) investigating a group of emerging markets 
confirms this findings. 
59Other assumptions are: Perfect capital markets in both countries, investors with constant absolute risk aversion, 
allowance of short sales, normally distributed security returns and a fixed exchange rate. 
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countries. The demand for the dually listed security depends on the covariance of its 
return with the returns of all pure foreign securities. 
The fact that all investors hold the dually listed security is reflected in the return 
structure. The expected return on the dually listed security depends on the 
covariance of its return with the returns on both the domestic and foreign market 
portfolios. The pricing of the pure domestic securities is influenced by an "externality 
effect" because the domestic market becomes indirectly integrated with the foreign 
market via the dual listing. The expected return on a pure domestic security depends 
now on its covariance with the return on the domestic market portfolio, its indirect 
covariance with the return on the domestic market portfolio and its indirect 
covariance with the return on the foreign market portfolio. However, the magnitude of 
this effect differs among different domestic securities depending on their correlation 
with the dually listed security. In the case of a perfect negative or positive correlation, 
the domestic security is a perfect substitute for the dually listed security and is priced 
as if it were dually listed itself. They use comparative statics to obtain further insights 
how dual listing affects asset pricing. They find out that the change in the expected 
rate of return upon dual listing depends on the relative values of the aggregate risk 
aversion coefficients, the market value coefficients in the two countries, and the 
covariance of the dually listed security with the domestic and foreign market 
portfolios. 
Since securities are assumed to be less positively correlated between countries than 
within a country, the required rate of return for a dually listed security should be 
lower than for a segmented security. Thus non-dually listed securities should have a 
higher expected return. 
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Urias (1995) constructs a model of security cross-listing for emerging market firms 
and incorporates the features of the American Depositary Receipt (ADR) market. 
This model extends the work by Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1988). It is 
based on a two-market world (the emerging capital market and the US market) 
where foreign (US) investors can only invest in cross-listed securities but are 
prohibited from holding other domestic equities of the restricted emerging market. 
Hence, cross-listed securities are priced by foreign (US) and domestic (emerging 
market) investors, while pure domestic shares are only priced by domestic investors. 
Moreover, the model allows for the four different types of cross-listed securities as 
found in the ADR market6o 
Urias's (1995) model tests for liberalisation and spillover effects of Chilean and 
Venezuelan stocks. Since emerging market firms face pronounced barriers to 
investment before the listing, they become "liberalised" upon the listing. 
"Liberalisation" refers to the impact of a stock's dual listing on its stock market risk. It 
measures the change in the stock's sensitivity to the market upon the cross-listing. 
This means if a Chilean stock becomes less sensitive to changes in the Chilean 
market and more sensitive to changes in the US market, and the required return in 
the US market is less than in the Chilean market, the firm's cost of capital will 
decline. "Spillover" refers to the impact which Chilean ADR programmes may have 
on other purely domestic Chilean stocks and the Chilean stock market in general. 
The results imply that the sensitivity of Chilean stocks to the US market has 
increased, while the exposure to the Chilean market has declined. 
In summary, the theoretical models predict that international listing will reduce the 
expected return of a security if capital markets are segmented. The magnitude of the 
60 For a detailed description of the ADR market, see 2.3.1. 
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reduction in expected returns depends on the degree of segmentation between the 
domestic and the foreign market. They also predict that the domestic and foreign risk 
exposure of an internationally listed firm changes. It is expected that the influence of 
the foreign market on the listed firm's return will increase and the influence of the 
domestic market will decrease. Since it is also likely that two segmented markets are 
not perfectly correlated, a diversification effect should lead to a reduction in standard 
deviation of stock returns. 
4.2 Stock price behaviour of listings 
Empirical research has tried to test the theoretical propositions, which arise from 
international market segmentation models, by investigating the stock price behaviour 
of listings. Similar to research on domestic exchange listing, research has focused 
on examining the stock price effects around the time of listing. In contrast to 
domestic exchange listings, however, previous empirical research provides mixed 
evidence concerning the valuation impact of international listing. While some studies 
provide evidence of significant listing effects, others suggest that an international 
listing on its own has no significant wealth effects. It should be noted, however, that 
the assessment of wealth effects is complicated by the difficulty to pinpoint the 
announcement date of a firm's decision to list abroad. Therefore, studies generally 
use the actual listing date as the event date which clearly weakens the power of the 
tests. In accordance with previous studies, price effects associated with international 
listings can be split into pre-listing and post-listing period effects. 
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4.2.1 Pre-listing period effects of international listings 
a) Negative abnormal returns 
Howe and Kelm (1987) were among the first to examine the effect of an overseas 
listing on shareholder wealth. They employ a sample of 112 US firms which have 
165 listings (67 listings on the Basle Stock Exchange; 60, Frankfurt; 31, Paris; and 7, 
Tokyo). The firms obtained their listing between 1962-85. They use the market model 
to estimate abnormal returns over the 90 day pre-listing period (t=-90 to t=0) and the 
40-day post-listing period (t=+1 to t=+40)61. Howe and Kelm (1987) find significantly 
negative abnormal returns for US firms listing on the Basle and Frankfurt Stock 
Exchanges and negative abnormal returns for the Paris Stock Exchange. These 
negative returns especially occur in the pre-listing period whereas the post-listing 
period does not seem to be consistently associated with negative abnormal returns. 
They explain these wealth losses are due to the arising regulatory uncertainty which 
is an important cost for companies listed abroad. 
b) No valuation effects 
Lee (1991) investigates a sample of 141 US companies that listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (119 companies) and on the Toronto Stock Exchange (22 
companies) between 1962-86. They compute average daily residuals and cumulative 
average residuals over the 131-day test period (t= -90 to t= +40). The CARs for both 
exchanges are not statistically significant. That indicates that overseas listings do not 
harm shareholders' wealth as opposed to Howe and Kelm's results. 
Lee (1992) reports similar results for 16 UK companies listing on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange between 1986-88, and 9 Japanese companies listing on the London Stock 
61The parameters of the market model are estimated from the 100-day period ending prior to the event period. 
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Exchange between 1983-89. They examine abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns over a 17-week period (12 weeks before, 4 weeks after the listing) 
using the market model62. Their results are consistent with Lee (1991) as they do not 
observe any significant price movements before or after the listing. 
Fry, Lee, and Choi (1994) examine the valuation effects of overseas listings using a 
sample of 71 US firms that listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1973 and 
1989. Their investigation spans a period of 121-days (pre-listing period from t=-100 
to t=0; post-listing period from t=+1 to t=+20), and utilises the market model63 to 
calculate abnormal returns. Their results are consistent with those reported above 
and thus, indicating no significant wealth effects for shareholders. 
c) Positive abnormal returns 
Two other studies which examine the US listing of non-US firms find positive 
abnormal returns in the pre-listing period. The results of Alexander, Eun, and 
Janakiramanan (1988) and Foerster and Karolyi (1993) show that international 
listings experience positive CARs in the pre-listing period. While Alexander, Eun, and 
Janakiramanan (1988) examine monthly abnormal returns over a 36-month pre- 
listing period, Foerster and Karolyi (1993) investigate daily abnormal returns over a 
103-day pre-listing window. Since both studies are more concerned with detecting 
structural changes in the pricing parameters in the post-listing period, they will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section (see 4.2.2. ). 
Jayaraman, Shastri, and Tandon (1993) examine the underlying shares of a sample 
of foreign firms that set up an ADR (American Depositary Receipt) programme in the 
62Parameters are estimated using 48 weeks of return data, ending on week-13 prior to the actual listing week. 
63Parameters are estimated over the 180 day period ending one day prior to the beginning of the test period. 
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US market and find positive abnormal returns on the listing day (for more details see 
4.3. ). 
Lau, Diltz, and Apilado (1994) examine 346 US firm stock listings on ten different 
stock exchanges in the period from 1962 to 1990. For a reduced number of sample 
firms, they use three different event dates: (1) the date of application for listing (42 
firms); (2) the date of acceptance of the application (153 firms); and (3) the first 
trading day on the stock exchange (346 firms). Their results show that firms 
experience positive abnormal returns around the date of acceptance (1.25 percent 
for CAR (-5, +4) but negative returns on the first day of trading (-0.36 percent). 
4.2.2 Post-listing period effects of international listings 
Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan (1988) are among the first to test the theoretical 
propositions (see 4.1.4. ) empirically. According to their hypothesis, expected returns 
should be at a lower level after the listing. Their research design tries to consider 
possible liquidity and signalling effects as well as selection bias64, therefore choosing 
a 36-month period (from t=-72 months to t=-36) to estimate the expected return 
before the listing. Thus, they avoid getting an upwardly biased estimate65. They 
argue that using residual analysis66 in this way allows them to detect changes in 
expected returns following the event of international listing. Persistent abnormal 
64 They argue that both liquidity and signalling effects, if they exist, may cause a firm's stock price to rise abnormally 
around the announcement date of the listing. In order to test for any announcement effects, they utilise the following 
Capital Asset Pricing Model-based return-generating process: Rit - rt = ai + (Rmt - rt) ßi + eit. OLS are applied to 
estimate ai and ßi. The a value should not be significantly different from zero if announcement effects are absent in 
the estimation period. But their results indicate the presence of some selection bias in the estimation period. 
651f an estimation period very close prior to the announcement date is used the chance of making Type I errors 
increases. 
66For more information on the Mean Adjusted Returns technique, see Brown and Warner (1980). 
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returns in the post-listing period combined with the assumption of efficient markets 
may indicate a change in the expected return upon international listing. 
Their sample comprises 34 non-US companies which listed on an US stock 
exchange over the period 1969-1982. Furthermore, they split the sample into two 
subsamples of 13 Canadian and 21 non-Canadian firms to detect any differences of 
the integration among national capital markets. They also hypothesise that non- 
Canadian firms should have a larger decline in expected returns than Canadian firms 
because their capital markets are less integrated with the US-market67 
Their results indicate a persistent decline of CARs in the post-listing period. This 
decline starts two months before the listing date and is statistically significant for the 
overall sample and the non-Canadian subsample. Their tests on the paired 
differences of mean returns also show significantly lower mean returns for the post- 
listing period in comparison to the pre-listing period for the overall sample and the 
non-Canadian subsample. 
In their view, the empirical results support their hypothesis that a listing is 
accompanied by a reduction in expected returns, especially for non-Canadian stocks 
if markets were either "mildly" or completely segmented beforehand. This decline in 
expected returns was stronger and statistically significant for non-Canadian 
companies. They suggest that non-Canadian stock markets are more segmented 
from the US market than the Canadian stock market. Alternatively, they suggest that 
the Canadian market is as segmented from the US market as the other stock 
markets but has a higher covariance with the US market. 
67Jorion and Schwartz (1986) reject an integration between the Canadian and the US market due to legal barriers 
linked to the country of origin of listed securities. 
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A more recent study by Foerster and Karolyi (1993) re-addresses this issue in 
examining pre-and post-listing returns for a sample of 49 Canadian firms which listed 
on US stock-exchanges between 1981-1990. They compute market-adjusted returns 
for each day over a period from t=-103 days to t=+103. In order to examine pre- to 
post-listing differences in expected returns, they compute cumulative average 
returns for the pre-listing period (t=-103 to t=-4) and for the post-listing period (t=+4 
to t=+103). They perform tests on whether "pre" returns are significantly greater than 
"post" returns. Although they reverse the findings of Alexander, 
. 
Eun and 
Janakiramanan (1998) regarding the integration of Canadian firms, they reaffirm the 
propositions of the theoretical models. They conclude that expected returns are 
significantly lower after the listing which supports their hypothesis of segmentation 
between the Canadian and the US markets. 
Foerster and Karolyi (1993) also provide empirical evidence of different price 
reactions due to industry effects. They base their examination on the assumption 
that the extent of integration and segmentation of financial markets is determined by 
the industry to which a firm belongs. Roll (1992) shows that the correlation between 
national stock markets is mainly explained by the industrial composition of a country. 
Countries with similar industrial composition are more highly correlated. Thus, 
companies from industries being more segmented from the foreign market 
experience a different stock price reaction upon listing. According to the results of 
Foerster and Karolyi (1993), non-resource based firms experience cumulative 
excess returns in the pre-listing period but drop in the post-listing while the pre- 
versus post-listing difference for resource based companies is insignificant. They 
infer that Canadian resource firms are not as segmented from US markets as non- 
resource firms. One possible explanation could be the segmentation effect of 
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Canada's dividend tax credit68 as non-resource companies tend to pay higher 
dividends than resource-based companies. This induces segmentation between US 
and Canadian markets. 
Damodaran, Liu, and Harlow (1993) investigate a sample of 276 NYSE stocks that 
listed on the Tokyo and London stock exchanges between 1965 and 1990. They find 
some evidence of lower mean returns69 after the listing. However, they do not find 
any price effects in the listing period starting 10 days before and ending 10 days 
after the listing date. 
Varela and Lee (1993a) examine their hypothesis that the integrating effect of the 
listing decreases the expected rate of return. Their sample is comprised of 68 US 
firms listing on the London Stock Exchange between 1984-87 and 43 US firms listing 
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1973-87. They observe a significant 
decrease in the SML's intercept. Their results support the theoretical implications in 
that international listings lead to a decrease in expected returns. 
Varela and Lee (1993b) also report significantly negative deviations from expected 
returns for a sample of US firms listing on the London Stock Exchange between 
1965-1987. Intertemporal comparisons yield significantly negative deviations for the 
1965-1975, the 1984 and the 1984-1987 listings group while the deviation from 
expected returns for the 1975-1983 group is negative but not statistically significant. 
Varela and Lee (1993b) perform inter beta-comparisons for their sample of US 
companies, listed on the London Stock Exchange. They base their investigation on 
68Canadian investors pay less tax on dividends received from domestic versus foreign stocks. Thus Canadian 
investors receive a premium on dividend-paying Canadian stocks what leads to a higher cost of capital for firms. 
69 They compare raw and excess returns in the pre- and post-listing period using 500 days of returns before and 
after the listing. 
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Stehle's (1977) finding70 that low beta firms tend to have a higher non-domestic 
systematic risk because of a higher degree of international operations and are larger 
in size than high beta firms. In order to determine the pre-listing return, Varela and 
Lee (1993b) use Black's modified asset pricing model in which barriers to 
international investment are represented by a proportional tax on holdings of foreign 
assets. The post-listing return is represented by the SL model. The difference 
between both equations results in u; 
, 
which may be defined as the difference 
between the listed firm's true required return and the required return corresponding 
to the pre-listing relationship. The expected value of u across firms should be zero if 
no segmentation exists between the domestic and the foreign markets. But the 
theoretical models, as described above, suggest a negative value for u assumed that 
the "super" risk premium for the segmented security vanishes upon dual listing. The 
cumulative value for u is estimated by employing a matrix format. A significant value 
for u would indicate a downward drift in returns in the post-listing period. 
Their empirical tests employ a sample of 168 US firms that listed on the London 
Stock Exchange between 1965-87. They perform intertempora171 and inter-beta 
comparisons for their sample. Their testing period is from 0 to 30 days after the 
listing. They assign dummy variables to high beta securities (defined as ß>1) to test 
their hypothesis that low beta stocks experience a larger decline in expected returns 
upon listing. This would be reflected by a negative deviation of the value of u. 
The findings of Varela and Lee (1993b) show significant negative deviations for the 
pre-84 and the post-84 groups for low beta stocks. High beta stocks have generally 
negative but insignificant deviations. These deviations may be due to changes in the 
70Stehle (1977) shows that returns for only low beta are underestimated when the simple SL model is used with a 
segmented capital markets assumption. 
7'The split their sample into two groups: Pre-84 group (1965-84) and post-84 group (1985-87). 
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pricing parameters of those firms as proposed by Black (1974) and Stulz (1981). The 
results of the pre-84 group are consistent with their hypothesis of a fall of the 
intercept and a rise in the slope. This suggests that low beta firms experienced 
significant integration effects in the 1965-83 period through a listing on the London 
Stock Exchange. But the results for the 1985-87 group do not show significant 
parameter changes although significant negative deviations exist. They conclude that 
some other unknown factors cause this deviation but see their results generally in 
support with the theoretical propositions. Their findings show significant negative 
deviations for low beta stocks but they are not able to explain the differing results in 
comparison towards high beta stocks. 
A very recent paper by Sundaram and Logue (1996) examines valuation effects of 
companies that list ADRs on the NYSE and the American Stock Exchange. To 
measure valuation effects associated with international listings, they employ price-to- 
book, price-to-cash-earnings, and price-to-earnings valuation ratios. Although their 
approach differs from previous studies, their findings are consistent with the 
implications of the models of international market segmentation. 
4.2.3 The price behaviour of new issues and domestic exchange listings 
Listings on domestic exchanges have received much attention in the literature. A 
great number of US studies investigates the behaviour of stock returns from firms 
which changed their trading location or simultaneously trade on more than one stock 
exchange. But in contrast to research on international listings most studies report 
similar results: they observe positive abnormal returns in the pre-listing period72 and 
72All studies use the actual listing date as date of reference. 
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a persistent decline of returns in the post-listing period. Since these post-listing 
period results are similar to the pattern observed for new issues, this body of 
literature will also be discussed. 
Ying, Lewellen, Schiarbaum, and Lease73 (1977) conclude that listing seems to have 
some value for the companies examined. It might serve as a signal of managers' 
confidence in the future prospects of the firm. 
Sanger and McConell (1986) investigate the behaviour of stock returns of US 
companies that moved from the OTC market to the NYSE between 1966 and 1977. 
They divide their sample into a pre-NASDAQ and a post-NASDAQ period in order to 
examine the impact of the introduction of NASDAQ. Consistent with earlier studies 
they find positive abnormal returns in the pre-listing period before the introduction of 
NASDAQ. However, this pattern changes in the post-NASDAQ period because they 
only find a reduced and statistically insignificant reaction to the same event. These 
results support their hypothesis that the increase in value associated with exchange 
listings is attributed to the "superior liquidity" of the new market. They define superior 
liquidity as following: "... a market is said to provide superior liquidity services if the 
cost of immediately trading a given quantity of a security in that market is lower than 
the comparison market. " However, this advantage of superior liquidity has been 
substantially reduced through the introduction of the new NASDAQ system74 which is 
demonstrated by the change in the return pattern in the post-NASDAQ period. 
McConnell and Sanger (1987) examine several explanations for the observed 
negative post-listing return behaviour but none of them gives a sufficient answer. 
Explanations related to data peculiarities, as (a) negative returns are due to a few 
73They examine a sample of 248 US companies that listed on the NYSE or AMEX between 1966-68. 
74Ho and Stoll (1983) develop a model of the interaction among competing dealers and provide empirical support for 
the advantages of such a market. 
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peculiar subperiods; (b) negative returns are due to a few outlier observations; and 
(c) negative returns are due to biases in the first trading price, do not provide an 
answer. They also name a number of other explanations: (a) Negative post-listing 
stock returns are due to the loss of market-maker support. This explanation is based 
on the difference in the market structure between the NYSE and NASDAQ75. (b) 
Negative post-listing stock returns are due to peculiarities of the NYSE76. (c) 
Negative stock returns are due to new stock issues shortly after the listing. (d) 
Negative stock returns are due to insiders dumping the stock. Insiders postpone their 
sales of large blocks until listing occurs. They hope to get a better price in the 
supposedly more liquid market than in the relatively illiquid market before the listing. 
This excess supply creates downward pressure on the stock price. (e) Negative 
stock returns are due to a "correction" of an initial market "overreaction". 
For the purpose of this study, only their test of the new issue explanation will be 
discussed briefly. McConnell and Sanger (1987) classify the companies into two 
subsamples, one for companies having issues within the following 12 months and 
those not having issues. However, only 10% of all companies had issues within the 
following 12 months and they experience positive abnormal returns compared to 
those without new issues which experience significantly negative returns. Thus, their 
evidence is strongly contrary to the conjecture that new issues of common stock 
explain the negative post-listing performance in stock returns. 
Baker, Khan, and Edelman (1994) investigate 87 NYSE and AMEX stocks that 
became dually listed on the Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE) between 1984 and 1990. 
Their results show that CARs decline (-3.29 percent) during a 20-day period 
75Whereas one single specialist handles the trades on the NYSE, an unlimited number of brokers and dealers act as 
market makers on the NASDAQ. 
i6But they do not further specify what these peculiarities might be. 
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following the day of listing but it does not persist for the 100-day period. The findings 
also indicate that low liquidity stocks, as measured by the Amivest liquidity ratio, 
perform worse than high liquidity stocks. This suggests that market fragmentation 
(see also 5.1.3. ) has a greater negative effect on low liquidity stocks. 
Kadlec and McConnell (1994) examine the stock price reaction of 273 US-domiciled 
OTC firms that listed their stock on the NYSE between August 1980 and December 
1989. Their findings are consistent with previous studies of domestic exchange 
listings. They report statistically significant positive abnormal returns from four weeks 
prior to the listing week through to the listing week. They continue their analysis by 
investigating the potential sources of value from exchange listings such as liquidity 
benefits and an increase in the shareholder base. Therefore, they jointly test 
Merton's (1987) investor recognition factor" and Amihud and Mendelson's (1986) 
liquidity factor78 by regressing the specified proxies for the asset-pricing factors on 
the listing period abnormal returns. Their results indicate that post-listing relative and 
absolute bid-ask spreads79 are lower than pre-listing spreads80. The change in the 
bid-ask spread for each security is examined further by controlling for the change in 
Merton's Ok 81 and regressing both proxies on the listing period abnormal returns to 
test for differences across securities. They find that firms experiencing a reduction in 
their bid-ask spreads exhibit higher positive abnormal returns. However, their results 
provide even stronger support for Merton's (1987) model as firms experiencing the 
greatest increase in shareholders exhibit the highest abnormal returns. 
77 The proxy for Merton's (1987) asset pricing factor is described above (see 4.1.3). 
78 Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that expected returns are an increasing and concave function of liquidity, 
as measured by the relative bid-ask spread. The implications of their model will be described in more detail in 
section 4.1.2. 
79 Absolute and relative bid-ask spreads are computed from end-of-day quotes over the month prior and subsequent 
to listing. 
80 Kadlec and McConnell report that ca. 60% of the sample firms experience a decline in their spreads. The fact that 
ca. 40% of the sample firms appear to experience an increase in their spreads may be partly explained by the use of 
the "market spread" (highest bid price and lowest ask price among all NASDAQ dealers) for the pre-listing period and 
the specialist quote for the post-listing period on the NYSE. 
81 The shadow cost of information - see 4.1.3. 
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Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) examine the post-listing behaviour of 2889 US 
exchange listings which moved from the NASDAQ to either the ASE or NYSE, or 
from the ASE to the NYSE between July 1962 and December 1990. They find that 
CARs of domestic exchange listings are significantly negative during a 36-month 
period subsequent to the listing. The post-listing drift is persistent for different sub- 
periods and industries. However, it varies over time across the three types of 
exchange listings. CARs of firms moving from NASDAQ to ASE show the most 
pronounced negative reaction, followed by NASDAQ to NYSE movers, and ASE to 
NYSE exchange listings. Although the magnitude of the post-listing drift is reduced, 
the results do not change when adjusted for size and book-to-market effects. 
Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) continue their analysis by examining the impact of 
equity offerings on the post-listing performance. While the presence of IPOs82 does 
not account for the post-listing drift, the presence of seasoned equity offerings 
explains some portion of the poor performance following the listing. Although 
particularly firms that offered equity prior to changing their listing location from 
NASDAQ to NYSE performed badly, the "equity issuance puzzle" does not fully 
explain the negative post-listing behaviour. They proceed their analysis and examine 
a "timing"-related explanation. Their results show that the post-listing drift is more 
severe for smaller firms and firms with relatively low institutional holdings. Since 
these firms have generally more volatile earnings, they are more constrained by the 
listing requirements. Hence, they have to list at opportune times when they qualify 
for a listing. 
Several studies have shown that new issues underperform in subsequent periods. 
While Ritter (1991) examines 1526 US initial public offerings (IPOs) which went 
82 They repeat their examination of the post-listing performance after excluding listing firms whose initial public 
offering was less than two years prior to the listing. 
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public between 1975 and 1984, Levis (1993) investigates 712 IPOs which came to 
the market between 1980-1988. Their results are very similar, since both studies find 
a poor aftermarket performance of IPOs. However, they also show that there is 
substantial variation in underperformance across industries and time periods. Ritter 
(1991) finds that firms which issued in high-volume years have the worst 
performance. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) provide similar 
evidence for seasoned equity offerings. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) examine 
the five-year post-offering performance of 1247 US equity offerings during 1975- 
1989. Their results show long-run underperformance of equity issuing firms when 
adjusting for size (-39.36 percent), industry- and size (-31.24 percent), and book-to- 
market (-30.99 percent). The underperformance also persists after controlling for 
trading system, offer size, and firm age. 
The evidence suggests that there are a number of different factors influencing the 
price behaviour in the pre- and the post-listing period. However, listing and in 
particular foreign listing does not appear to be an uniform event across companies 
and stock exchanges. Hence, a research design must also consider other factors as 
institutional characteristics and capital raising activity of a firm. 
4.3 Listing and variance of stock returns 
Another line of research examines the risk implications of international listings. The 
assumption of perfectly segmented markets implies that the risk of an asset is only 
measured relative to the systematic factors present in that market. The theoretical 
models of international asset pricing (see 4.1.4) predict that international listing 
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should lead to a decline in the risk characteristics if listing is an effective integration 
mechanism. However, the model of Freedman (1991) implies that cross-listing leads 
to an increase in the variance of returns. 
In order to detect changes between pre-and post-listing periods for 68 US companies 
which listed in Germany, France, Japan and Switzerland, Howe and Madura (1990) 
utilise different related measures of risk. None of these measures (as domestic beta, 
foreign beta, standard deviation, other measures) provides significant evidence of 
changes in the risk characteristics. They interpret their results as being consistent 
with already integrated markets. However, a few words of caution are necessary 
because the majority of their sample consists of US corporations that listed in 
Germany or in Switzerland. Since the US market is much bigger in size and trading 
volume and the volume of foreign equities in both countries is only a fraction of the 
total trading activity, no changes in the risk characteristics should be expected. 
Jayaraman, Shastri, and Tandon (1993) examine the impact of the listing of 95 ADRs 
on an US stock exchange on the risk of the underlying stock. Basing their 
investigation on several theoretical models83 which examine the linkage between 
information arrival, trading volume and the variance of return on a security, they 
hypothesise that international cross-listing should result in an increase in the 
variance. According to the Freedman model, they assume that international cross- 
listing allows informed traders to optimally allocate their trading of dually listed stock 
between two separate markets to take advantage of information differentials in the 
markets. Informed traders are provided additional opportunities to trade on and profit 
83Kyle (1985) models a market with three types of traders - informed, random liquidity, and the specialist. Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988) include a fourth class of traders called discretionary liquidity traders. Freedman (1991) extends 
Kyle's model in allowing traders to allocate their trades between separate markets. 
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from their long-lived information84. Thus, cross-listing leads to an increase in the 
revelation of information which causes the variance of the stock price to increase. 
The empirical analysis of Jayaraman et al. (1993) compares pre- and post-listing 
variances of returns on the underlying stock. They compute pre-and post-listing 
variances from daily close-to-close returns on the underlying security. The pre-listing 
period starts 150 days and ends 26 days before the listing, while the post-listing 
period starts 26 days and ends 150 days after the listing date of the ADR. They 
report a 55.7% increase in the variance for their sample of ADRs. A breakdown into 
subsamples shows that the magnitude of the variance change differs with the 
nationality of the companies. UK firms experience a significant change of 98.8% 
while the variance of Japanese stocks only changes 34.6%. 
Their results are consistent with the Freedman-hypothesis but inconsistent with noise 
trading85 because they do not observe changes in the autocorrelation structure after 
the listing. The increase in volatility is also inconsistent with the hypothesis of a 
change in the return generating process after the listing86. Their results support the 
proposition that the increased trading time associated with the cross-listing allows for 
more revelation of information. 
Makhija and Nachtmann (1990) examine the variance-effects of 37 NYSE stocks 
which listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1973-1988. They compare pre- 
listing to post-listing daily variances for various windows. However, the change in the 
84The Freedman model (see also 5.1.2) differs as it allows for a long-lived information structure (assuming a life of 
two periods) whereas the model of Admati and Pfleiderer assumes that private information becomes useless after 
one period. 
85Black (1986) assumes that an increase in trading time causes the variance to increase due to the overreaction of 
traders to each others trades. If the noise trading hypothesis is correct, one would observe negatively autocorrelated 
returns since these overreactions are corrected over longer periods. 
86They estimate domestic and foreign betas utilising a two-factor model of returns before and after the listing. But 
their results do not provide evidence of changes in the return-generating process. 
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variance is not significant for the 50,100 and 200 day periods87. But they report 
significant increases in the variance when using different windows after dropping 100 
trading days before and after the listing date. They conclude that the variance of 
NYSE stocks increased after their Tokyo listing. Their results, however, need to be 
treated with some caution because 50% of the companies in their sample listed in 
1986. After dropping 100 trading days the reported values of their post-listing periods 
are probably strongly influenced by the occurrence of the crash in October 1987. 
This might explain their findings that the variance increases as the period is 
extended away from the listing date88. Makhija and Nachtmann (1990) interpret their 
results as being consistent with the private information theory. This states that the 
flow of information is increased when exchange hours are extended. 
Makhija and Nachtmann's (1990) results, however, are in contrast to Barclay, 
Litzenberger and Warner's (1990) findings which indicate no changes in the overall 
level of return variance for dually listed US stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
They perform time-series and matched pair tests to examine the ratios of open-to- 
close to close-to-close variances. They match 21 internationally listed US firms with 
21 only domestically traded US companies on the basis of size and industry but find 
no differences in their ratio of variances. Their average ratio of within-day (open-to- 
close) to 24 hour (close-to-close) return variance is almost identical and shows that 
approximately 80% of the 24 hour variance occurs during the trading day in the 
domestic market. Furthermore, they compare the variance ratio of 16 listed stocks 
before and after the listing. The results do not show any changes and indicate again 
that the stock-return variance is more closely related to the level of normal trading 
87They test the percentage change in daily variance for three different windows: 50-day window (-50, +50), 100-day 
window (-100, +100) and 200-day window (-200, +200) comparing the means for the two periods. 
88They perform the same tests for the same window but drop 100 days before and after the listing, so that their 50- 
day window comprises now the days (-150 to -100 and +100 to +150) and so forth. They report an increase of 39.7% 
for the 50-day window, 40,4% (100-day), and 88% (200-day). 
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volume than to the number of trading hours. The Admati and Pfleiderer model 
suggests that the volume will be lower in the foreign than in the domestic market. 
Thus, the variance only increases if the international listing increases the trading 
volume. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The review of the theoretical literature which examines the determinants of the cost 
of capital has shown that liquidity, investor recognition, and international market 
segmentation have an impact on the cost of capital of firms. This implies that firms 
can reduce their cost of capital if they find ways to improve the liquidity of their 
stocks and increase their shareholder base. Since the literature suggests that firms 
can invest in "liquidity-enhancing projects", international listing may be one of them. 
Moreover, such a project may also increase the shareholder base because the firm 
spends resources to make itself an eligible investment for international investors. 
This idea forms the link to the models of international market segmentation. They are 
based on the assumption that foreign firms are ineligible investments for domestic 
investors because of the existing barriers to international investment as transaction 
costs, information costs, or legal restrictions on portfolio investment. All these 
models conclude that a reduction or removal of these barriers should lead to 
structural changes in the equilibrium asset pricing relationship. Hence, one should 
observe an increase in the share price prior to the listing and a decline in expected 
returns once these stocks become internationally listed. 
While studies which examine pre-listing period abnormal returns provide different 
results, post-listing period results appear to be more unanimous. They report 
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persistently negative abnormal returns in the post-listing period which is interpreted 
as being consistent with a decline in expected returns once these stocks obtain an 
international listing. However, an increasing body of literature provides empirical 
evidence that initial public offerings and domestic exchange listings of US firms exihit 
a similar negative return pattern. Several studies have shown that new issues 
underperform in subsequent periods. Other papers that examine domestic exchange 
listings of US firms observe a negative post-listing drift in stock returns. Very often it 
is argued that firms try to time their issues to take advantage of overoptimistic 
investors. However, this misvaluation is gradually corrected in subsequent periods 
leading to negative abnormal returns. These competing interpretations of negative 
post-event returns raise questions for international listings. 
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5. Chapter: Determinants of the international listing decision 
The results of the previous chapter, which reviewed the literature on the 
determinants of the cost of capital, have highlighted the importance of liquidity and 
international market segmentation for asset pricing. This chapter presents a more in- 
depth analysis of different aspects of liquidity. It also examines the relevance of 
international listing for raising equity and the effect of market conditions on equity 
issuance. Moreover, it reviews other motives of listing which have been suggested 
by previous research. The last part summarises the implications that arise from the 
review of the literature in this chapter. 
5.1 Listing and market microstructure effects 
The relationship of liquidity and expected returns has been discussed in the previous 
chapter. The literature provides a wide body of evidence which examines liquidity in 
various contexts. Previous research does not only focus on bid-ask spreads but 
extends the investigation to different measures of liquidity and liquidity-related 
factors. This stream of the literature is often called market-microstructure literature, 
since it examines the effect of different trading systems and market structures on 
asset prices. 
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5.1.1 Cross-sectional variation in liquidity 
In the literature, liquidity has generally been proxied by three different measures: (1) 
bid-ask spreads, (2) volume, and (3) depth89. Previous research has shown that 
there is a relationship between these different measures of liquidity and some other 
microstructure related variables. 
Benston and Hagerman (1974), Stoll (1978), and Barclay and Smith (1988) provide 
evidence that price level, return volatility, and volume explain a significant. fraction of 
the cross-sectional variation in bid-ask spreads. Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam 
(1993) confirm these findings by examining the change in bid-ask spreads of the 
underlying shares after the introduction of the S&P 500 index futures contract, and 
control for price, return volatility, and volume. It is usually argued that a higher 
volume should result in lower spreads because it offers market makers greater 
flexibility to offset inventory imbalances. Larger volatility should lead to higher 
spreads because it implies higher inventory risk. The inverse relationship between 
price level and spreads is due to a lower fixed-cost component. For a given number 
of shares per trade, fixed costs can be spread across more dollars in high priced 
stocks. 
Many previous papers have attempted to model the cost components of the quoted 
spread. In general, three components are distinguished: (1) order processing costs 
(Tinic, 1972); (2) inventory holding costs (Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and 
Stoll (1981)); and adverse selection costs (Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985), and Kyle (1985)). George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) develop a 
new approach to estimate bid-ask spreads and its components. Their findings show 
89 Kyle (1985) defines depth as the size of an order flow innovation that is required to change prices at a given 
amount. This means that in a highly liquid market almost any amount of stock could be bought or sold immediately 
without moving the current market price. 
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that order processing costs are the predominant component of quoted spreads. 
While adverse selection costs comprise a significant component of the spread, they 
do not find evidence of an inventory cost component. Snell and Tonks (1995) 
develop a model that measures the impact of inventory control, adverse selection, 
and anticipated liquidity trade effects on price quote revisions of market makers on 
the London Stock Exchange. Their dataset allows for stronger tests of inventory 
control effects since all trades on the London Stock Exchange must pass through the 
market makers' inventory and can be unambiguously classified as buys or sells. 
They find that market makers set their price quotes to maintain their inventory 
around a desired level. Although there is some evidence of adverse selection, they 
conclude that asymmetric information is not very widespread in highly liquid stocks. 
The models of Chowdry and Nanda (1991) and Freedman (1991) examine the effect 
of multiple trading locations on the liquidity of assets (for more details see 5.1.2). 
Both models predict that multiple market trading increases liquidity. Neal (1987) 
develops a model of bid-ask spreads based on the theory of contestable markets to 
examine the effect of multiple-listed options on spreads. This model relates the bid- 
ask spread to trading volume, price, volatility, and competition and predicts lower 
spreads for a market with potential competition. The competition variable is 
constructed as a multiple listing dummy variable which is zero if the option is listed 
on a single exchange and one for multiple-listed options. Their results show that 
multiple-listed options have lower bid-ask spreads than options which are listed on a 
single exchange. 
Since a great body of literature has investigated the impact of the trading system on 
liquidity, it appears to be crucial to understand their role. However, the remarks of 
Pagano and Roell (1996) show the inherent difficulties: "The substantive differences 
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between the different securities trading systems currently operating around the world 
are not easy to understand. The trading systems differ across many different 
dimensions. Many details concerning rules and practices are not available in 
published form or even understood by anyone except the direct participants in the 
trading process. And opinions differ as to the relative importance of many aspects of 
dealing regulations. " 
Two alternative trading systems9° can be distinguished (see also 3.3.2), as described 
by Pagano and Roell (1992): Whereas in an auction market (or often referred to as 
order-driven system) all outstanding orders are transacted at a single price via a 
centralised mechanism, in a dealership market (or referred to as quote-driven 
market) they are placed with individual dealers, who execute them at pre-set 
prices91 
. 
Some empirical studies address this question by comparing trading costs of foreign 
equities on SEAQ International to their domestic markets. The London Stock 
Exchange (1992)92 splits total costs into explicit and implicit costs. Explicit costs 
include commissions, fees, and turnover taxes and implicit costs are measured by 
the bid-ask spread. Their results show that explicit costs are significantly lower on 
SEAQ International than in the domestic markets. Implicit costs appear to be 
significantly lower in the home markets but the estimation procedure depends on the 
trading system and makes an exact comparison very difficult. 
Wagner and Edwards (1993) remark that execution costs vary depending on the 
manager's style of investment decision making. Their study investigating institutional 
90 However, there are a number of hybrid market structures because some markets run different systems depending 
on the trading activity of a particular stock or the time of the day. 
91 Market makers quote bid and ask prices at which they are willing to buy and sell shares up to a specified size. 
92The study compares trading costs of four markets: London, Paris, Milan, and Frankfurt. 
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trades splits execution costs into the four components commissions, price impact, 
timing cost, and opportunity cost. Their findings are consistent with a study 
investigating the trading in German equities on SEAQ International. Fund managers 
and traders asked to list the key factors used in selecting a broker or market maker 
cited quality of research, execution skills, long-term relationships, and readiness to 
handle large orders amidst other factors. Institutions also expressed the view that the 
preference for immediacy or order building influences the choice between a quote- 
driven (e. g. SEAQ) or an order-driven (e. g. IBIS) market mechanism. 
Pagano and Roell (1991) investigate trading in Italian stocks. They provide further 
empirical evidence that the trading volume on a specific exchange is not only due to 
cost factors but also to other characteristics, as greater market depth, immediacy, 
location, and other typical features of dealership markets. Their results show an 
overall increase in trading volume after the start of the Italian market sector on SEAQ 
Internationa193. De Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1993) find lower spreads for the Paris 
Bourse but conclude that the London market provides more liquidity at larger sizes. 
Size appears to be one key factor because the trading systems differ in the 
execution of large "block" trades. While other trading systems require pre- 
negotiations, block trading on SEAQ International is facilitated by limiting disclosure 
on block trades. 
Based on Amihud and Mendelson's (1986) findings, Reinganum (1990) investigates 
market-microstructure effects in asset pricing after controlling for size and potential 
liquidity-related variables94 by comparing NYSE with NASDAQ listed firms. A Fama- 
93A further increase in aggregate trading volume is reported when Milan reformed its market. See London Stock 
Exchange (1993). 
94Previous research generally finds that trading volume is negatively related to spreads (the greater the volume, the 
smaller the spread). Applying this results to Amihud and Mendelson means that stocks with lower volume will have 
higher average returns. 
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Mac Beth pooled time-series, cross-sectional regression95 framework is utilised to 
calculate an adjusted differential liquidity premium. The exchange dummy is a proxy 
for the market microstructure in which the securities are traded. Reinganum (1990) 
finds that differences in average monthly returns persist after controlling for risk and 
some liquidity-related variables. This suggests that the exchange dummy is a proxy 
for omitted liquidity effects. But this liquidity advantages seem to depend on 
individual firm characteristics. 
5.1.2 Trading model for internationally cross-listed stocks 
Freedman (1991) develops a theoretical trading model which examines the impact of 
international cross-listing on the variability of prices, the volume of trading, the 
informativeness of prices, and the costs of trading for different types of traders. She 
assumes that the foreign and the domestic market do not operate simultaneously96 
and trading on the foreign market precedes trading on the domestic market. Her 
model has three different types of traders: 
1) "Informed traders" who trade on their long-lived private information97 about the 
value of the stock. This value becomes public information at the end of period 2. 
There are several informed traders who compete with each other. Since this 
information is long-lived, information traders must decide how to optimally allocate 
their trading between the domestic and the foreign market. 
95Following variables are included: Exchange dummy, Roll's implicit spread, aggregated-coefficient beta, stock- 
market capitalisation, number of shares outstanding, price per share, variance ratio, and stock return during the prior 
12-month period. 
96 Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) develop a theoretical model which is based on the assumption of simultaneous 
trading of one asset in multiple locations. In this model informed traders can exploit their short-lived private 
information in multiple markets. 
97 Freedman assumes a life of two periods for the information. In this sense her model is based on Kyle's (1985) 
multi-period model but Kyle's model applies only to the case of one informed trader. Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988) 
develop a model with more than one informed trader but that private information is only useful for one period. 
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2) "Uninformed liquidity traders" who trade randomly. She further assumes that most 
of the liquidity traders prefer to trade on the domestic stock exchange, however, 
without modelling traders' preference for the domestic market. 
3) The "market maker" receives submitted orders from liquidity and informed traders 
and sets prices so that his expected profits of the given order flow are zero. 
Freedman examines the effects of international cross-listing on trading costs, price 
variance, informativeness of prices, and trading volume in the domestic and the 
foreign market under different scenarios98 by comparing the results of a dually listed 
stock with a singly listed stock. 
Freedman measures trading costs using the market depth parameter k which is an 
inverse measure of market depth. Trading costs for liquidity traders on the domestic 
market are a decreasing function of the number of informed traders in the case of a 
dually-listed stock as well as for a singly-listed stock. However, the decline in trading 
costs is stronger for the dually-listed stock as long as there is more than one 
informed trader. An increasing number of informed traders causes more competition 
in the earlier round of trading in the foreign market, thereby forcing traders to reveal 
more information. Therefore, informed traders make less profit in the second round 
of trading in the domestic market, thus lowering the cost of liquidity trading in the 
domestic market. Liquidity traders who are assumed to prefer trading on the foreign 
market always face higher trading costs. But this result has to be treated with some 
caution as the assumed benefits for trading earlier are not modelled. The expected 
profits of the informed traders equal the costs of the liquidity traders since the market 
makers' profits are expected to be zero. This implies that dual listing can increase 
98 Freedman varies the number of informed traders N, and the variance of liquidity trading on the domestic and the 
foreign stock exchange. 
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informed traders' profits because they have more opportunity to trade upon their 
inside information, however, provided the number of informed traders is relatively 
small. 
The results show that the variance on the domestic exchange increases after the 
dual listing because traders are provided with more opportunities to trade. This leads 
to an increase in the revelation of information by the time the price is set on the 
domestic exchange. 
The informativeness of prices Q99 measures to what extent the price P at which 
market makers are willing to trade a certain quantity, that is necessary to clear the 
market, reveal the value of an asset F. The expected value of an asset reflects all 
the private information about it. The informativeness of prices increases with the 
number of informed traders. The increased competition among informed traders 
forces them to reveal more private information in earlier rounds and, thus, increases 
the informativeness of prices. 
Total trading volume (domestic + foreign exchange) increases when the stock 
becomes dually listed. The magnitude of increase is an increasing function of the 
number of informed traders which are given more opportunities to trade. However, 
the domestic exchange loses some trading volume to the foreign exchange. 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) utilise the framework of the theoretical models of Kyle 
(1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) to investigate the effects of multiple trading 
locations on trading volume. They model a market with different participants who 
have different strategies. "Small" liquidity traders are assumed to execute all their 
trades in one market. "Large" liquidity traders split their trades across markets to 
99 Q= var (Fl P) 
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minimise costs. The informed traders' and the large traders' order sizes are perfectly 
correlated across different markets. Therefore, an increasing proportion of liquidity 
trading leads to an increase in the total trading volume. If trading costs differ 
between markets the cost-minimising liquidity trader is forced to concentrate his 
trading in the cheapest market. This will also attract the information traders because 
their profitability of trading on the information is maximised in the most liquid market. 
Furthermore, the presence of "small" liquidity traders implies that the aggregate size 
of a typical trade becomes smaller if there is only a single market.. However, 
informed traders need liquid markets which enable them to camouflage their trades. 
5.1.3 International listing and changes in liquidity 
While Freedman's model predicts an increase in liquidity for internationally cross- 
listed stocks, other studies have suggested that an additional trading location may 
lead to a decline in the liquidity of a stock. Three different hypotheses concerning the 
effect of an additional trading location on the market quality of the primary market (or 
domestic market) have been suggested by previous literature: fragmentation, 
competition, or segmentation. 
"Fragmentation"'00 assumes that international listing diverts order flow away from the 
domestic market, thus resulting in less efficient pricing and lower market quality. 
"Competition" assumes that international listing increases the number of traders. This 
increased competition enhances the liquidity and the efficiency of the market. 
"Segmentation" presents an intermediate view combining aspects of both theories. 
Segmentation assumes that the effect on liquidity depends on the structure of the 
100 For details on fragmentation see also Hamilton (1979). 
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local market, especially if there is segmentation between domestic and foreign 
customers. Therefore, segmentation may lead to narrower bid-ask spreads, 
however, accompanied by a lower depth101 
Empirical studies on international listing examine these theoretical predictions in a 
number of ways and for different markets. While Foerster and Karolyi (1993) 
examine changes in trading volume from the pre- to the post-listing period for 
Canadian stocks listing in the US, Noronha, Sarin, and Saudagaran (1996) 
investigate changes in bid-ask spreads and depth for US firms. Domowitz, Glen, and 
Madhavan (1995) are the first to examine changes in liquidity for ADR listings of 
Mexican companies. Kleidon and Werner (1994) use a different approach to examine 
the liquidty effect of international cross-listing. They compare the intraday pattern of 
cross-listed firms with other firms which are not cross-listed. 
Improvements in liquidity once a stock becomes internationally listed appear to be an 
important motivation for managers to obtain a listing. Mittoo (1992) uses a survey 
approach to address the question of managerial perceptions of the net benefits of 
foreign listings. His sample consists of 78 Canadian companies102 which are listed in 
the US and UK. The results show that managers' perceptions of benefits from foreign 
listings are associated with the increased liquidity of their firms' stock103 A further 
examination utilising univariate tests between the perceived net benefits and the 
percentage of a firm's stock trading on the foreign stock exchange104 supports this 
relationship. Multivariate tests that control for other variables such as percentage of 
101This phenomena is described in more detail in Madhavan (1995). 
ß°2A mail questionnaire was used to obtain information. 190 Canadian companies listed on stock exchanges in the 
US or UK were identified. 78 companies replied (response rate of 41 %). The survey was anonymous and the 
companies were not identified. 
103 Firms' managers were asked to select and rank their potential reasons for an overseas listing from a list 
constructed from the literature. A second question requested their perceived benefits of the listing. 
104The percentage of a stock' s trading volume is obtained through the survey by requesting the respondent to check 
one of the five categories. 
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sales in foreign countries, percentage of equity issued, size of the firm, and listing 
location105 indicate that the trading volume on foreign exchanges is the only factor 
that influences the perceived net benefits significantly. These results show that 
managerial perceptions of net benefits from foreign listings are strongly linked to the 
level of trading activity in their firm's shares on foreign stock exchanges. 
Mittoo (1992) points out that the importance of trading volume is corroborated by 
analysing answers of firms which delisted from foreign exchanges voluntarily'06 
They all cited a lack of trading activity for their main reason of delisting. This trend is 
consistent with recently reported delistings of mainly US companies from the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange where the trading volume of foreign stocks declined substantially107 
He also examines the question why trading activity differs across companies. He 
estimates another multiple regression model to explore the relationship between the 
trading volume and some firm specific factors. Three of the specified variables have 
a significant impact on the foreign trading volume. The main factor appears to be the 
percentage of equity issued in foreign markets. He concludes that firms conducting 
most of their business abroad are likely to have a greater appeal to foreign investors. 
However, he also points out that an increase in liquidity may not be relevant in the 
case of US firms that list abroad because US firms already enjoy a high liquidity in 
their domestic market. 
Foerster and Karolyi (1993) base their analysis on the framework of Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988). They hypothesise that dual listing should lead to an increase in the 
overall trading volume if there are different costs of trading stocks between the 
Canadian and the US market. They compare the monthly average security trading 
105US studies try to examine different effects of a NYSE or a NASDAQ listing. 
106An additional questionnaire was mailed out to companies which delisted voluntarily from foreign exchanges. 
Although the response rate was very low it gives a good indication of the motives of a foreign listing. 
107The average daily trading in foreign stocks declined from a peak of Y11,235 bn in 1989 to Y41 Obn in 1993. 
See 
also Aponte (1994). 
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volume of dually listed Canadian stocks in the pre-listing period108 to the post-listing 
period109. Their results show an increase in the aggregate trading volume, and thus 
support the findings of Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and Freedman (1991) that dual 
listing is associated with increased liquidity. However, they do not give any 
information on differing transaction costs in the Canadian and US market as 
hypothesised. 
Kleidon and Werner (1994) compare the intraday pattern of volatility of prices, 
trading volume, and bid-ask spreads of a sample of UK firms1° that are cross-listed 
on the NYSE or AMEX to FT-SE 100 firms111 which are not cross-listed and S&P 100 
firms' 2. Firstly, they estimate time-of-day-effects using regression analysis for the 
S&P 100 firms. Their results show a U-shaped pattern of volatility with significantly 
higher variances in the first hour of trading. Trading volume is also U-shaped since it 
is significantly higher at the open and at the close. Bid-ask spreads are also U- 
shaped being significantly higher from the open up to 11: 00 and rising again above 
the mid-day-level during the last 35 minutes of trading. This observed intraday 
pattern is generally explained by Admati and Pfleiderer's (1988) model which 
focuses on asymmetric information between traders. Informed traders choose to 
trade in periods of high volume because this enables them to disguise their trades. 
Competition among informed traders reveals sufficient information to the market to 
induce liquidity traders to trade at the same time because their trading costs are 
lowest when volume is heavy. Therefore, informed and uninformed traders trade 
simultaneously. The higher volatility during that period is due to the revelation of 
108Volume transacted on the Toronto Stock Exchange in particular stock. 
109Volume includes now the transactions on the US and the Canadian exchange. 
110 Their sample comprises 23 companies which are listed in form of ADRs. The time period is from January 1,1991, 
through December, 31 1991.. 
"' This subsample consists of 76 UK firms. Transactions data spans the period from October 1,1991, through 
March 10,1992. 
112 98 US firms are in the subsample and the time period is from January 1,1991, through December, 31 1991. 
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private information to the market by informed traders. The results for spreads are 
consistent with Bagehot's (1971) argument that highest spreads coincide with 
periods of highest informed trading. 
The results for FT-SE 100 firms show a different intraday pattern of return variance 
and volume than S&P 100 firms. Although volatility of transactions returns is 
generally U-shaped, it is the largest at the end of the day. The volatility of mid-point 
quote returns are also generally U-shaped, however, early morning returns are more 
volatile than afternoon returns. The pattern for trading volume has a two-hump- 
shape with spikes at 10: 00 and at 12: 00. Trading volume is significantly higher at the 
end of the day between 14: 40 and 16: 30. Spreads are seen to be U-shaped but they 
fall and rise much faster to and from their mid-day level than those of the S&P 100 
firms. Moreover, they are virtually flat throughout the day. 
The volatility pattern for UK cross-listed securities in the UK is similar to the results 
for FT-SE 100 firms. The volume pattern is also similar, however, volume is 
significantly higher between 14: 40 and 16: 30. Spreads also show the same intraday 
behaviour but they generally decline between 15: 30 and 16: 25. This might be an 
indication of increased competition at a time when the US market and SEAQ 
simultaneously operate. The results for UK cross-listed securities in the US are 
generally similar to those of S&P 100 firms. Trading volume shows a U-shaped 
pattern and is significantly higher in the morning. However, spreads are not U- 
shaped and are significantly higher in the morning and significantly lower in the last 
hour of trading. 
Kleidon and Werner (1994) conclude that their results suggest some degree of 
segmentation between the two markets. Furthermore, the results indicate distinct 
intraday patterns in prices and volumes for different market structures. 
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Noronha, Sarin and Saudagaran (1996) investigate liquidity effects of internationally 
listed US companies13 using intraday data. Comparing changes in bid-ask spreads 
and depth from the pre- to the post-listing period14 their results show no change in 
bid-ask spreads but an increase in depth after the listing. The increase in depth is 
around 10%, and is statistically and economically significant. They also report an 
increase in daily trading volume. They proceed their analysis by regressing other 
microstructure related variables such as price, trading volume, daily return variance, 
and a dummy variable indicating spread changes on bid-ask spreads and depth. 
Their results for the spreads are consistent with earlier findings' 5: raw spreads 
should be higher for higher priced stocks, larger volatility implies higher spreads, and 
a higher trading volume leads to lower spreads. Return variance and volume have 
the opposite effect on depth than on spreads. The effects of the price on depth are 
the same as for spreads. These results indicate that all changes in depth can be 
explained by changes in other microstructure variables. 
Noronha, Sarin and Saudagaran (1996) further analyse the impact of international 
listing on informed trading. Their results suggest that trades in the underlying stock 
become more informative after the listing. This is consistent with Freedman (1991) 
who argues that more informed traders are attracted to the market after the listing 
because they can trade for extended hours and with a greater degree of anonymity. 
They argue that this increase in informed trading is responsible for the lack of 
improvement in spreads in spite of increased competition among traders. The cost of 
113 Their sample consists of 126 US companies which were listed on the London and Tokyo Stock Exchange 
between 1983 and 1989. 
114 The pre-listing period starts 125 days prior and ends 26 days prior to the date of listing. The post-listing period is 
from day +26 to +125. Daily weighted average bid-ask spreads are calculated by using quote-by-quote data where 
the weight for each quotation is the seconds for which that quotation is outstanding divided by the number of 
seconds in the trading day. The use the same weighting scheme 
for the depth measure. 
115 See Demsetz (1968) and Stoll (1978). 
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providing liquidity increases because marketmakers try to compensate themselves 
against the increased risk of trading with investors with superior information. 
Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (1995) examine the impact of Mexican companies' 
ADR listing in the US on the market quality of their primary Mexican stock market' 16 
They argue that inferences about market quality can be made by examining 
underlying market liquidity and base level volatility. In a market where transitory 
order imbalances generate price movements, price volatility and volume are 
positively correlated. They develop an econometric model to examine the effects of 
ADRs on price volatility and liquidity. Price volatility consists of two elements. The 
first component arises from changes in fundamentals and imperfect information 
signals. The second component is due to order flow shocks that arise from non- 
information based trading. The volatility induced by order flow shocks increases with 
greater risk aversion, greater variance in public beliefs, and fewer market 
participants. The second component can also be expressed as the product of volume 
and a market liquidity parameter' 17. This implies that liquidity increases with the 
number of traders, and decreases with greater risk aversion and a greater variance 
in public beliefs. 
Their empirical results show an increase in the base level of volatility and an 
increased sensitivity of price variability to volume. They argue that their results are 
consistent with the fragmentation hypothesis. Their test of changes in spreads reveal 
a decrease in 17 of their 23 series. This indicates that there may have been a trade- 
off between depth and spreads which is consistent with the segmentation 
hypothesis. However, their analysis of average ADR and domestic market returns 
116 Their sample includes 16 Mexican firms that listed ADRs between September 1989 through July 1993. The data is 
comprised of 26 different time series. 
117ln this case the variance of price changes can be written as follows: 62 (AP) = wt + ß. V2 where cot is the base level 
of volatility, X, the market liquidity parameter which is an inverse measure of market liquidity, and V, the volume. 
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suggests that there is sufficient arbitrage between both markets. Although they find 
that the ADR market has diverted some order flow118 away from the Mexican market, 
the overall volume seems to have increased. 
The results of the empirical studies appear to be largely consistent showing that 
international cross-listing leads to an increase in liquidity. However, the studies have 
also shown that the impact of international cross-listing on liquidity is influenced by 
different market structures. Although liquidity seems to be an important motivation for 
managers to obtain a listing, the results have highlighted the importance of 
understanding different markets before making a choice. 
5.1.4 Evidence of domestic listing and liquidity changes 
Previous research has investigated the issue of listing and liquidity for the domestic 
US market in various contexts. Research, for example, includes studies that examine 
market microstructure effects of domestic exchange listings (e. g. Sanger and 
McConnell (1986), Cooper, Groth, and Avera (1985), Edelman and Baker (1990), 
Cowan, Carter, Dark, and Singh (1992), and Kadlec and McConnell (1994)), 
changes in the index list (e. g. Harris and Gurel (1986) and Beneish and Gardner 
(1995)), and derivatives trading (e. g. Neal (1987) and Jegadeesh and 
Subrahmanyam (1993)). 
Sanger and McConnell (1986) and Kadlec and McConnell (1994) provide empirical 
evidence that a major stock exchange listing improves liquidity119. These findings 
contrast with earlier evidence by Cooper, Groth, and Avera (1985) who examine the 
118 Order flow is calculated similar to Foerster and Karolyi (1994). It is calculated as the ratio of average daily dollar 
volume of the ADR market to average daily dollar volume of the Mexican market. 
119 For more details see 42.3. 
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relationship of liquidity to exchange listing and price behaviour during major up and 
down movements. They compare the liquidity ratio and "up- and down betas" of 1515 
NYSE, 801 AMEX, and 964 OTC stocks. Their study centers around the idea that 
smaller stocks, and hence less liquid stocks, are affected by institutional buying and 
selling behaviour if swings in the market take place120. Their results suggest that 
security performance becomes more sensitive to downward movements in the 
market as liquidity decreases, and less sensitive to market upswings as liquidity 
increases. Moreover, OTC stocks appear to be more liquid than AMEX stocks of the 
same size which suggests that exchange listing is of little benefit to companies. 
The findings of Cowan, Carter, Dark, and Singh (1992) investigating US firms' 
domestic listing choices support the idea that firms list their stock on other 
exchanges in search of a more liquid market121. This would reduce transaction costs 
for their potential shareholders. They emphasise, however, that this potential cost- 
reducing benefits are not uniform across all firms. Moreover, they argue only those 
firms list on an exchange whose characteristics offer the greatest probability of 
reducing their spread by doing so. In a first step, they compare a number of 
microstructure-related characteristics of listing firms to the matched control 
portfolios122. Their microstructure-related variables include book value of assets, 
market value of equity, ratio of market to book value of equity, number of 
shareholders, shares outstanding, average volume, average trade size, market 
makers, relative bid-ask spread, return variance, beta, years qualified for listing, 
fraction of sample with dual classes of shares, fraction of sample listed on 
120 They suggest that institutional investors "probably buy big stocks first and sell small stocks first". 
12'They compare a sample of 277 US firms that list on the NYSE in the period 1973-1990 to a control sample of 
firms that are eligible but remain on the NASDAQ. 
122They match listing with non-listing control firms on the basis of two-digit SIC code industry classification and 
compare listing firm data with control firm data 
for the same year. 
121 
NASDAQ/NMS, and growth in pre-tax profit. Their results suggest that listing choices 
depend on stock liquidity characteristics and thus, the potential benefits of a listing. 
According to results of other studies123, the reduction of bid-ask spreads is a likely 
motive for exchange listing. Cowan, Carter, Dark, and Singh (1992) proceed in their 
investigation and examine the relationship of a number of independent liquidity- 
related variables of the bid-ask spread. Their results indicate that the bid-ask spread 
is especially influenced by the volume of a stock, the bid price, and the number of 
market makers. In a next step, they examine the impact of a number of trading 
characteristics on the listing decision. They observe several variables which appear 
to influence a firm's listing decision. Firms are more likely to list when their spreads 
are larger than other market microstructure characteristics would predict. 
Furthermore, they suggest that the reduction of estimation risk124 could be a motive 
for a listing. 
While Harris and Gurrel (1986) investigate price and volume effects of S&P 500 list 
changes, Beneish and Gardner (1995) examine stock price and trading volume 
effects of changes in the composition of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). 
The sample of Beneish and Gardner (1995) consists of 37 listings and 31 delistings 
between 1929 and 1988. They find that the inclusion of stocks in the DJIA does not 
affect their stock price and volume behaviour. However, delistings experience 
negative abnormal returns and a decrease in their trading activity. These findings are 
consistent with an information cost/ liquidity explanation. Information cost models 
(e. g. Arbel and Strebel (1982), Barry and Brown (1984), and Amihud and Mendelson 
123Grammmatikos and Papaioannou (1986a) suggest that a listing on the NYSE reduces the bid-ask spread and find 
that companies benefit the more the greater the bid-ask spread in the pre-listing market for the stock. This is 
demonstrated by positive abnormal returns at the announcement of the listing. 
124Other studies find that the betas of newly NYSE listed firms decline during the first year of trading on the 
exchange. Clarkson and Thompson (1990) argue that the reduction in beta is the result of a decreasing estimation 
risk as more information is generated about listed firms. Dhaliwal (1983) presents empirical evidence that more 
financial information is collected and disseminated on firms listed on the NYSE or AMEX. 
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(1986)) predict that investors demand higher returns for stocks with less available 
information. Since bid-ask spreads (see 5.1.1. ) decrease with trading volume, the 
decline in trading volume for delisted stocks is consistent with an increase in 
transaction costs and a reduction in information for these stocks. 
5.1.5 Price transmission dynamics and efficiency of the ADR market 
The issue of linkage and dynamic interaction of markets has been examined in 
various contexts. Previous studies, for example, have investigated the 
interdependence between national stock markets (Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993), 
Eun and Shim (1989), Kasa (1992), Malliaris and Urrutia (1992), and Taylor and 
Tonks (1989)), the price discovery in futures and cash markets (Fleming, Ostdiek, 
and Whaley (1996), Garbade and Silber (1983), Quan (1992), and Wahab and 
Lasghari (1993)), the efficiency of foreign exchange markets (Hakkio and Rush 
(1989), and Sephton and Larsen (1991)), and price interactions of cross-listed stocks 
(Ben-Zion, Hauser, and Lieberman (1996) and Eun and Jang (1996)). A great 
number of these studies make use of developments in the theory of cointegration to 
test for market efficiency and linkages among markets. 
Since the flow of international investment has rapidly grown in recent years, studies 
on international stock market linkages provide information on how shocks in one 
market are transmitted to other markets. The majority of these studies use stock 
market indices and find that the US market leads other international equity markets. 
Eun and Shim (1989) investigate the international transmission mechanism of stock 
market movements for 9 different markets. Their vector autoregressive analysis 
(VAR) shows that a substantial amount of multi-lateral interaction between these 
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markets exists. While movements in the US market are rapidly transmitted to other 
markets, no foreign market can significantly explain movements in the US market. 
Taylor and Tonks (1989) use Granger-causality tests to examine the integration of 
UK and other stock markets. They find that the UK stock exchange has become 
cointegrated with the German, Dutch, and the Japanese market. Arshanapalli and 
Doukas (1993) conduct cointegration and error-correction tests to examine the 
dynamic interaction between the US, French, German, Japanese, and UK markets. 
Their findings show that the three major European markets (UK, France, and 
Germany) have become strongly cointegrated with the US market after the 1987 
crash. Kasa (1992) uses Johansen's multivariate cointegration tests and finds that a 
common stochastic trend drives equity markets of the US, Japan, UK, Germany, and 
Canada. Most studies draw similar conclusions arguing that in the long run there 
appear to be no gains from international portfolio diversification since markets have 
become closely correlated. 
Karolyi and Stulz (1996) and Lau and Diltz (1994) use NYSE-listed Japanese ADRs 
and their underlying shares to investigate the impact of information shocks on the 
comovement of US and Japanese returns. The results of Karolyi and Stulz (1996) 
show that large shocks to broad-based market indices have a positive impact on the 
magnitude and persistence of return correlations. Lau and Diltz (1994) show that the 
transmission of pricing information for Japanese firms with listed ADRs runs from the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange to the NYSE. However, they argue this result is not surprising 
since these firms are headquartered in Tokyo. 
Other ADR studies are mainly concerned with the efficiency of the ADR market. 
Rosenthal (1983) finds that ADR prices are fairly consistent with weak-form 
efficiency since abnormal returns could not be earned from any price dependence. 
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Kato, Linn, and Schallheim (1991) investigate the underlying share and ADR prices 
of 8 Australian, 7 English, and 8 Japanese firms. Their findings show no significant 
differences between the prices, and thus no arbitrage opportunities seem to exist. 
Rosenthal and Young (1990) examine two Anglo-Dutch groups (Unilever and 
Royal/Dutch Shell) which trade on the London Stock Exchange, on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange, and as ADRs on the NYSE. Although they report persistent 
deviations from the theoretical pricing relationships, the direction and the magnitude 
of the mispricing is not sufficiently large enough to formulate profitable intra- or 
intermarket trading rules. Kim, Mathur, and Szakmary (1995) examine 21 Japanese, 
21 British, 5 Dutch, 5 Swedish, and 4 Australian companies which trade as ADRs in 
the US. To investigate informational efficiency and the dynamics of information 
transmission of ADRs and underlying shares, they perform multivariate cointegration 
tests and a vector autoregressive analysis (VAR). Their results show that ADRs 
respond to unexpected movements in the underlying shares, the S&P 500 index, the 
domestic index, and the exchange rate, implying that ADR markets are 
informationally efficient. Moreover, their findings show that currency shocks have 
become a more important factor for pricing ADRs in recent years. 
To explore the transmission of pricing information for identical assets trading in 
different markets, Garbade and Silber (1979) develop a model that examines short- 
run price relationships for dually-traded securities on the NYSE, the Midwest Stock 
Exchange (MSE), and the Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE). Their results indicate that 
regional market prices always adjust to NYSE prices. Hence, the NYSE is the 
dominant market while the regional stock exchanges are satellites of the NYSE. The 
"Garbade and Silber approach" is also used by Pagano and Roell (1991) to 
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investigate whether the London market for Italian equities125 and the Milan Stock 
Exchange are integrated. Their examination of the direction of information flows 
between both markets shows that a mutual feedback relationship over time between 
prices exists but in most cases Milan seems to lead London. 
Quan (1992) examines the price discovery of crude oil and futures markets. They 
find that the spot price and one- and three-month-ahead futures prices are 
cointegrated which suggests there is a long-run relationship between the spot and 
futures price. The results of an error correction model, which is used to study the 
dynamics of the relationship between futures and spot prices, show that the spot 
price leads the futures price. 
Wahab and Lasghari (1993) examine the daily price change relation between stock 
index and stock index futures markets for the Standard and Poor 500 (S&P 500) and 
the Financial Times-Stock Exchange 100 share index (FT-SE 100). To test the 
causal relationship between time series, they employ the theory of cointegration, as 
developed by Engle and Granger (1987). The estimation procedure consists of two 
steps. In a first step, a levels regression is performed to generate residuals which 
may be thought of as equilibrium pricing errors. These residuals are then subjected 
to a variety of tests for cointegration. In the second step, the lagged values of the 
residuals enter into the error correction model as the last period equilibrium error. 
The error correction coefficients serve to purposes: they help to identify the direction 
of causal relation between two time series and show the speed with which 
departures from the equilibrium are corrected in the short run. 
125Italian equities are traded on SEAQ International which is a screen-based price quotation system for trading non- 
UK shares. However, to be traded on SEAQ International does not require an "official" listing (for more details on 
SEAQ I, see 3.3.2). For details on Pagano and Roell (1991) see also 5.1.1. 
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The results from Wahab and Lasghari (1993) indicate that a feedback relationship 
between spot and futures markets seems to exist. Similar to previous studies the 
spot appears to lead the futures market. The equilibrium adjustments are not fully 
completed within one day. They argue, however, that the presence of causal 
linkages is consistent with a variety of market imperfections and realities that prohibit 
market participants from responding to every single deviation between both markets. 
Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley (1996) also argue that in practice frictions exist and 
trading costs differ across markets. Hence, price discovery will tend to occur first in 
the lowest cost market, as information-based trades are executed where they 
produce the highest net profit. Their empirical results show that the S&P 500 index 
futures and S&P 100 index options appear to lead the S&P 500 stock index and the 
underlying S&P 100 index respectively since trading in index futures and index 
options is cheaper than trading an equivalent stock portfolio. This trading pattern, 
however, is reversed for individual stocks since the stock market offers lower trading 
costs and is deeper than any particular option price series. 
Following the price discovery studies of cash and futures markets, Eun and Jang 
(1996) and Ben-Zion, Hauser, and Lieberman (1996) use an error correction 
approach to examine the price behaviour of international cross-listed stocks. Their 
results are similar showing that the domestic market leads the foreign market which 
is consistent with the "home market leadership hypothesis". This can be explained by 
a number of reasons. It is likely that the home country produces most information 
concerning the domestic stock and home country investors have immediate access 
to these news. Moreover, the home market is often the place where most 
transactions are carried out which reinforces the role of the home market as the price 
leader in the global market. 
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While Eun and Jang (1996) construct portfolios of firms that are cross-listed on three 
major markets (New York, London, and Tokyo), Ben-Zion, Hauser, and Lieberman 
(1996) investigate 5 New York-listed Israeli firms. The sample of Eun and Jang 
(1996) is comprised of 29 US, 9 UK, and 18 Japanese firms which are 
simultaneously listed on the New York, London, and Tokyo Stock Exchange. Using 
daily price series they construct three portfolios (US portfolio, UK portfolio, and 
Japanese portfolio) to examine the pattern of international price transmission. They 
find that the home market returns always cause the foreign market returns. While the 
New York market provides significant feedback for the UK and Japanese portfolios to 
their domestic markets, it does not receive feedback from both markets for US 
stocks. The study of Ben-Zion, Hauser, and Lieberman (1996) takes account of the 
different trading days in Israel and in the US since trading in Israel takes place from 
Sunday through to Thursday. While the domestic market emerges as the dominant 
market, they find, as expected, a different pattern for middle of the week days and 
beginning/ end of the week days. Only in one case a feedback relationship seems to 
exist. They argue, however, this is not surprising since this company is a large 
international company. 
5.2 Financial disclosure levels and the exchange choice 
The financial disclosure level is an important issue for companies considering an 
international listing since it imposes a potential cost for companies. This cost is 
expected to be higher for companies whose domestic listing requirements differ 
substantially from the host stock exchange. In particular, different accounting 
standards across countries represent one major hurdle for foreign companies (for 
more details, see also 3.1.3). 
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Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) hypothesise that firms are less likely to list on foreign 
stock exchanges with higher disclosure levels than their domestic exchange. They 
interpret "financial disclosure" very broadly including mandated (accounting, listing 
and regulatory requirements) and voluntary disclosures (as expected by market 
participants). In order to determine the disclosure level ranks of individual countries, 
they construct an index of disclosure levels which is based on previous studies. 
These studies (see Lafferty and Cairns (1980), Choi and Bavishi (1982) and Cairns, 
Lafferty and Mantle (1984)) have reached similar conclusions about the 
comprehensiveness of financial disclosures among different countries. They rate 
financial disclosures of companies from the US, UK and Canada among the most 
comprehensive and those from Germany, Switzerland and France among the least 
comprehensive. 
Gray (1980) suggests a possible explanation for differences in disclosure levels 
across countries. According to their findings, disclosure levels are influenced by user 
demands. While countries such as the US, UK and Canada have a widespread 
ownership of securities, they display a greater equity investor orientation in their 
disclosure requirements. In Germany and France, banks are the dominant 
shareholders as well as the major suppliers of debt capital for many listed 
companies126. Thus they are less interested in wider disclosure of information. 
These findings imply that companies from countries with lower disclosure levels face 
higher financial reporting costs when seeking a foreign listing in a country with high 
disclosure levels. Cooke (1993) reports that Japanese companies have traditionally 
avoided a quotation in the US in favour of the more liberal European capital markets. 
'26 See also 3.1.3.1. 
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Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) investigate the listing choices of 207 internationally 
traded firms. However, their results give only weak support to their hypothesis that 
firms are more (less) likely to list on foreign exchanges with disclosure levels less 
(more) stringent than their domestic levels. They also control for other factors as 
industry, geographic location, exports of firms' goods to the exchange market, and 
firm size relative to the domestic capital market. They observe some evidence that 
firms appear less likely to list their shares on a foreign stock exchange with higher 
disclosure levels than those of their domiciles. 
However, their results fail to explain firms' choices for some exchanges and the case 
of London illustrates that very well. Their index of disclosure levels rates London as 
the second most stringent exchange. This gives rise to the assumption that their 
disclosure index is not an exact representation of the reality. This argument is 
corroborated by a more recent study by Meek and Gray (1989) which investigates 
the extent to which Continental European companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange comply with the minimum standards of the exchange. They find out that 
the London Stock Exchange's disclosure requirements appear to be relatively 
minimal for Continental European companies. Their disclosure standard (mandated 
domestic standard or voluntary disclosure) must exceed those minimum standards in 
order to compete successfully in international capital markets. Moreover, the 
environment has changed in recent years and listing requirements for overseas 
companies have been relaxed since. This is also documented in the recognition of 
SEAQ International as a "regulated market" in the Investment Services Directive127 
This means that companies are required to disclose information voluntarily rather 
127For a moor detailed discussion of the ISD, see also Steilt (1994) and Hawawini and Schill (1992). 
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than through mandated standards because a quotation is due to market participants' 
desire to trade in a stock128 
As argued in chapter 3, disclosure levels are certainly of great importance to 
companies considering a listing abroad. They influence a firm's decision in such that 
the possible benefits of a foreign listing must exceed the high costs associated with a 
listing on a stock exchange with stringent disclosure requirements. Thus, a different 
stock price reaction is expected upon listing from companies with a lower disclosure 
level than the foreign stock exchange. The decision of a company to comply with 
stringent disclosure requirements may be seen as a signal to the investment 
community. Especially, Continental European companies which mainly relied on debt 
financing in the past may signal a change to a policy of equity investors' culture. This 
may even be more important for emerging markets companies, since their move to a 
stringent exchange serves to build up investors' confidence in their stock129. 
5.3 International listing and equity issuance 
Many previous studies have identified the importance of access to foreign capital 
markets as one of the prime reasons to obtain a listing on foreign stock exchanges. 
However, empirical evidence which tests this proposition and examines the use of 
international listing for raising new capital remains very scarce. Although ADRs have 
developed into an important instrument to raise capital internationally, research on 
international equity offerings with ADR tranches hardly exists. Research on IPOs 
(initial public offerings) has generated a large international literature. However, IPOs 
128Rule 535.4 of the "Rules and Regulations of the London Stock Exchange" permits its members to deal in foreign 
equities if they are issued by a company which is listed or quoted on an recognised investment exchange. 
12 Lucas (1994) reports about Chinese companies' factors influencing their listing decision. Some of them perceive 
that a listing in New York carries a higher prestige than a listing in Hong Kong because this proves their ability to 
comply with more stringent disclosure rules. 
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which are offered simultaneously in a number of different markets have been largely 
overlooked. 
Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) summarise the findings of IPO studies from 25 
different countries. Their evidence shows that the phenomenon of positive first day 
returns exists in every country, although the degree of underpricing varies from 
country to country. Explanations for this phenomenon focus on the relationship 
between uncertainty and initial returns. Several proxy variables have been suggested 
to measure value uncertainty. For example, issue size, annual sales volume, age of 
company, gross proceeds, asset value, and price at issue have been tested to 
explain underpricing. Overall these uncertainty characteristics seem to be positively 
related to initial returns, and hence consistent with the empirical implications derived 
from Rock's (1986) and Benveniste and Spindt's (1989) models. Miller and Reilly 
(1987) argue that the level of trading activity may signify the extent to which 
investors disagree about the value of a security. Miller and Reilly (1987) and Barry 
and Jennings (1993) also show that many shares experience a high level of trading 
activity during their first day of trading. 
Explanations for the "underpricing" anomaly are summarised by Ibbotson, Sindelar, 
and Ritter (1994) but these theories are not- mutually exclusive. The various theories 
put forward by the IPO literature focus on the relations between investors, issuers, 
and investment banks. While the "winner's curse" explanation focuses on an 
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors (see Rock's 
(1986) model), other models concentrate on the relation between the issuing firm 
and the investment bank (see, for example, Baron and Holmstrom (1980), Baron 
(1982), and Tonks (1996)). Empirical evidence for the "winner's curse" explanation is 
provided by Koh and Walter (1989) for Singapore and by Levis (1990) for the UK. 
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Tonks (1996) shows that positive first day returns can be explained by the sequential 
equilibrium in the bargaining game between the issuing firm and the investment 
bank. This allows the investment bank to underprice the issue to reduce its 
marketing efforts. 
Doukas and Yung (1992) examine 39 foreign firms that issued ADR-IPOs in the US 
market from 1977 to 1989 and a control sample of US-IPOs from 1982 to 1989. They 
report an insignificant first day return of 0.96 percent, and hence argue that ADR- 
IPOs are not underpriced. Moreover, their regression results show that underpricing 
of ADR initial offerings is statistically smaller than the underpricing of domestic initial 
offerings. US investors may possess less private information about foreign 
companies than about domestic firms. This explains the lack of underpricing for 
foreign IPOs. This also suggests that foreign capital markets are not completely 
integrated with US markets. They argue this is consistent with Rock's (1986) model 
since US investors are likely to be less informed about foreign firms than US firms. 
Mittoo's (1992) results130 show that an increased ability to raise equity is perceived 
as the main benefit of foreign listing by corporate managers. Radebaugh, Gebhardt, 
and Gray (1995) examine the factors that influenced Daimler-Benz to list on the 
NYSE. They provide evidence that Daimler Benz conducted a rights issue seven 
month after the listing. Moreover, they argue that without the NYSE listing the size of 
the rights issue would have exceeded the capacity of the German market to absorb 
the offering. 
Glen and Pinto (1994) investigate the use of international capital markets as a 
source of external financing for emerging market firms after their economic 
liberalisation. They show that cross-border equity and cross-border debt issues have 
130 For more details see 5.1.3. 
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increased substantially in recent years. They discuss the financing options that are 
available for emerging market firms, however, argue that the marginal cost of listing 
on a major exchange may still outweigh the advantages generated by it. Moreover, 
Glen and Pinto (1994) apply the pecking order theory to an Indonesian firm which 
would look as follows: (1) Use of internal funds; (2) state bank loans; (3) private and 
foreign bank loans; (4) domestic floatation; (5) international issues. 
5.4 Effect of market conditions on raising equity capital 
The new issues literature has shown that market conditions play an important role for 
firms seeking to raise equity capital. Timing considerations could also be important 
for companies that access international capital markets to issue equity. Additional 
factors may influence the decision of firms since international capital markets may 
offer certain "international windows of opportunity". This is also suggested by Marr, 
Trimble, and Varma (1991) who compare 32 Euroequity131 and 196 domestic equity 
offerings of US companies between 1985-1988. They find that Euroequity offerings 
experience higher positive abnormal returns in the pre-announcement period, but 
only insignificantly negative returns in the post-announcement period. Their results 
show that the issue size has a significant influence on the choice of corporations 
between a Euroequity or domestic-equity offering. This implies that a company 
increases the issue size above their actual needs if it perceives favourable market 
conditions overseas. These bargains can also be caused by currency revaluations or 
changes in investors' perception. To examine firms' choice of Euroequity and 
13'Euroequity is a registered new issue of stock by an American corporation that is sold simultaneously in two 
tranches. The domestic tranche is sold in the home market. The foreign tranche is sold abroad and its legal structure 
tries to take advantage of the needs of foreign investors. The foreign tranche is issued as a bearer instrument to 
foreign investors who desire anonymity. 
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domestic-equity offerings in more depth, they perform further tests. If samples were 
random a test would regress the issue and issuer characteristics and the percentage 
of the issue sold offshore, and the tranche on announcement returns. But 
substantially larger issue sizes and issuer capitalisations of Euroequities indicate 
self-selection bias by issuers132. Another problem occurs as the size of the offshore 
tranche may be endogenous133 Their analysis includes two steps: 
Firstly, they estimate the probability of a firm choosing Euroequity financing which is 
a function of issue size and the size and the ownership structure of the issuing firm. 
This estimation procedure provides selection bias W which controls for the self- 
selection bias that may occur if Euroequity issuers actually have a comparative 
advantage in issuing offshore. Secondly, they regress the following independent 
variables on the abnormal returns for domestic-equity and Euroequity issues: the 
firm's beta coefficient, the size and the ownership structure variables, the selection 
bias variable W and the tranche (percentage of the issue in the offshore). Their 
results indicate that the abnormal return is influenced by selection bias, institutional 
holdings and tranche. The value for tranche suggests that Euroequity issuer 
experience a smaller decrease in their market value. 
This finding is consistent with the theoretical propositions by Stapelton and 
Subrahmanyam (1977) and Alexander, Eun, Janakiramanan (1987) that companies 
can reduce their cost of capital if they dismantle barriers of investment and increase 
diversification opportunities for foreign investors. Since these results also suggest 
that foreign capital markets may not be completely integrated with the US capital 
market, they conclude that companies try to capitalise on financing bargains 
132They suggest that many variables would have to be included in such a regression: Any characteristics of 
companies that appeal to foreign investors, established names overseas, location of overseas operations, etc. 
133The percentage of stock sold offshore depends on the likelihood of reduction of the cost of equity. 
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overseas. Doukas and Yung (1992) also argue that the incomplete integration 
between the US market and foreign capital markets may be an incentive for foreign 
companies to list their stock abroad and take advantage of favourable market 
conditions in the targeted market. 
The listing decision may also be related to the performance of a stock market over a 
particular time period. Companies may hope that the strong demand for domestic 
stocks might also affect the demand for foreign shares. For example, the 
percentage134 of US shares traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange increased from 
0.5% in 1980 to 9% in 1986. This coincided with an increase in the overall trading 
volume in Japanese shares and a rising Japanese stock market. The trading volume 
and the number of listings of foreign stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange increased 
substantially135 throughout this period. 
The new issue literature provides substantial evidence that market conditions 
influence the timing of equity issues. A number of studies show that prior stock 
market increases are positively related to the frequency of equity issues (e. g. 
Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), and Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993)). 
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) provide empirical evidence that a large number of 
firms issue equity in expansionary phases of the business cycle. They argue that this 
phenomenon is consistent with firms issuing equity when the face lower "adverse 
selection" costs. Such a period occurs when firms are more optimistic about future 
business conditions. Hence, the widely documented equity announcement effect is 
less pronounced in such periods. Bayless and Chaplinsky's (1996) findings support 
134Average volume of US stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as a percentage of their volume on the NYSE. 
135The Tokyo Stock Exchange 1993 Fact Book reports significant increases in the trading volume in foreign stocks 
peaking in 1989. About 90% of US companies listed throughout the period of 
1986-1990 on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. A similar picture is obtained from other foreign companies. 
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the existence of windows of opportunity for equity issues. Their results show that the 
equity announcement effect is lower in periods with high equity issue volume (hot 
markets) than in low equity issue volume (cold markets). This suggests that firms 
face lower adverse selection costs in periods with high issuing activity. 
Ritter (1991) argues that firms try to time their issues when the market is willing to 
pay high multiples. These `windows of opportunity' arise when investors are 
overoptimistic about the future prospects of certain industries. In this case, a poor 
long-run performance should be observed because investors correct this 
misvaluation in subsequent periods. 
Ljungqvist (1996) 136 however, refutes this "sentiment timing" proposition. To 
conclude that investor sentiment causes long-run underperformance, he argues, 
firms floated in buoyant market conditions should perform worse than those issued in 
a bearish market. He uses three different proxies to distinguish whether IPOs were 
floated in bullish or in bearish markets: (1) observable index returns prior to the 
issue; (2) price-earnings ratios; and (3) market-to-book market. His results show that 
firms issued in bullish markets perform better than bearish market IPOs. This 
evidence is inconsistent with sentiment timing which proposes that long-run 
underperformance is caused by the correction of a misvaluation of periodically 
overoptimistic investors. 
5.5 Other factors of the listing decision 
Previous research has also suggested that the listing decision is influenced by a 
number of other factors. It may simply be the case that bigger firms are more likely to 
136 Ljungqvist (1993) examines 145 German IPOs which were floated between 1970 and 1990. 
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list or their choice is motivated by business activities in the host country, or solely by 
geographical proximity. 
5.5.1 Listing decision and the size of the company 
To examine the firm size proposition, Saudagaran (1988) uses market capitalisation 
concentration ratios137 to examine this hypothesis. He suggests that large companies 
from small markets outgrow their domestic capital market. In order to compete with 
other multinational companies, they need to go to a market which mitigates these 
financial disadvantages. Using univariate and multivariate tests they find out that the 
relative size of a company seems to have a significant influence on the listing 
decision of corporations. 
While Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) especially examine the effects of financial 
disclosure levels on firms' choices among alternative foreign listings they include the 
relative size of a company as a control variable in their multivariate regression 
equation. But the relative size is only significant for companies' listing decision on the 
Paris and Zurich stock exchanges. Since a further examination of the sample reveals 
that in the case of the Paris Stock Exchange about 60% of the companies are from 
the US, the results have only a limited explanatory power. There are also some 
indications that companies with smaller domestic capital markets perceive the 
highest net benefits138 
137It is calculated as follows: Market value of the outstanding common shares of a firm at year-end divided by the 
market value of the outstanding common shares of all domestic firms listed on the stock exchange at year-end. 
138Eitemann and Stonehill (1989) examine in a case study the experience of the Danish pharmaceutical firm, Novo, 
which listed on the NYSE. They conclude that Novo could lower its cost of capital substantially through a number of 
successive share issues in the US market. Because the Danish market would not have been big enough to absorb 
this volume. 
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5.5.2 Listing and foreign business activity 
Firms may list their stock to assist their foreign business activities in the country of 
listing. Several motives are suggested by the literature. The foreign market may be 
of importance for the company's products or as a manufacturing facility. A listing may 
also facilitate acquisitions or the financing of subsidiaries in the foreign country. 
Saudagaran (1988) and Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) examine the importance of 
the market for a firm's goods and services in the location country of the foreign stock 
exchange. A listing may enhance the company's visibility and the name recognition 
in that country. This may be seen as "free" advertising and be particularly beneficial 
for producers of consumer and industrial products. However, both studies face 
problems in measuring this factor precisely because companies do not disclose 
country-by-country breakdown of revenues. Saudagaran (1988) uses the ratio of the 
firm's total sales to its world-wide sales. Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) use the 
proportion of exports from a given industry and domicile to a given foreign exchange 
country 139. Saudagaran's (1988) findings140 show that companies with a greater 
degree of revenues abroad are more likely to list on a foreign stock exchange. This 
might explain a firm's willingness to list in countries with a smaller capital market than 
their own. Mittoo's (1992) results do not support the hypothesis that the listing 
decision is influenced by the location of the company's manufacturing facilities. 
Saudagaran (1988) points out that companies have become more dependent on 
foreign labour, and hence they give more attention to labour relations in foreign 
affiliates. Therefore, they have introduced employee stock-ownership plans (ESOP's) 
139But this estimation weakens the power of the tests because it does not account for the different position of each 
individual company. 
140Fry, Lee, and Choi (1994) find that a business presence in Japan prior to the listing on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
is not of any advantage for US companies. 
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for their personnel. But this programs are more meaningful to foreign employees if 
the parent's company is listed on the local stock exchange. However, he does not 
explicitly investigate the use of ESOP's by foreign listed companies141. He uses a 
matched pair sample of listed and non-listed companies to compare the relative level 
of foreign employment for both groups. His results indicate that foreign listed firms 
have a higher level of foreign employment than only domestically listed companies. 
However, the use of a multivariate regression to explain firms' listing decision on the 
level of foreign employment fails to perform well. 
Fatemi and Rad (1996) explore the motives of 40 Dutch firms to obtain an 
international cross-listing. They find that financial considerations and the desire to 
build up a profile as an international firm influence their decision to cross-list 
internationally. 
Dugan (1989) describes different uses of ADR programs. A listing in a foreign market 
enables a company to use an equity offer as a method of payment for their 
acquisition 142 
. 
Further examples are UK companies with US subsidiaries that have 
dollar-funding requirements. Companies may float part of their foreign subsidiaries 
because these may be able to raise equity capital more cheaply than their 
parents143 
141 Statistics released by the London Stock Exchange (Quality of Markets Review, Spring Edition 1993, Summer 
Edition 1993, Autumn Edition 1993) include under "Money Raised by Further Issues from Overseas Companies" the 
category "Employee Shares". Figures for January-March 1993 show an amount of £1140.7m, for April-June 1993 
£311.9m and for July-September 1993 £141.8m. 
142This may be cheaper for a company. But an equity offer might not be possible without a listing because some 
investment funds (especially in the US) are prohibited by their charter to hold foreign equities (e. g. ADRs have the 
status of domestic equities). 
143The Economist (January 1994) gives an example of a Japanese company which floated their Hong Kong 
subsidiary on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The public share offering was heavily oversubscribed because 
investors viewed that subsidiary as a "Chinese" company. 
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5.5.3 Geography and listing 
Firms are more likely to list in neighbour countries with which they have close cultural 
and economic links. Foerster and Karolyi (1993) expect more interlistings within 
trading bloc countries (as the EU or NAFTA). Also Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) 
provide some evidence that European firms are more likely to list in European 
countries. Cultural and economic ties might also explain the great number of 
companies from the US, Canada, or South Africa which have been listed on the 
London Stock Exchange for a long time. 
5.6 Summary and conclusions 
The aim of the last two chapters has been to provide a critical review of past studies, 
that have examined international listings and related literature, and identify some of 
the key issues that require further investigation. Apart from examining the motivation 
of firms to list abroad, previous literature has highlighted the importance of the 
impact of listing on liquidity and international market segmentation. While there is 
ample evidence of the significance of liquidity for pricing assets and liquidity effects 
of domestic exchange listings, there is still very little evidence on the liquidity and 
stock return differences across international stock exchanges. These differences 
may arise from differences in the institutional framework that govern the issuance 
and trading of foreign equities in the two markets under investigation (US and UK). 
The examination whether one stock exchange offers larger liquidity benefits than 
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others may also shed further light on the motives of firms to list on a particular stock 
exchange. 
Since it appears to be harder for foreign firms to obtain a listing in the US, the 
potential benefits may be larger. The barriers to access the US market may even be 
higher for emerging market firms. While previous research has mainly examined 
listings of US firms in other markets, it has not investigated whether foreign firms 
listing in the US experience larger wealth effects and liquidity benefits than firms 
listing in London. Moreover, research has also not compared the impact of 
international listing for emerging market and developed market firms. 
Previous literature provides extensive evidence on initial public offerings (IPOs) and 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in various contexts. While a number of previous 
studies emphasise the significance of international listing to gain access to foreign 
capital markets, the link between international listing and capital raising activity has 
not been investigated empirically. This area appears to be of particular importance 
since the amounts raised in global equity offerings, as shown in Chapter 2 and 3, 
have constantly increased in recent years. The decision to raise equity with the 
listing and the choice of the offering method may also affect the liquidity and the 
investor base of firms. 
The new issues literature provides substantial evidence that market conditions 
influence the timing of equity issues. A number of studies show that prior stock 
market increases are positively related to the frequency of equity issues. Previous 
research has argued that firms try to time their issues when the market is willing to 
pay high multiples. These `windows of opportunity' arise when investors are 
overoptimistic about the future prospects of certain industries. Similar evidence has 
been provided for domestic exchange listings. While timing considerations may affect 
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the decision to list internationally, existing literature to date has not investigated this 
issue. 
The trading of internationally cross-listed stocks has also raised questions 
concerning the linkage and dynamic interaction between markets. Empirical research 
has shown that the ADR market and the underlying share market appear to be 
efficient since one market responds to innovations in the other market. Previous 
studies examining seasoned firms support the `home market leadership hypothesis'. 
While in recent years an increasing number of equity issues has been structured as 
global offerings, this issue has not been examined for global IPOs which are sold 
simultaneously in different markets. 
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6. Chapter: The impact of international market segmentation 
and market conditions on the stock price behavior of listings 
The review of the literature in Chapter 4 has shown that studies which examine 
listings of US firms on European and Asian stock exchanges find negative abnormal 
returns, or no evidence of any significant price movements in the pre-listing period. 
However, non-US firms that list in the US experience positive abnormal returns. 
Studies that examine the post-listing performance of internationally listed firms 
appear to provide more unanimous results, since they report persistently negative 
abnormal returns in the post-listing period. Previous literature interprets this result as 
being consistent with a decline in expected returns once these stocks become 
internationally listed. These results seem to support the theoretical implications of 
several models which conclude that an international listing should result in structural 
changes in the equilibrium asset pricing relationship if markets are segmented. 
However, empirical studies examining new issues and domestic exchange listings of 
US firms report a similar negative return pattern. Very often it is argued that firms try 
to time their issues to take advantage of overoptimistic investors. However, this 
misvaluation is gradually corrected in subsequent periods leading to negative 
abnormal returns. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 2 describes the sample. Section 3 discusses 
different performance measurement methodologies. The empirical findings are 
presented in Section 4. The first part examines the influence of institutional 
characteristics on the price reaction of international listings. The second part 
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provides evidence on the return behaviour of emerging market and developed 
market firms. The third part analyses timing-related explanations of ADR listings. The 
fourth part examines the price reaction of ADRs and underlying shares jointly. 
Section 5 concludes the article. 
6.1 Hypotheses tested 
The mixed evidence of previous research regarding the valuation impact of 
international listing raises questions to what extent the stock price reaction is 
influenced by institutional factors. Since the institutional framework which governs 
trading and issuance of foreign equities differs markedly between the US and UK, it 
is reasonable to expect differences in the stock price reaction upon an US or UK 
listing of foreign stocks. Unless foreign firms register with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) of the United States, their stocks cannot be traded on 
a regulated exchange or even marketed to US investors within the US. This is in 
stark contrast to the UK approach which does not restrict trading and marketing of 
unlisted foreign equities. Hence, it is likely that the dismantling of investment barriers 
is stronger in the case of foreign firms listing in the US, since US investors may face 
higher transaction and information costs in the pre-listing period. In particular, high 
information costs, which are caused by different accounting rules, are of great 
importance144 
Although previous literature has shown that emerging market firms face higher 
barriers to investment, none of the studies has examined differences in the price 
144 Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) argue that the home bias in equity portfolios is caused by costs of international 
equity ownership. One important component is costs associated with acquiring and interpreting information about 
foreign companies. 
145 
reaction for emerging market firms and developed market firms that list ADRs on the 
NYSE. Moreover, previous research has not taken account of differences in the 
method of listing (introduction or public offering). Approximately 35 percent of all 
NYSE listings, and in particular 90 percent of all emerging market firms, raised new 
capital with their international listing. Hence, these differences may also affect the 
price reaction of international listings. 
The existing literature to date has not investigated whether ADR listings are also 
subject to market conditions. A timing related explanation could also apply to 
international firms which have experienced an increase in their stock price prior to 
the listing period and, hence, decide to take advantage of this "international window 
of opportunity". This study attempts to explore whether the "industry-argument145" 
could be applied to an international context. Listings of emerging market firms could 
be due to an "emerging market sentiment" of international investors which are unduly 
overoptimistic of the future growth prospects of emerging market firms. 
If international listing reduces market segmentation, returns of ADRs and their 
underlying stocks should not differ. To our knowledge, none of the previous papers 
has jointly examined the price behaviour of ADRs and their underlying shares 
surrounding the listing date and their subsequent investment performance. If 
previously OTC-traded ADRs experience a positive price reaction once they become 
fully listed, this may indicate the integration benefits of international listings. 
145 The new issues literature has shown that there are variations in post-issuing returns across industries (for more 
details see 4.2.3 and 5.3.2). 
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Hypotheses: 
1. ) International listing increases the public availability of information (or 
investor recognition) and reduces information costs to investors. This 
increase in information about the firm is expected to be more significant for 
foreign companies listing on an US exchange. Therefore, companies listing on 
an US exchange should experience more positive abnormal returns in the pre- 
listing period and more negative abnormal returns in the post-listing period 
than companies listing in London. 
2. ) The magnitude of the price reaction is expected to be more pronounced for 
emerging market firms since they face higher investment barriers. Hence, they 
should experience more positive abnormal returns in the pre-listing period and 
more negative abnormal returns in the post-listing period than developed 
market returns. 
3. ) Companies that raise new capital with their listing experience a bigger 
increase in their investor base. Hence, they should have higher positive 
abnormal returns in the pre-listing period and more negative abnormal returns 
in the post-listing period. 
4. ) OTC-traded ADRs experience integration benefits once they become "fully" 
listed. This should be reflected in positive abnormal returns on the listing day. 
Subsequent to the listing, the returns of ADRs and underlying shares should 
be very similar if they are priced in an integrated market. 
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6.2 Sample selection 
Our initial sample consists of all foreign firms that obtained a listing on the London 
Stock Exchange, the New Stock Exchange (NYSE), and on NASDAQ during the 
period from January 1980 to December 1994. We identify 185 firms on the London 
Stock Exchange, 177 firms on NYSE, and 61 firms that listed ADRs on NASDAQ146 
Information concerning the listed companies and their listing date is obtained from 
the respective stock exchanges. A special criterion is applied to NASDAQ firms 
which must be sponsored ADRs. This eliminates 5 unsponsored ADRs which were 
granted an exemption from Rule 12g3-2(b)147. We require that all internationally 
listed firms are also listed in their country of origin because we only consider 
international cross-listings for most of our analysis. This criterion eliminates 48 
companies (14 London, 23 NYSE, and 11 NASDAQ listings) from our sample. Firms 
with less than 104 weeks of stock return data prior to the listing date are 
subsequently deleted resulting in a sample 'of 118 companies for London, 84 
companies for New York, and 31 companies for NASDAQ (see Table 6.1. ). The high 
rate of exclusion is due to two main reasons. Firstly, a high percentage of 
internationally listed firms are initial public offerings (IPOs). However, we will include 
34 international IPOs in our investigation of the impact of market conditions. Shares 
of these firms were offered simultaneously in their domestic market and in the US 
market in form of ADRs. 31 firms are listed on the NYSE and 3 on NASDAQ. 
Secondly, many internationally listed firms are from emerging markets which often 
lack sufficient historical data. 
146 We exclude approximately 140 Canadian firms that are listed on NASDAQ since they are not listed in the form of 
ADRs. 
147 Rule 12g3-2(b) requires OTC securities to register with the SEC but foreign companies were exempted until 
October 1983. In October 1983 the SEC abolished this exemption for foreign securities but gave already-listed 
securities a "grandfather" exemption. 
148 
Table 6.1. 
Frequency of international cross-listings and location of sample firms, 
1980 
- 
1994. 
The sample consists of 233 international listings which listed their stock over the 
period from 1980 to 1994. All firms are listed on their domestic stock exchange. 
118 firms are listed on the London Stock Exchange, 31 firms are listed on 
NASDAQ, and 84 firms are listed the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
NASDAQ listings only include ADR listings. 
Year of Listing London NASDAQ New York 
1980 7 1 
1981 7 1 1 
1982 3 2 
1983 7 2 
1984 19 4 2 
1985 2 0 
1986 12 1 5 
1987 12 6 11 
1988 4 1 4 
1989 20 3 7 
1990 11 1 5 
1991 4 8 
1992 4 4 6 
1993 2 7 10 
1994 4 3 20 
84 
TOTAL 118 31 
Table 6.2. provides a distribution of the sample firms by exchange and domestic 
country showing that the majority of London-listed foreign firms are US companies 
(58) and Japanese companies (26). The NYSE shows a different geographical 
distribution of foreign-listed companies which are spread over more different 
countries although approximately 45% of foreign listings are UK (21) or Canadian 
companies (18). UK companies (10) make up the biggest group on NASDAQ 
because our NASDAQ sample only includes companies that list shares in the form of 
ADRs. However, Canadian firms are by far the biggest group on NASDAQ 
comprising approximately 50% of all foreign listed firms. The major difference 
between NYSE and the other two exchanges, however, is the number of companies 
from so called "emerging markets" listed on NYSE. 
149 
Table 6.2. 
Distribution of sample firms by exchange and domestic country. 
The sample consists of 233 international listings and consists of firms from 25 
different countries. All firms are listed on their domestic stock exchange. 118 firms 
are listed on the London Stock Exchange, 31 firms are listed on NASDAQ, and 84 
firms are listed the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). NASDAQ listings only 
include ADR listings. 
Domestic country London NASDAQ New York 
Australia 7 7 8 
Belgium 1 
Bermuda 1 
Canada 3 17 
Chile 8 
Denmark 2 2 
Finland 1 
France 2 2 3 
Germany 6 1 
India 2 
Ireland 3 1 
Italy 3 
Japan 26 1 4 
Netherlands 1 2 4 
New Zealand 1 
Mexico 5 
Norway 2 
Philippines 1 
South Africa 3 
South Korea 1 1 2 
Sweden 4 5 
Switzerland 1 
UK 10 21 
United States 58 
TOTAL 118 31 84 
6.3 Performance measurement methodology 
To examine the stock price behavior of international listings in the pre- and the post- 
listing period, a variety of approaches are available. In general two approaches can 
be distinguished, which are then applied in a number of variations. The fundamental 
difference between cumulative average adjusted returns (CARs) and holding period 
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returns lies in the assumption concerning the portfolio rebalancing for each interval. 
While weekly CARs approximate the returns on a portfolio with weekly portfolio 
rebalancing, holding period returns represent a buy and hold portfolio strategy. 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) argue that cumulative performance measures suffer from a 
methodological and a conceptual drawback leading to a bias in the "market 
overreaction" studies148 
A very recent paper by Kothari and Warner (1996) questions the validity of long- 
horizon abnormal return studies around firm specific events. They show that long- 
horizon tests have a severe tendency to indicate abnormal performance when none 
is present. They use four commonly-employed models to estimate abnormal returns 
(market-adjusted model, market model, CAPM, and Fama-French empiricial CAPM) 
and find their results hold irrespective of the model employed. Their testing 
procedure uses samples of randomly selected NYSE/AMEX securities and simulated 
event dates to examine the specification of tests for long-horizon abnormal return 
studies. They argue this is a direct way to study the sources of misspecification in 
more depth. In particular, they focus on the components of the test statistics, the 
sample mean cumulative abnormal return and its estimated standard deviation, 
which may both be biased. These biases may be mainly caused by selection biases 
and survival-related shifts in the variance, and arise very often from event study data 
requirements. Although they conclude that the interpretation of long-horizon tests 
requires extreme caution, they do not provide clear guidelines for better tests. They 
argue potential improvements could be achieved by using nonparametric 
procedures, as bootstrap procedures or sign tests, but emphasise the importance of 
further research in this area. 
148 The bias is caused by cumulating single-period returns over long periods. Moreover, it not only cumulates true 
returns but also measurement errors (for example bid-ask effects). The cumulation process also implicitly amounts 
to rebalancing the portfolios to equal weights each period. 
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To document the return pattern surrounding the listing date, we calculate abnormal 
returns and holding period returns for the pre-listing period (from 52 weeks prior to 
the week of listing to the listing week) and the post-listing period (from the listing 
week to 104 weeks after the listing week). Similar to previous research on domestic 
exchange listings (Sanger and McConnell (1986) and Kadlec and McConnell (1994)), 
we use weekly returns. Kadlec and McConnell (1994) argue that the results of earlier 
studies indicate that price effects associated with listings take place over an interval 
longer than a day or even a week. While long-run performance studies of, IPOs and 
seasoned equity offerings report three year post-issue results, international listing 
and domestic exchange listing studies generally examine shorter post-listing 
periods149. This study tries to extend the post-listing period but faces some practical 
problems since many firms obtained a listing in 1993 and 1994. Hence, there is not 
have sufficient data available to examine a three year post-listing period. 
6.3.1 Cumulative average adjusted returns (CARs) 
We employ standard event-study methodology to compute abnormal returns for the 
sample of internationally listed stocks150 with the week of listing as event week. 
Individual securities returns are calculated from Datastream. They are based on 
weekly closing prices, include dividend payments, and are adjusted for scrip and 
rights issues. The market return is calculated from the closing prices of the 
respective domestic market index. We use "Datastream Global Indices" which are 
provided by Datastream for each country. They are calculated from a representative 
149 For domestic exchange listings a 52-week post-listing period seems to be the convention. However, in the case 
of international listings no uniform event period appears to exist. 
Studies use monthly, weekly, or daily returns alike 
and event windows range from 36 months to only 10 days around the 
listing date. 
150 Brown and Warner (1985) compare the properties of excess returns in event studies under alternative measures 
of excess returns. Brown and Warner show that market-adjusted returns have similar properties to Ordinary 
Least 
Squares (OLS) market model excess returns. 
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list of stocks for each market, which are value-weighted, and include aggregate 
annualised dividends. The representative sample of stocks aims to cover 
approximately 80% of each market and the suitability for inclusion is determined by 
market value and availability of data. In the few instances where the IFC indices 
(India and South Korea) provide a longer history, we use them instead. 
A number of long-run performance studies (e. g. Levis (1993) and Ritter (1991)) use 
raw returns. However, continously compounded returns appear to be more 
appropriate because they offer distributional advantages. Moreover, our results show 
no material differences between raw and continously compounded returns151 
Most long-run performance studies that examine initial public offerings (IPOs) and 
equity offerings calculate adjusted returns by using several different benchmarks. 
Common approaches are adjustments for size, book-to-market ratios, and industry, 
as well as the use of different stock market indices. Dimson and March (1986) show 
that long-run performance measurement can be subject to biases if the size 
composition of the sample firms differs from the chosen benchmark. Fama and 
French (1992,1993) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) find that size and 
book-to market ratios are important determinants of stock returns. However, the 
simulations of Kothari and Warner (1996) show that the Fama-French empirical 
CAPM does not provide better results than the other models employed. They 
suggest an alternative could be a matched-portfolio approach, similiar to Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995). However, since the majority of our sample firms 
are relatively large firms in their domestic market, a size-adjustment does not appear 
to be necessary. Although a book-to-market adjustment appears desirable, the 
application suffers from two practical problems. Firstly, Datastream only provides 
151 See Appendix for a comparison between log and raw returns. 
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book-to-market ratios for a limited number of companies. This could even introduce a 
more severe selection bias into our results. Secondly, book-to-market ratios are not 
strictly comparable across different countries. The calculation of book values is not 
consistent across countries since different accounting standards prevail. 
6.3.1.1 Market-adjusted returns 
The abnormal return art for stock i at time t is calculated as follows: 
arit = Rit - Rmt (6.1. ) 
where r; t is the realised return on each stock i in week t and rmt is the respective 
market return for the corresponding week. 
To gauge the overall reaction of the firms in the sample, we calculate the equally 
weighted arithmetic average of the market-adjusted abnormal returns: 
ARt= 1/nIar; t 
where n is the number of listed firms in the portfolio in week t. 
(6.2. ) 
The cumulative average abnormal return on event week T is the sum of the weekly 
adjusted abnormal returns from event week K through to event week T: 
CARK = yKt=T ARt (6.3. ) 
For the pre-listing period T is set equal to 
-52 (i. e. 52 weeks prior to the listing week) 
and K is zero (listing week). For the post-listing period T equals one (one week after 
the listing week) and K is 104 (104 weeks after the listing week). 
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To assess the statistical significance of CARs, the following formula is used: 
t (CART, K )_ (nt) 1/2 / [t * var +2* (t - 1) * cov] 1/2 (6.4. ) 
where n is the number of listings in the sample, t is the event week, var is the 
average cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order auto-covariance of the 
ARt series. This approach takes account of the lack of independence of the AR 
series (Ritter, 1991). 
6.3.1.2 Risk-adjusted returns 
The market model is implemented by computing ex post abnormal returns for each 
security as follows: 
arit = Rit 
- 
(ai + Pi Rmt) (6.5. ) 
where Rat and Rmt are the observed returns for security j and the market portfolio. 
The security specific parameters aj and 13j are computed from Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regressions. We choose an estimation period of 100 weeks using 
weekly returns from week t= 
-104 to week t= -4 relative to the listing week ("week 0"). 
Average abnormal returns across all firms are computed as 
ARt=Y- ar; t/n (6.6) 
where n is the number of firms in the sample in week t. Cumulative abnormal 
average returns (CARs) and signficance tests are calculated in the same way as 
shown for market-adjusted abnormal returns (see 6.3.1.1. ) 
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However, throughout the remainder of this study market-adjusted abnormal returns 
are used for the follow-up analysis since market model returns suffer from a host of 
well-known problems. For example, Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) point out that the 
nature of pre-listing period returns makes this procedure subject to bias. In particular, 
the market model assumes that returns in the (pre-listing) estimation period respond 
only to systematic market forces. However, they argue that listing firms cannot be 
described as having mean-zero idiosyncratic components in their pre-listing returns 
because self-selection bias is likely to be present (see also Sanger and McConnell, 
1986)152. Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1988) argue that liquidity and 
signalling effects may cause a firm's stock price to rise in the pre-listing period. If this 
is the case the intercept of such stocks will be biased upwards. 
6.3.2 Holding period returns 
Since CARs assume that the portfolio is weekly rebalanced, we also calculate buy 
and hold returns. In the case of the pre-listing period returns, the stock is bought 52 
weeks prior to the listing week and held until the listing week. Post-listing period 
returns are calculated from buying the stock in the listing week and holding it either 
until 104 weeks after the listing week or the week data is available. Holding period 
returns are calculated as 
HR; =1-1 (1 +Rit)-1 (6.7. ) 
where R; t is the raw return on firm i in event week t. The performance for a group of 
internationally listed firms is measured by the arithmetic average of the holding 
152 We examine the distributions of weekly raw returns in the pre- and post-listing period (weeks -52 to -1 and +1 to 
+104 respectively). The findings are similar to Sanger and McConnell (1986), which examine weeks -52 to -1 and +1 
to +52, showing that pre-listing period returns are more positively skewed. 
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period returns, or by the wealth relative (WR). The wealth relative is the ratio of one 
plus the mean holding period return divided by the mean holding period return for the 
corresponding index (over the same truncated return interval): 
WR = (1 + average HRinternationai listings )/ (1 + average HRindices ) (6.8. ) 
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6.4 Empirical Results 
6.4.1 Influence of institutional factors on price reaction of international listings 
Previous research has argued that an international listing may result in structural 
changes in equilibrium asset pricing relationships. Moreover, institutional differences 
between the US and UK market should also be reflected in the price reaction for 
companies listing on the LSE, NYSE or on NASDAQ. Table 6.3. shows a comparison 
of CARs for London, NYSE, and NASDAQ listings. NYSE listings experience positive 
CARs in the pre-listing period reaching a peak of 11.37 percent by week 
-1. CARs of 
London listings are also positive in the pre-listing period but are lower and 
insignificant. NASDAQ listings experience a price reaction of similar magnitude as 
NYSE listings but the results are not significant at the 95% level. The results for the 
NYSE and NASDAQ listings are similar to the evidence of Foerster and Karolyi 
(1993) who find pre-listing CARs of 5.06 percent (NYSE and AMEX) and 10.59 
percent (NASDAQ) over 100 days for Canadian firms. Alexander, Eun, and 
Janakiramanan (1988) report pre-listing CARs of 34.65 percent for non-Canadian 
over a 24 month period. 
This pattern changes in the post-listing period. NYSE listings start a decline from the 
listing week onwards. CARs of NASDAQ firms, however, increase in the immediate 
post-listing period and reach 5.02 percent (t = 2.85) in week 5. The post-listing 
decline in NASDAQ CARs only starts in week 64 and is not statistically significant. 
The finding that the decline for NASDAQ listings is less than for NYSE listings is 
consistent with Foerster and Karolyi's (1993) evidence. In contrast, London listings 
do not experience any change in the post-listing period. Their CARs remain at the 
same level throughout the 2-year post-listing period. These return patterns are 
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consistent with previous empirical and theoretical research. Alexander, Eun, and 
Janakiramanan (1988), Foerster and Karolyi (1993), and Varela and Lee (1993) 
report a decline in expected returns in the post-listing period. 
Table 6.3. 
Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for London, NYSE and NASDAQ 
listings 
The Table shows weekly cumulative average returns (CARs) for international listings on the 
London Stock Exchange, on NYSE, and on NASDAQ. CARs are calculated from domestic 
prices using market-adjusted returns. t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation and for firms 
dropping out of the sample with increasing weeks of seasoning. 
London (N=118) NYSE (N=84) NASDAQ (N=31) 
Event CARs % t-statistic CARs % t-statistic CARs % t-statistic 
week 
Pre-listing period 
-52 0.08 0.20 0.70 1.36 -0.26 -0.33 
-30 1.92 0.94 6.05 2.46 3.67 0.97 
-20 3.18 1.29 8.30 2.82 6.73 1.49 
-10 4.27 1.52 9.09 2.71 8.57 1.66 
-5 4.88 1.65 9.86 2.78 8.33 1.53 
-1 5.16 1.67 11.37 3.08 10.10 1.78 
0 4.66 1.50 10.29 2.76 10.67 1.86 
Post-listing period 
1 0.64 1.49 0.17 0.34 
-0.07 -0.09 
2 0.00 0.00 
-0.10 -0.14 0.88 0.79 
3 
-0.08 -0.11 -0.84 -0.94 1.54 1.13 
4 
-0.18 -0.20 -0.75 -0.73 4.32 2.74 
5 0.21 0.21 
-0.78 -0.68 5.02 2.85 
10 0.98 0.72 
-2.01 -1.24 4.80 1.93 
25 
-0.24 -0.11 -2.14 -0.84 0.74 0.19 
52 0.19 0.06 
-7.06 -1.75 0.98 0.17 
80 
-0.63 -0.16 -15.04 -2.93 -3.90 -0.53 
104 0.87 0.20 
-18.63 -3.09 -7.61 -0.90 
Table 6.4. shows the results for the same analysis using market model abnormal 
returns. Although the results for the pre-listing period seem to differ from the market- 
adjusted results, the order between the three exchanges remains the same. While 
NYSE (0.22 percent in the listing week) and NASDAQ (2.83 percent in the listing 
week) listings experience positive CARs in the pre-listing period, London listings (- 
3.46 percent in the listing week) experience negative CARs. Although these results 
are not statistically significant at any conventional level, the findings indicate that 
firms listing in the US experience a different price reaction than firms listing on the 
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London Stock Exchange. The difference between market-adjusted and market model 
CARs may be caused by an upward-biased intercept as described above (see 
6.3.1.2. ) which leads to a downward bias in abnormal returns. Table 6.4. also shows 
that NYSE CARs reach a peak of 2.16 percent in week 
-20, which is, however, not 
statistically significant (t=0.74). This is probably due to the price run-up before the 
announcement of equity offerings, since a number of firms raised equity with their 
NYSE listing153 
The comparison of market model calculated post-listing period results to market- 
adjusted CARs provides a similar picture as discussed for the pre-listing period. 
While the CARs of London, NYSE, and NASDAQ listings are significantly negative, 
the decline is far more pronounced for NYSE (-36.09 percent) and NASDAQ (-19.85 
percent) listings than for London listings (-12.83 percent) over the 104-week post- 
listing period. Similar to the findings above, NASDAQ CARs increase in the 
immediate post-listing period and reach 4.22 percent (t=2.42) in week 5. The finding 
that NYSE listings experience the biggest decline is consistent with our findings 
above and the implications of previous theoretical and empirical research. The 
stronger decline using a risk-adjusted methodology may even be an indication of the 
severity of the decline in expected returns for internationally listed firms154 
153 For a more detailed discussion of the stock price behavior of public offerings, see 6.4.2. 
154 To examine whether the strong decline for NYSE listings is due to a change in beta, we also estimate post-listing 
betas over a period from weeks +4 to +104. However, our results 
do not show any change in betas. The average 
beta is 1.02 for the pre-listing period and 1.01 for the post-listing period. 
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Table 6.4. 
Risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for London, NYSE and NASDAQ 
listings 
The Table shows weekly cumulative average returns (CARs) for international listings on the 
London Stock Exchange, on NYSE, and on NASDAQ. CARs are calculated from domestic 
prices using market model-adjusted returns. t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation and for 
firms dropping out of the sample with increasing weeks of seasoning. 
London (N=118) NYSE (N=84) NASDAQ (N=31) 
Event CARs % t-statistic CARs % t-statistic CARs % t-statistic 
week 
Pre-listing period 
-52 -0.28 -0.65. 0.58 1.14 
. 
-0.29 -0.37 
-30 -2.56 -1.24 2.12 0.86 0.93 0.25 
-20 -2.56 -1.03 2.16 0.74 1.56 0.35 
-10 -2.92 -1.03 0.60 0.20 1.79 0.35 
-5 -3.02 -1.01 0.46 0.14 1.33 0.24 
-1 -2.88 -0.74 1.47 0.40 2.69 0.48 
0 
-3.46 -1.10 0.22 0.06 2.83 0.50 
Post-listing period 
1 0.31 0.73 0.02 0.04 
-0.25 -0.32 
2 
-0.19 -0.31 -0.4 -0.63 0.70 0.63 
3 
-0.38 -0.52 -1.38 -1.55 0.94 0.69 
4 
-0.71 -0.82 -1.46 -1.42 3.58 2.29 
5 
-0.62 -0.65 -1.76 -1.54 4.22 2.42 
10 
-0.80 -0.59 -4.29 -2.64 3.24 1.31 
25 
-3.82 -1.77 -7.92 -3.09 -1.97 -0.50 
52 
-7.37 -2.34 -18.36 -4.43 -3.30 -0.58 
80 
-11.71 -2.99 -28.88 -5.46 -11.94 -1.71 
104 
-12.83 -2.87 -36.09 -5.69 -19.85 -2.49 
Table 6.5. compares holding period returns for London, NYSE, and NASDAQ 
listings. The median pre-listing holding period return for London listings is 16.75 
percent and the average holding period return is 28.93 percent. This compares to an 
average return of 18.73 percent for the stock market index. The median pre-listing 
holding period return for NASDAQ listings is 30.51 percent and the average return is 
36.57 percent. The corresponding average return of the stock market index is 16.25 
percent. NYSE listings have a median holding period return of 31.90 percent and an 
average holding period return of 48.35 percent. The average return for the market 
index is 25.46 percent. The wealth relatives (WR) confirm our previous findings: 
161 
London listings (WR=1.09) have a lower pre-listing period performance than NYSE 
listings (WR=1.18) and NASDAQ listings (WR=1.17). 
Table 6.5. 
Holding period returns of London, NYSE, and NASDAQ listings for the pre- and post- 
listing period 
This Table shows holding period returns for international listings calculated from domestic 
prices. It reports the median holding period return, the average holding period return, the 
mean holding period return of the market index, and the wealth relative for the 52-week pre- 
listing period and the 104-week post-listing period. All returns are reported in percent. 
Stock Number of Median Mean listing Mean market Wealth 
exchange companies listing firms indices relative 
firms 
Pre-listing Period 
London 118 16.75 28.93 18.73 1.09 
NASDAQ 31 30.51 36.57 16.25 1.17 
NYSE 84 31.90 48.35 25.46 1.18 
Post-listing period 
London 118 3.85 22.49 15.15 1.06 
NASDAQ 31 18.36 37.00 32.31 1.04 
NYSE 84 7.21 7.33 19.74 0.90 
The post-listing holding period returns are similar to the market-adjusted and the risk- 
adjusted results. The median returns are 3.85 percent for London listings, 18.36 
percent for NASDAQ listings, and 7.21 percent for NYSE listings. The average 
returns are 22.49 percent (London), 37.00 percent (NASDAQ), and 7.33 percent 
(NYSE). The respective average holding period returns for the market index are 
15.15 percent (London), 32.31 percent (NASDAQ), and 19.74 percent (NYSE). The 
wealth relative is 1.06 for London listings, 1.04 for NASDAQ listings, and 0.90 for 
NYSE listings. Although London and NASDAQ listings have positive wealth relatives 
compared to negative CARs for NASDAQ listings (using market-adjusted and risk- 
adjusted methods) and London listings (using risk-adjusted returns), the median 
holding period returns indicate that the results for London and NASDAQ listings are 
skewed. However, the order between the three exchanges is not changed. 
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The findings show that the place of listing influences the price reaction. These results 
appear consistent with different information costs and regulatory barriers for US and 
London investors. The dismantling of investment barriers is stronger for foreign 
companies that decide to list in the US than for companies listing in London. This is 
due to the distinct approach towards regulating foreign securities in the US and the 
UK. Moreover, companies that list in the US experience a bigger increase in their 
shareholder base because a number of institutional investors are only permitted to 
invest in foreign stocks that meet the rigorous disclosure and reporting requirements 
of the SEC. 
6.4.2 ADR listing and emerging markets 
Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1988) suggest that the "international listing 
effect" depends on the nationality of a firm. They argue that the magnitude of the 
price reaction is influenced by the degree of market segmentation between different 
countries. Table 6.6. (market-adjusted returns) and Table 6.7. (risk-adjusted returns) 
show CARs of all NYSE listings which are broken down into a subsample of 
developed market firms, and a subsample of emerging market firms. The results 
show that emerging market firms experience higher abnormal returns prior to the 
listing week than developed market firms. Market-adjusted CARs of emerging market 
firms are 14.19 percent and of developed market firms are 9.37 percent in week 
-1 
(see Table 6). Risk-adjusted returns are 3.86 percent for emerging market firms and 
0.91 percent for developed market firms (see Table 6.7. ). 
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Table 6.6. 
Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for NYSE listings 
The Table shows weekly cumulative average returns (CARs) for international listings on 
NYSE and are categorised on the basis of being from a developed or a emerging market. 
CARs are calculated from domestic prices using market-adjusted returns. t-statistics are 
adjusted for autocorrelation and for firms dropping out of the sample with increasing weeks 
of seasoning. 
Developed market firms (N=68) Emerging market firms (N=16) 
Event CARs % t-statistic CARs % t-statistic 
week 
Pre-listing period 
-52 0.99 1.85 -0.56 -0.37 
-30 6.31 2.46 4.94 0.68 
-20 7.31 2.38 12.48 1.44 
-18 6.89 2.18 17.66 1.98 
-10 7.92 2.26 14.04 1.42 
-1 10.57 2.74 14.79 1.36 
0 9.37 2.41 14.19 1.29 
t-test of differences in mean for pre-listing period (CAR at week 0): 0.37 
Post-listing period 
1 0.58 0.77 
-1.58 -1.04 
2 0.51 0.55 
-2.70 -1.26 
3 0.45 0.42 
-6.32 -2.41 
4 0.59 0.50 
-6.46 -2.14 
5 0.60 0.46 
-6.61 -1.96 
10 
-1.23 -0.73 -4.84 -1.01 
20 
-1.19 -0.50 -3.82 -0.57 
25 
-0.81 -0.30 -6.42 -0.85 
52 
-4.41 -1.06 -12.88 -0.89 
80 
-12.72 -2.46 -34.23 -1.55 
104 
-14.77 -2.45 -61.17 -1.99 
t-test of differences in mean for post-listing period (CAR at week 104): 
-1.23 
Table 6.6. and 6.7. also show that emerging market firms' and developed market 
firms' CARs decline in the post-listing period. According to Alexander, Eun, and 
Janakiramanan (1988), this persistence of abnormal returns in the post-listing period 
is an indication of a change in expected returns following the event of international 
listings. This decline is much more severe for emerging market firms than for 
developed market firms. Whereas market-adjusted CARs of emerging market firms 
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decline to 
-34.23 percent at week 80 and -61.17 percent at week 104155, CARs of 
developed market firms reach 
-12.72 percent at week 80 and 
-14.77 percent at week 
104 (see Table 6.6. ). Using risk-adjusted CARs the decline is even more 
pronounced. At week 104 the CARs are 
-81.14 percent for emerging market firms 
and 
-31.03 percent for developed market firms (see Table 6.7. ). 
Table 6.7. 
Risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for NYSE listings 
The Table shows weekly cumulative average returns (CARs) for international listings on 
NYSE and are categorised on the basis of being from a developed or a emerging market. 
CARs are calculated from domestic prices using risk-adjusted returns. t-statistics are 
adjusted for autocorrelation and for firms dropping out of the sample with increasing weeks 
of seasoning. 
Developed market firms (N=68) Emerging market firms (N=16) 
Event CARs % t-statistic CARs % t-statistic 
week 
Pre-listing period 
-52 0.90 1.66 -0.76 -0.53 
-30 2.42 0.93 0.84 0.12 
-20 1.18 0.38 6.35 0.78 
-18 0.15 0.05 10.72 1.24 
-10 -0.33 -0.09 4.56 0.47 
-1 0.91 0.23 3.86 0.37 
0 
-0.46 -0.12 3.11 0.29 Post-listing period 
1 0.39 0.72 
-1.58 -1.07 
2 0.09 0.12 
-2.88 -1.39 
3 
-0.14 -0.15 -6.72 -2.64 
4 
-0.15 -0.14 -7.15 -2.44 
5 
-0.31 -0.26 -7.93 -2.42 
10 
-3.31 -1.94 -8.49 -1.83 
25 
-6.22 -2.30 -15.93 -2.18 
52 
-14.97 -3.81 -34.37 -2.44 
80 
-25.15 -5.00 -64.31 -3.01 
104 
-31.03 -5.15 -81.14 -2.35 
Although the difference in post-listing period CARs for emerging market and 
developed market firms is consistent with our expectations and previous theoretical 
implications, our conclusions remain tentative. Since the decline in post-listing CARs 
of emerging market firms appears to be very strong, we cannot rule out other 
explanations. Emerging market CARs reach a peak of 17.66 percent (t = 1.98) at 
155 The sample comprises only 3 companies at week 104 since many emerging market firms listed after mid 1994. 
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week 
-18. This is an indication of the widely documented price run-up before equity 
offerings because 15 of the 16 emerging market firms raised equity capital with their 
listing. The peak at week 
-18 probably occurs at the time when the offering is 
announced: The time which elapses between the announcement of an international 
offering and the listing date is approximately similar to the time reported by Stonham 
(1993). Hence, the strong decline in the post-listing period may be due to the well- 
documented underperformance in long-run stock returns following seasoned equity 
offerings (e. g. Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995)). 
Table 6.8. and 6.9. show CARs of all companies that listed ADRs on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ with respect to the method of listing. 62 companies listed their stock using 
an introduction and 37 companies raised new equity capital via a public offering. 
CARs peak at week 
-14 reaching 12.40 percent (t = 2.39) using a market-adjustment 
and 5.08 percent (t = 1.03) using the market model. However, our methodology does 
not measure the exact magnitude of the price run-up in stock prices and the drop in 
stock prices on the announcement date 156 Since we are interested in changes in the 
equilibrium pricing relationships, we do not pinpoint the announcement date of the 
international equity offering. Although CARs decline following the likely offering 
announcement period, they increase again towards the listing date indicating that the 
market associates value with a listing. Introductions also experience positive 
abnormal returns of similar magnitude in the pre-listing period reaching a peak of 
11.50 percent (t = 2.82), if market-adjusted, and 4.72 percent (t = 1.04), if risk- 
adjusted, at week 
-1. 
156 See Asquith and Mullins (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986) for domestic equity 
offerings and Marr, Tremble, and Varma (1991) for Euroequity offerings. 
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Table 6.8. 
Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for different methods of listing 
ADRs 
The Table shows weekly cumulative average returns (CARs) for firms that list ADRs on NYSE 
or NASDAQ. They are categorised by their method of listing. 61 firms were listed in an 
introduction and 37 firms conducted a public offering with their listing. CARs are calculated 
from domestic prices using market-adjusted returns. t-statistics are adjusted for 
autocorrelation and for firms dropping out of the sample with increasing weeks of seasoning. 
Introductions (N=61) Public offerings (N=37) 
NYSE 34 33 
NASDAQ 27 4 
Event week CARs % t-statistic CARs % t-statistic 
Pre-listing period 
-30 4.54 1.69 6.75 1.70 
-20 6.39 1.98 9.27 1.95 
-14 8.02 2.29 12.40 2.39 
-10 8.23 2.24 10.23 1.88 
-5 9.57 2.46 10.26 1.78 
-1 11.50 2.84 12.02 2.01 
0 11.33 2.78 11.09 1.84 
Post-listing period 
1 0.31 0.56 
-0.65 -0.81 
2 0.43 0.54 
-1.05 -0.91 
3 0.20 0.21 
-1.85 -1.30 
4 1.59 1.42 
-2.47 -1.50 
5 1.47 1.17 
-1.31 -0.71 
10 0.64 0.36 
-1.82 -0.70 
20 
-1.98 -0.79 -0.91 -0.24 
30 
-3.64 -1.19 -3.00 -0.66 
52 
-1.99 -0.48 -8.74 -1.22 
80 
-7.45 -1.40 -15.33 -1.63 
104 
-10.88 -1.76 -18.01 -1.56 
Table 6.8. also shows that the decline in CARs of public offerings is by far not as 
severe as the decline of emerging market firms (see above). Moreover, they are not 
significantly different from zero for introductions (t = -1.76) as well as for public 
offerings (t = 
-1 
. 
56) using market-adjusted returns. Similar to our previously reported 
results, market-model CARs are more negative than market-adjusted CARs. Table 
6.9. shows that the CARs are -23.76 percent for introductions (t = -3.90) and -36.94 
percent for public offerings (t = -3.21). 
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Table 6.9. 
Risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for different methods of listing 
ADRs 
The Table shows weekly cumulative average returns (CARs) for firms that list ADRs on NYSE 
or NASDAQ. They are categorised by their method of listing. 61 firms were listed in an 
introduction and 37 firms conducted a public offering with their listing. CARs are calculated 
from domestic prices using risk-adjusted returns. t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation 
and for firms dropping out of the sample with increasing weeks of seasoning. 
Introductions (N=61) Public offerings (N=37) 
NYSE 34 33 
NASDAQ 27 4 
Event week CARs % t-statistic CARs % t-statistic 
Pre-listing period 
-30 2.05 0.76 2.81 0.74 
-20 1.74 0.54 3.31 0.73 
-14 2.17 0.62 5.08 1.03 
-10 2.10 0.57 2.18 0.42 
-5 2.91 0.75 1.71 0.31 
-1 4.72 1.16 2.63 0.46 
0 4.27 1.04 1.40 0.24 
Post-listing period 
1 0.19 0.33 
-0.77 -0.97 
2 0.29 0.36 
-1.40 -1.26 
3 
-0.16 -0.16 -2.38 -1.74 
4 1.07 0.94 
-3.16 -2.01 
5 0.81 0.64 
-2.36 -1.34 
10 
-0.93 -0.52 -4.26 -1.71 
20 
-5.00 -1.97 -6.64 -1.88 
30 
-7.30 -2.35 -11.74 -2.72 
52 
-7.16 -1.71 -22.93 -3.25 
80 
-16.40 -3.12 -33.26 -3.47 
104 
-23.76 -3.90 -36.94 -3.21 
Table 6.10. summarises holding period returns for emerging and developed market 
firms as well as for introductions and public offerings. Median (95.92 percent) and 
average (92.91 percent) holding period returns of emerging market firms experience 
a stronger increase in the pre-listing period than developed market firms (Median: 
26.27 percent; mean: 39.51 percent). The wealth relative is 1.24 for emerging market 
firms and 1.18 for developed market firms. Public offerings (Median: 39.94 percent; 
mean: 52.69 percent) experience a stronger increase than introductions (Median: 
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29.69 percent; mean: 41.34 percent) in the pre-listing period. Public offerings have a 
wealth relative of 1.15 and introductions have a wealth relative of 1.19. 
Table 6.10. 
Holding period returns of NYSE listings and ADR listings for the pre- and the post- 
listing period. NYSE listings are categorised into emerging and developed market 
firms. ADR listings are split into public offerings and introductions. 
This Table shows holding period returns for international listings calculated from domestic 
prices. It reports the median holding period return, the average holding period return, the 
mean holding period return of the market index, and the wealth relative for the 52-week pre- 
listing period and the 104-week post-listing period. All returns are reported in percent. 
Number of Median Mean listing Mean Wealth 
companies listing firms market relative 
firms indices 
Pre-listing period 
NYSE 
- 
Emerging 16 95.92 92.91 55.07 1.244 
- 
Developed 68 26.27 39.51 18.45 1.178 
ADR listings 
- 
Introductions 61 29.69 41.34 18.30 1.194 
- 
Public offerings 37 39.94 52.69 32.83 1.149 
Post-listing period 
NYSE 
- 
Emerging 16 3.62 0.06 32.23 0.757 
- 
Developed 68 8.24 8.64 18.57 0.916 
ADR listings 
- 
Introductions 61 8.76 20.33 24.26 0.968 
- 
Public offerings 37 8.90 11.04 26.47 0.877 
The post-listing period results using holding period returns are consistent with the 
results of the previously reported performance measures. The wealth relative of 
emerging market firms (WR=0.76) is lower than for developed market firms 
(WR=0.92). The median (3.62 percent) and the average holding period return (0.06 
percent) of emerging market firms indicate that the difference between developed 
and emerging market firms is caused to a great degree by a stronger positive 
movement of emerging stock markets. While the median returns are very similar for 
introductions (8.76 percent) and for public offerings (8.90 percent), the average 
holding period returns differ. They are 20.33 percent for introductions and 11.04 
percent for public offerings. The wealth relative of introductions (WR=0.97) is higher 
than of public offerings (WR=0.88). 
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The combined evidence of holding period returns and CARs indicates that the strong 
decline in emerging market firm' CARs is not only due to the "equity offering effect" 
and gives rise to the assumption that the decline is caused by some other factors. 
Hence, we also examine timing explanations as suggested by the IPO literature. 
6.4.3 Market conditions and the performance of ADR listings 
The review of the new issues literature has shown that market conditions influence 
the decision of firms to raise equity capital. Since the post-listing performance of our 
sample firms resembles the pattern reported for new issues, this section examines 
the effect of market conditions on the post-listing performance of companies that 
listed ADRs on NYSE or NASDAQ. To investigate the effect of market conditions on 
international listings in more detail, we also include 34 international IPOs in our 
sample. We partition our sample of all international cross-listings and IPOs in the US 
on domestic market conditions. To gauge investor sentiment, Ljungqvist (1996) uses 
a market conditions proxy which measures whether the market as a whole traded at 
a historically high price-earnings ratio when IPO prices were fixed. We divide the 
domestic market's average PE ratio in every listing week by its 52-week moving 
average and obtain the market condition variable PE-RATIO. If PE-RATIO is above 
unity we assign it to the "high PE" category, and if PE-RATIO is below unity it is 
assigned to the "low PE" category. The second variable measures the condition of 
the stock market and is based on the increase in the respective stock market index 
26 weeks prior to the listing week157. We use a longer window than Choe, Masulis, 
and Nanda (1993), who calculate the market return over the 75-day period prior to 
the announcement, to account for the time that is necessary to prepare an 
157 See Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993). 
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international listing. If the market return was positive during this period we assign it to 
the "buoyant market" category, if it was negative it is assigned to the "sluggish 
market" category. 
Table 6.11. categorises all ADR listings and those that raised capital with it according 
to our first market condition proxy. Panel A shows average CARs, average holding 
period returns, average market holding period returns, and wealth relatives of the 
underlying shares of ADR listings conditioned on whether the shares were listed in a 
"high PE" or in a "low PE" market'. The fact that approximately 62% of all firms listed 
in a "high PE" market may be an indication that firms try to time their listings to take 
advantage of some potential "window of opportunity" for foreign firms in the US 
market. Although "high PE" firms (-14.97 percent) have stronger negative CARs than 
"low PE" firms (-10.29 percent) the difference is not statistically significant (t=0.47). 
This difference is even reversed when wealth relatives are compared. The wealth 
relative of "low PE" firms (0.92) is slightly higher than of "high PE" firms (0.89). To 
investigate the effect of market conditions on the performance of firms that raised 
capital with their ADR listing, we repeat the same analysis but exclude introductions 
from our sample. Panel B of Table 11 shows that "low PE" firms (-22.83 percent) 
perform worse than "high PE" firms (-16.93 percent), although the difference is not 
statistically significant (t=0.37). A comparison of the respective wealth relatives 
confirms these findings, since they are almost identical for "high PE" firms (0.84) and 
for "low PE" firms (0.85). 
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Table 6.11. 
Impact of market conditions (PE-ratio) on performance of ADR listings 
The Table examines the impact of market conditions on the post-listing period (104-weeks) 
performance of ADR listings. Panel A distinguishes all ADR listings for which PE-data on their 
respective country index is available whether they listed in a "high PE" or in a "low PE" period. 
A "high PE" period is defined when the market's PE-ratio in the listing week is above its 52- 
week moving average. A "low PE" period is defined when the market's PE-ratio in the listing 
week is above its 52-week moving average. Panel B only examines firms which raised capital 
with their listing. t-statistics are performed as a paired t-test of the difference in the estimates 
of each group. 
High PE Low PE t-test of 
difference in 
means 
Panel A: All ADR listings 
Number of ADR listings 79 49 
Average CAR % 
-14.97 -10.29 0.47 
Average holding period 6.58 18.92 
-1.45 
return % 
Average market holding 19.39 29.35 
-1.64 
period return % 
Wealth relative 0.89 0.92 
Panel B: Capital raising firms 
Number of capital raising 43 25 
firms 
Average CAR % 
-16.93 -22.83 0.37 
Average holding period 
-0.67 10.24 -1.17 
return 
Average market holding 18.16 29.35 
-1.20 
period return 
Wealth relative 0.84 0.85 
Table 6.12. conditions the firms on the market return. It reports a similar trend as 
observed in Table 6.11., since approximately 75% of all firms listed after a "buoyant 
market" period. The results in Panel A show that "buoyant market" firms (-9.91 
percent) have less negative CARs than "sluggish market" firms (-22.12 percent) 158 
but the difference is not statistically significant (t=0.97). The wealth relative is 0.90 for 
"buoyant market" firms and 0.91 for "sluggish market" firms, and hence very similar 
to the wealth relatives observed when conditioned on PE-ratios. Panel B repeats the 
analysis for capital raising firms. CARs of "sluggish market" firms (-53.77 percent) 
158 Our data show that the number of firms varies considerably by the year of listing. Hence, we also test for "hot 
issue"-effects, as widely documented in the IPO literature. But our results do not provide evidence that firms which 
listed in years with high activity (e. g. in 1993 and 1994) perform worse than in other years. 
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are far more negative than of "buoyant market" firms (-8.81 percent) and the 
difference is statistically significant (t=2.23). The wealth relative for "sluggish market" 
firms (WR=0.81) is also lower than for "buoyant market" firms (WR=0.86). These 
results provide some evidence that market timing seems to matter for capital raising 
firms. It may be an indication that successful market timing influences the post-issue 
performance of capital raising firms. However, since these results are similar to 
Ljungqvist's (1995) findings, they are inconsistent with sentiment timing. He argues 
that sentiment timing can only be infered if firms perform worse when they raised 
capital in a "buoyant" rather than a "sluggish" market. Moreover, our results seem to 
indicate that the negative post-listing performance is not simply due to an "equity 
offering effect" or to irrational overoptimism which is then corrected in subsequent 
periods. 
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Table 6.12. 
Impact of market conditions (price run-up of stock market index) on performance of 
ADR listings 
The Table examines the impact of market conditions on the post-listing period (104-weeks) 
performance of ADR listings. Panel A distinguishes all ADR listings whether they listed in a 
"buoyant market" or in a "sluggish market". A "buoyant market" is defined when the weekly 
average market return during the 26-week period prior to the listing week is positive. A 
"sluggish market" is defined when the weekly average market return during the 26-week 
period prior to the listing week is negative. Panel B examines only firms that raised capital with 
their listing. t-statistics are performed as a paired t-test of the difference in the estimates of 
each group. 
Buoyant Sluggish t-test of 
difference in 
means 
Panel A: All ADR listings 
Number of ADR listings 99 32 
Average CAR % 
-9.91 -22.12 0.97 
Average holding period 9.28 14.79 
-0.59 
return % 
Average market holding 21.55 25.44 
-0.66 
period return % 
Wealth relative 0.90 0.91 
Panel B: Capital raising firms 
Number of capital raising 56 15 
firms 
Average CAR % 
-8.81 -53.77 2.23 
Average holding period 4.95 
-6.98 1.21 
return 
Average market holding 22.75 14.50 1.08 
period return 
Wealth relative 0.86 0.81 
Since we have shown above that emerging market firms experience the strongest 
decline in the post-listing period, we examine their performance separately. Panel A 
of Table 6.13. compares CARs of emerging market firms (-37.86 percent) and 
developed market firms (-5.15 percent). These results corroborate our earlier 
findings (see Table 6.6,6.7, and 6.10) of a more severe decline of emerging market 
firms and are statistically significant (t=-2.41) at the 5% level. The wealth relative for 
emerging market firms (WR=0.77) is also lower than for developed market firms 
(WR=0.94). While the average market holding period return does not differ for 
emerging and developed market firms, the average holding period return shows 
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significant differences. It is positive (16.71 percent) for developed market firms but 
negative (-9.00 percent) for emerging market firms (t=-3.26). This indicates that the 
performance of emerging market firms may be driven by different factors than 
developed market firms. 
Panel B and C examine the post-listing performance of emerging market firms 
partitioned on market conditions. The results are very similar for both proxies and are 
consistent with our previous evidence. "High PE" firms (-28.50 percent) have less 
negative CARs than "low PE" firms (-70.07 percent) and "buoyant market" firms (- 
24.12 percent) perform better than "sluggish market" firms (-77.34 percent). The 
wealth relatives are 0.80 for emerging market firms and 0.69 for developed market 
firms, when conditioned on the PE-proxy, and 0.77 for emerging and developed 
market firms, when using the market return proxy. These results are similar to our 
previous findings. However, these results also suggest a different form of the 
"sentiment timing" proposition. Since "emerging markets" have very much become 
the topic of the 90's for international investors, there may have been a lot of 
overoptimism about their growth prospects at the time of the listing. This apparent 
misvaluation could have then been corrected in the post-listing period leading to this 
strongly negative post-listing performance. 
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Table 6.13. 
Market conditions and their impact on performance of emerging market and developed 
market firms 
The Table examines the impact of market conditions on the post-listing period (104-weeks) 
performance. Panel A distinguishes emerging market and developed market firms. Panel B 
categorises emerging market for which PE-data on their respective country index is available 
whether they listed in a "high PE" or in a "low PE" period. A "high PE" period is defined when 
the market's PE-ratio in the listing week is above its 52-week moving average. A "low PE" 
period is defined when the market's PE-ratio in the listing week is above its 52-week moving 
average. Panel C distinguishes firms whether they listed in a "buoyant market" or in a 
"sluggish market". A "buoyant market" is defined when the weekly average market return 
during the 26-week period prior to the listing week is positive. A "sluggish market" is defined 
when the weekly average market return during the 26-week period prior to the listing week is 
negative. t-statistics are performed as a paired t-test of the difference in the estimates of each 
group. 
Panel A: All ADR listings t-test of 
difference in 
means 
Emerging market Developed market 
firms firms 
Number of firms 31 100 
Average CAR % 
-37.86 -5.15 -2.41 
Average holding period 
-9.00 16.71 -3.26 
return % 
Average market holding 18.44 23.76 
-0.64 
period return % 
Wealth relative 0.77 0.94 
Panel B: Emerging market firms 
High PE Low PE 
Number of firms 19 9 
Average CAR % 
-28.50 -70.07 1.23 
Average holding period 
-6.47 -11.27 0.29 
return % 
Average market holding 17.60 28.91 
-0.49 
period return % 
Wealth relative 0.80 0.69 
Panel C: Emerging market firms 
Buoyant Sluggish 
Number of firms 23 8 
Average CAR % 
-24.12 -77.34 1.50 
Average holding period 
-4.67 -21.44 1.28 
return % 
Average market holding 24.10 2.16 1.67 
period return % 
Wealth relative 0.77 0.77 
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To examine the impact of market conditions and some other factors on the post- 
listing performance of ADRs, we also regress post-listing CARs on the following 
variables: 
PE-RATIO a dummy variable which is one if the firm was listed when the 
domestic market's PE ratio was above its 52-week moving 
average and 0 otherwise. 
INDEXRET the weekly average domestic market return during the 26-week 
period prior to the listing week. 
EMERGING a dummy variable which is one for firms from emerging markets. 
LNSIZE the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the listed firm. 
The regression results in Table 6.14. confirm our previous findings. The emerging 
market dummy variable is the only statistically significant variable (t=-3.23). The 
proxies for market conditions are not significant. Previous research has generally 
shown that underperformance is partly explained by firm size. A very recent paper by 
Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) provides some evidence that the negative post-listing 
drift is more severe for smaller firms. To account for this possibility, firm size is also 
included in the cross-sectional regression. However, our results show that 
performance is not influenced by firm size, since LNSIZE is insignificant (t=0.56). 
Even if size had appeared to be of significance, we would have had to be very 
careful in interpreting it. Performance is measured against the respective local 
market index and most of our sample firms are relatively large firms in their domestic 
market. However, especially many emerging market firms are relatively small firms 
compared to developed market firms. Hence, a size-adjustment appears to be less 
meaningful for a study comparing firms from different international markets. 
0 
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The results change, however, when we repeat the regression only for capital raising 
firms (Level III ADR programmes). The emerging market dummy variable is still 
highly statistically signficant (t=-2.81) indicating that emerging market firms may have 
timed their listings for periods of investor over-optimism. The significantly (t=2.60) 
positive coefficient for INDEXRET clearly refutes the "sentiment timing" proposition, 
since it shows that capital raising firms experience a more positive post-listing 
performance if issued in a "buoyant market" period. If we believed in "investor 
sentiment" for capital raising firms, we would expect a much stronger price correction 
for "high PE" and "buoyant market" firms than for "low PE" and "sluggish market" 
firms. 
Table 6.14. 
Impact of market conditions, firm size, equity offerings, and emerging market 
sentiment on performance of international listings 
The Table below gives the OLS estimates of the following equation: 
CAR; = Bo + B1 PE-RATIO; + B2 INDEXRET; + B3 EMERGING; + B4 LNSIZE; 
The dependent variable is the individual cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the post- 
listing period. The independent variables are: PE-RATIO;, a dummy variable which is one if 
the firm was listed in a "high PE" market, and 0 if the firm was listed in "low PE" market; 
INDEXRET;, the weekly average return during the 26-week period prior to the listing week; 
EMERGING;, a dummy variable which is one for emerging market firms, and zero for 
developed market firms; LNSIZE;, the natural logarithm of the market value. The t-statistics 
for each coefficient are in brackets. 
Independent variable 
All ADR listings 
Estimated coefficient 
Level III ADR programmes 
Estimated coefficient 
Intercept 
-0.1199 -0.3541 (-1.29) (-2.21) 
PE-RATIO 
-0.1047 -0.1061 (-0.99) (-0.75) 
INDEXRET 0.1609 0.4280 
(1.37) (2.60) 
EMERGING 
-0.3461 -0.3745 (-3.23) (-2.81) 
LNSIZE 0.0000 0.0001 
(0.56) (0.73) 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.22 
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6.4.4 Price reaction of ADRs 
Previous sections have examined the impact of international listing on domestic 
share prices. Since the vast majority of foreign companies list their shares in form of 
ADRs on US stock exchanges, we are provided with an opportunity to examine the 
return behaviour of ADRs and their underlying shares. The comparison of the 
corresponding ADR returns and underlying share returns is important because it 
allows inferences concerning the integration of both markets. If internationally listed 
stocks are priced in an integrated market subsequent to the listing, we should not 
observe discernible differences between ADR returns and underlying share returns. 
ADR returns are measured against the S&P 500 index and underlying share returns 
are measured against their domestic stock market index (as described above). Table 
6.15. confirms our expectations that ADR returns are very similar to underlying share 
returns. This suggests, as argued by Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1995) in the 
case of Mexcian ADRs, there is efficient arbitrage across markets159. Table 6.15. 
also shows again that NYSE listings experience a stronger decline than NASDAQ 
listings. 
159 We also compare the equality of average weekly ADR and underlying share returns. Although they are not 
identical, their differences are not statistically significant. This reaffirms our findings of sufficient cross-arbitrage 
between the US market and the domestic market. Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (1995) provide two possible 
reasons for this result: This could reflect non-synchronous trading or the effect of currency movements. 
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Table 6.15 
Post-listing Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of ADRs and their underlying shares 
The Table shows weekly cumulative average returns (CARs) for ADRs and their underlying 
shares categorised into NYSE or NASDAQ listings. CARs are calculated using market- 
adjusted returns. t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation and for firms dropping out of the 
sample with increasing weeks of seasoning. 
NYSE NASDAQ 
ADRs Underlying shares ADRs Underlying shares 
Event CARs t-stat. CARs t-stat. CARs t-stat. CARs t-stat. 
week 
2 
-0.0014 -0.15 -0.0094 -1.09 0.0233 1.19 0.0131 1.60 
5 
-0.0017 -0.11 -0.0202 -1.66 0.1025 3.32 0.0532 3.25 
10 0.0021 0.10 
-0.0349 -1.91 0.0804 1.84 0.0502 2.04 
20 
-0.0027 -0.77 -0.0336 -1.26 0.0827 1.34 0.0185 0.52 
30 
-0.0589 -1.62 -0.0602 -1.84 0.0455 0.60 0.0190 0.43 
52 
-0.0669 -1.40 -0.0673 -1.37 0.1103 1.11 0.0195 0.33 
80 
-0.1992 -2.99 -0.1391 -2.17 0.0855 0.66 -0.0216 -0.28 
104 
-0.2469 -3.18 -0.1780 -2.32 0.0089 0.06 -0.0578 -0.66 
So far we have argued that international listing lowers expected returns since it 
reduces barriers to investment as transaction or information costs. The structure of 
the ADR market160 provides us with an unique opportunity to conduct a more direct 
test of potential benefits of ADR listings. Some of the sample firms had in place an 
unsponsored or a sponsored Level I programme before they decided to upgrade 
their ADR programme to a listing. Since pre-listing price data is available for these 
ADRs, we can now test the magnitude of benefits that US investors experience when 
ADRs start trading on a regulated and potentially more liquid marketplace. Table 
6.16. provides striking evidence of the positive effect on the ADR price. ADRs 
experience an abnormal return of 12.18% on the day of listing which is highly 
significant (t=18.17)161. It shows that previously OTC-traded ADRs were segmented 
from the underlying share market. Subsequent to the upgrading, the ADR price 
becomes integrated with the underlying share price. The magnitude of this 
Aso See Velli (1994). 
161 Even after removing one outlier, which experienced an increase of 200%, the average abnormal return is 6.8% 
and highly significant (t=8.23). 
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integration effect is reflected in the strong price reaction of the ADRs upon 
upgrading. This finding may be explained by the positive effect on liquidity that 
upgradings experience. Moreover, the strength of this strongly positive liquidity effect 
could help to explain the observed reduction in expected returns in the post-listing 
period. 
Table 6.16. 
Daily abnormal returns (ARs) of companies upgrading their Level I ADR programme to 
a listing 
This Table shows daily abnormal returns of ADRs and their underlying shares for firms that 
upgraded their Level I ADR programme to a listing. 
ADRs Underlying shares 
Event day AR t-statistic AR t-statistic 
-1 
0 
0.0080 
0.1218 
1.20 
18.17 
0.0038 
0.0015 
0.56 
0.22 
6.5 Conclusion 
This paper shows that foreign firms listing on NYSE or NASDAQ experience positive 
abnormal returns in the pre-listing period and negative abnormal returns in the post- 
listing period. This contrasts with foreign firms that list on the London Stock 
Exchange which do no not experience any significant changes in the pre- and the 
post-listing period. This finding is attributed to the institutional differences in 
regulating foreign equities across both markets. Since foreign firms face higher 
hurdles to gain access to the US capital market, the benefits of reducing these 
barriers to investment appear to be higher. Emerging market firms, as suggested by 
theoretical research, seem to experience the biggest integration effects. Although we 
cannot fully rule out the presence of an "emerging market sentiment" of international 
investors, our evidence is weak. This chapter also shows that negative post-listing 
returns are not concentrated among capital raising ADR-listings, as suggested by the 
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existing equity issuance literature, which lends further support to the "decline in 
expected returns"-explanation. Moreover, we also demonstrate that the underlying 
share price becomes aligned to the ADR price after the listing. The substantial 
positive abnormal return of 12.18% on the listing day for firms that upgrade their 
OTC-traded ADR programme to a "fully" listed ADR programme provides strong 
support for the benefits associated with listings. 
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7. Chapter: The international cross-listing decision and its 
impact on liquidity 
Previous studies have investigated the motives of companies that decide to list their 
stock on an exchange outside their country of origin and the benefits associated with 
it. They suggest that international listing is perceived by managers to increase the 
liquidity of their stock, provide better access to foreign capital markets, increase the 
exposure for the products of the firm, and lead to a growth in the shareholder base 
(Mittoo, 1992). The listing decision of international firms may also be related to the 
proportion of exports to the host country and the size of the firm. However, the most 
prominent explanation throughout the literature is the idea that companies have the 
desire to increase the liquidity of their stock. 
The review of previous literature has shown that international listing and domestic 
exchange listing increases the liquidity of a stock. International listing increases the 
total trading volume and the informativeness of prices. Explanations for the sources 
of liquidity improvement are still tentative. Some theoretical models of multiple 
trading locations have shown that the improvement in liquidity may be explained by 
the increased competition among traders. The increased competition also forces 
informed traders to reveal more private information which increases the 
informativeness of prices. However, other studies have argued that trading on an 
alternative market could have a negative impact on the liquidity of the primary market 
since marketplace fragmentation reduces trading volume and pricing efficiency. This 
suggests that the impact of foreign listing on the liquidity of a stock in its domestic 
market may be influenced by the structure and interaction of both markets. Previous 
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studies, however, have not investigated whether the impact of international cross- 
listing on the liquidity of the domestic market varies across stock exchanges. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 2 describes the sample and the methodology. In 
particular, the matching process between sample and control firms is described and 
the estimation of abnormal trading volume is discussed. The empirical findings are 
presented in Section 3. While the first part examines the effect of different stock 
exchanges, the second part investigates the impact of the method of listing. Part 
three examines differences in microstructure-related characteristics between listed 
and control firms. Part four investigates order flow effects of ADR listings. 
7.1 Hypotheses tested 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the effect of international cross- 
listing on the trading volume of the domestic market differs for firms listing on the 
London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and NYSE. An US listing may lead to a larger 
increase in trading volume from the pre- to the post-listing period since it increases 
the total number of traders. An increase in the number of traders is generally 
associated with an increase in competition and pricing efficiency. While it is 
assumed that trading costs are typically low in the US market, this may provide even 
stronger competition for traders in the firm's domestic market. However, it may still 
be cheaper for many traders to trade in the domestic market. Hence, we expect that 
US listings should experience stronger positive volume effetcs in the post-listing 
period in their domestic market. The increase in the trading volume in the firm's 
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domestic market stems from the increased trading by liquidity traders who 
concentrate their trading activity in the market with the lowest tranasction costs. 
Previous research has also not examined whether the liquidity impact varies for 
different methods of listing. Companies that raise capital with their listing may 
experience stronger positive volume effects in the post-listing period. Companies that 
conduct a public offering in the US market offer a higher percentage of their total 
number of shares outstanding to US investors. Hence, the increase in the 
shareholder base is larger for public offerings than for introductions. Since there is a 
link between the size of the shareholder base and liquidity, a bigger US shareholder 
base is expected to create a more active US secondary market in this foreign stock. 
At the same time, an increased trading activity in the US market provides stronger 
competition for domestic traders, as described above, leading to an increase in 
trading activity in the domestic market. 
Previous studies examining changes in trading activity from the pre- to the post- 
listing period have not taken account of market-wide or industry-related fluctuations 
in volume. Our study adjusts for changes in the market volume and matches control 
firms by nationality, firm size, and industry. This comparison between listed and 
control firms, which appear to qualify for a listing but do not list their stock 
internationally, could also shed some light on the motives of companies obtaining an 
international cross-listing. If a listing on one exchange leads to a stronger increase in 
the trading volume than on other exchanges, this may explain the listing decision of 
firms. 
Earlier studies examining ADR listings have not distinguished between listing ADRs 
on an OTC-market or on a regulated stock exchange, as NYSE and NASDAQ. This 
chapter also investigates the impact of a regulated ADR listing on the order flow of a 
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stock. If international listing is consistent with an increased competition among 
traders we would expect an increase in the total order flow of a stock (domestic + 
foreign volume). A high number of firms should experience an increase in their 
domestic order flow. However, this does not preclude a significant foreign order flow 
because it may be beneficial for some market participants to trade in the foreign 
market. Moreover, cross-market arbitrage should generate additional trading volume 
in both markets. 
Hypotheses: 
1. ) The market attaches a liquidity benefit to internationally listed companies. 
While all firms experience positive short-term volume effects in the immediate 
pre-listing period in their domestic market, US listings experience positive 
long-term abnormal volume effects in the post-listing period in their domestic 
market. 
2. ) The method of listing influences the impact on the domestic trading 
volume. Public offerings bear larger liquidity benefits than introductions 
because they lead to a stronger increase in the shareholder base of a firm. 
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7.2 Sample and methodology 
7.2.1 Listed companies 
Our initial sample consists of all foreign firms that are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and foreign firms which have 
listed ADRs on NASDAQ. We identify 185 firms on the London Stock Exchange, 177 
firms on NYSE, and 61 on NASDAQ, that obtained a listing between 1980 and 1994. 
Information concerning the listed companies and their listing date is obtained from 
the respective stock exchanges through private communication. A special criterion is 
applied to NASDAQ firms which must be sponsored ADRs. This eliminates 5 
unsponsored ADRs which were granted an exemption from Rule 12g3-2(b)162. We 
require that all internationally listed firms are also listed in their country of origin 
because we only consider international cross-listings. This criterion eliminates 48 
companies (14 London, 23 NYSE, and 11 NASDAQ listings) from our sample. 
Since we are interested in changes in trading volume from the pre- to the post-listing 
period, we have to estimate "normal" trading volume over a certain period prior to the 
listing. We choose a 52-week estimation period from week t=-78 to t=-26 prior to the 
listing week 163 This imposes an additional constraint on our sample selection 
because we have to delete firms with less than 78 weeks of stock price data prior to 
the listing. This leaves us with a preliminary sample of 118 companies on the London 
Stock Exchange, 84 companies on the New York Stock Exchange, and 31 
companies on NASDAQ. The high rate of exclusion is due to two main reasons. 
Firstly, a high percentage of internationally listed firms are initial public offerings 
162 Rule 12g3-2(b) requires OTC securities to register with the SEC but foreign companies were exempted until 
October 1983. In October 1983 the SEC abolished this exemption for foreign securities but gave already-listed 
securities a "grandfather" exemption. 
163 For more details see 3.3. Estimation of abnormal trading volume. 
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(IPOs). Secondly, many internationally listed firms are from emerging markets which 
often lack sufficient historical data. 
Table 7.1. 
Sample selection 
This table shows the various steps of the sample selection procedure. Only international 
cross-listings with sufficient historical data are considered. 
NYSE London NASDAQa 
Total number of firms that listed 177 185 61 
between 1980-1994 
Unsponsored ADRs 5 
Primary listings 23 14 11 
Companies with less than 78 70 53 14 
weeks of price data 
Subtotal: Companies with price 84 118 31 
data 
Companies without trading volume 25 38 15 
data 
Number of companies in sample 59 80 16 
Firms without matched control firms 25 19 7 
Number of companies with 34 61 9 
matched control firms 
a Only firms that listed ADRs are considered. 
Since we are interested to what extent an international listing influences the liquidity 
of a stock, we have to exclude firms with less than 78 weeks of trading volume data 
on their domestic exchange prior to the listing date. However, in many instances 
sufficient historical volume is not available on Datastream164 The high rate of 
exclusion is mainly due to Japanese and UK companies. Datastream only reports 
trading volume from October 1986 onwards for UK companies and from mid 1990 
onwards for Japanese companies. Hence, we have to exclude 27 Japanese 
companies (22 in London, 2 on NYSE, and 1 on NASDAQ) and 18 UK companies 
(11 on NYSE and 7 on NASDAQ). Moreover, an additional 24 companies from 
various countries have to be excluded because no volume data is available prior to 
their listing date. This results in a sample of 80 companies on the London Stock 
Asa Although price data was available for these sample firms, Datastream does not report volume for the following 
countries: Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa. This eliminates 9 firms from our sample (3 in London, 3 
on NYSE, and 3 on NASDAQ). 
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Exchange, 59 companies on the NYSE, and 16 companies on NASDAQ (see Table 
7.1. ). 
7.2.2 Control firms 
To examine possible changes in trading volume, we also generate a sample of not 
internationally listed control firms on the basis of nationality, size, and industry. 
Saudagaran (1988) uses firms' assets, sales 165 and market value as surrogate 
measures for size. Since market value is related to bid-ask spreads, market value 
appears to be the most appropriate measure for size. Nationality proxies for a 
number of other factors as financial reporting and listing requirements, size of the 
domestic capital market, and the trading system of the domestic stock exchange. 
Industry is used as a third factor. According to Saudagaran (1988), industry may 
proxy for a number of variables as size, level of technology, and capital intensity. 
This part describes the procedure used to choose control firms for the sample firms. 
In a first step, we search Datastream country lists for each particular domestic 
country to identify firms that have the same industry code as the internationally listed 
firm. For each firm in the sample, the firm with the market capitalisation closest to 
and, if possible, larger than that of the sample firm on its listing date is chosen as the 
control firm. While size is positively related to liquidity, choosing larger firms ensures 
that we do not introduce a size bias in our results. However, we observe a similar 
pattern in many countries. Firms that are larger than our sample firm have been 
internationally listed for years. Very often the largest firm in one particular industry 
165 Some studies suggest that companies list their stock abroad to market their products. In order to take account of 
this factor, we would have to match companies by their foreign sales in the listing country. However, many 
companies do not provide a country-by-country breakdown of revenues. 
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lists first. This indicates that the listing decision of firms is partly influenced by the 
relative size of a firm in its domestic market or industry. We also include in the 
control sample firms that eventually list on the foreign stock exchange. If we only 
used firms that are known to have never listed internationally, we would introduce an 
ex post selection bias into the tests (see Cowan, Carter, Dark, and Singh, 1992). 
However, their listing has to occur at least one year after the listing of the sample 
firm to avoid using overlapping data. A firm that is listed on another foreign stock 
exchange (e. g. London Stock Exchange) can be included in our control sample (e. g. 
for NYSE-listings) as long as the listing date does not fall within our observation 
period. 
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Table 7.2. 
Distribution of international cross-listings on the New York Stock 
Exchange, London Stock Exchange, and on NASDAQ by domestic 
country. 
The sample consists of 155 international listings from 16 different countries. All 
firms are listed on their domestic stock exchange. 59 firms are listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 80 firms are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, and 16 firms are listed on NASDAQ. NASDAQ listings only include 
ADR listings. The number in brackets shows the number of internationally 
listed firms which could be matched with a control firm. The matched sample 
consists of 104 matched pairs from 12 different countries. 
Domestic country New York London NASDAQ Total 
Australia 8 (2) 8 (6) 6 (4) 22 (12) 
Belgium 1 (1) 1 (1) 
Canada 16(14) 3(2) 19(16) 
Chile 8 (6) 8 (6) 
Denmark 1 1 
Germany 1 (1) 3 (3) 4 (4) 
Hong Kong 1 (1) 1 
Italy 11 
Japan 2 (1) 2 (2) 4 (3) 
Mexico 6(1) 6(1) 
Netherlands 4 (2) 1 (1) 1 6 (3) 
Norway 1 1 2 
Philippines 1 1 
Sweden 5 (1) 5 (2) 10 (3) 
UK 10(7) 3(2) 13(9) 
US 56 (45) 56 (45) 
TOTAL 59 (34) 80 (61) 16 (9) 155 (104) 
Due to the problems, as described above, our final sample of control firms includes 
104 companies that can be matched with their corresponding listing firms. Table 7.2. 
shows that 34 control firms are matched with a NYSE-listed firm, 61 control firms are 
matched with a London-listed firm, and 9 are matched with a NASDAQ-listed firm. 
Data on prices and market microstructure-related variables used in this study were 
collected from Datastream. It includes weekly observations of domestic trading 
volume, variance of returns, and closing prices during the pre- and the post-listing 
period, and market values in the listing week. Domestic trading volume is calculated 
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from the weekly closing price, converted into US dollar, times the weekly number of 
shares traded. Variances are calculated from weekly returns. To obtain the weekly 
trading volume of the total market, we use "Datastream Global Indices" which are 
provided by Datastream for each country. They are calculated from a representative 
list of stocks for each market and are value-weighted. 
7.2.3 Estimation of abnormal trading volume 
Our interest is to examine the influence of international listing on liquidity. Liquidity 
can potentially be proxied by a number of different variables. Commonly used 
measures are (1) trading volume (2) the bid-ask spread and (3) market depth. Since 
quoted bid-ask spreads are not available for a large number of sample firms, we 
examine trading volume effects associated with international listings. Moreover, 
volume has been shown to explain a significant fraction of the cross-sectional 
variation in bid-ask spreads. To assess whether trading activity on the domestic 
stock exchange changes when a stock becomes internationally listed, we analyse 
trading volume in event time. Similar to Beneish and Gardner (1995), we measure 
abnormal trading volume, using a mean adjustment model and a market volume 
adjustment. 
The mean adjustment model is defined by 
AV; t=V; t-V;, 
The market volume adjustment model is given by 
VRit = VitNmt * VmNi 
(7.1. ) 
(7.2. ) 
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where V; t is the ratio of shares of security i traded in week t to firm i's shares 
outstanding (turnover), V; is the mean V; t in the estimation period prior to the listing, 
Vmt is the weekly trading volume of the total domestic stock market, and Vm is the 
average trading volume of the total market in the estimation period. Harris and Gurel 
(1986) propose the volume ratio VR; t, which is a standardised measure of period t 
trading volume in security i adjusted for market variation. It takes account of changes 
in market conditions which can be caused by structural events as the 1987 Crash or 
volume changes due to derivatives trading (Kabir and Vermaelen, 1993). 
To ensure that our estimated parameters are not biased by high trading activity in 
the immediate pre-listing period, we choose a 52-week estimation period from week 
t= 
-78 to t= -26 prior to the listing date. Although the choice is arbitrary, it is partly 
influenced by the findings in Chapter 6 that international listings experience a run-up 
in their prices approximately 35 weeks prior to the listing week. This gives rise to the 
assumption that trading activity may be abnormally high during this period. Moreover, 
it is important to note that our estimation period partly overlaps with our observation 
period since for a number of firms there is not sufficient pre-listing volume data 
available (see Table 7.1. ). However, using a shorter estimation period (e. g. from t=- 
78 to t=-52) would result in less robust estimates166 
While the volume ratio (VR; t) has an expected value of one if there is no change in 
volume during the event-period t, the expected value of the abnormal volume (AV; t) 
is 0. Test statistics for the volume ratio are based on a t-test which examines 
whether the average VR of the sample is different from one. For the abnormal 
166 Our results show that this would lead to even stronger positive volume effects, especially for NYSE listings. 
Hence, this would overstate the findings. 
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volume (AV; t) the test statistic is calculated as in Ajinkya and Jain (1989) which 
adjusts for autocorrelation in trading volume167 
7.3 Empirical results 
7.3.1 Change in liquidity and the effect of the foreign stock exchange 
The results in Table 7.3. and Table 7.4. show that international listings are 
associated with abnormal trading volume effects. These effects can be split into long- 
term volume effects of international listings and short-term abnormal trading activity 
around the listing week. 
Table 7.3. compares trading volume effects of NYSE, NASDAQ, and London listings. 
Panel A shows average (AV) and cumulative average abnormal volume (CAV) 
effects around the time of listing. All listings experience positive CAVs in the post- 
listing period with London (t=4.62) and NYSE (t=3.17) listings highly significant. 
However, the pre-listing period results of London (0.0430) and NASDAQ (0.0507) 
listings are also positive and significant. This may be an indication that other effects, 
for example a strong increase in the trading volume of the market, have influenced 
the results. Hence, Panel B adjusts trading volume effects for changes in the trading 
volume of the market. It shows the mean and the median volume ratio (VR) for the 
52-week pre-listing and post-listing periods. To examine whether the VR is different 
from 1 in each subperiod, standard t-tests and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are 
performed. 
167 Ajinkya and Jain (1989) argue that autocorrelation in trading volume could arise because some investors adjust 
their holdings later than others. This could be the case because they come to know this information later or they 
choose to trade periodically to minimise transaction costs. 
194 
Table 7.3. 
Trading volume effects of international listings around the time of listing 
This Table shows abnormal trading volume effects of international listings around their time of 
listing. Panel A compares the cumulative average (CAV) abnormal weekly trading volume in 
the pre-listing period and the post-listing for NYSE, London, and NASDAQ listings. It also 
shows abnormal volume (AV) effects in the listing week. Cumulative average abnormal 
volume (CAV) is calculated by summing the abnormal volume of each week over the 52-week 
pre- and post-listing period. t-statistics are given in brackets and are adjusted for 
autocorrelation. Panel B compares market-adjusted volume effects of NYSE, London, and 
NASDAQ listings between the pre- and post-listing period. It shows the mean and the median 
of the volume ratio (VR; t) which is a standardised measure of security i trading in period t. 
Under the null hypothesis of no change its expected value is 1. t-tests are performed whether 
the mean of the volume ratio is different from 1. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are performed 
to test whether the median is different from 1 with p-values shown in brackets. 
Panel A: Average (AV) and cumulative average (CAV) abnormal weekly trading volume 
Event period (in weeks) NYSE London NASDAQ 
-52 to -1 0.0107 0.0430 0.0507 (1.23) (2.67) (2.15) 
0 0.0039 0.0004 0.0028 
(2.75) (0.24) (0.48) 
1 to 52 0.0342 0.0965 0.0431 
(3.17) (4.62) (1.88) 
Panel B: Weekly market-adjusted volume effects 
NYSE London NASDAQ 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
-52 to -1 1.14 1.09 1.06 1.07 1.01 0.91 (3.33) (0.006) (5.02) (0.000) (0.16) (0.004) 
1 to 52 1.32 1.27 1.01 1.00 0.89 0.82 
(8.89) (0.000) (0.70) (0.591) (-2.56) (0.000) 
The average volume ratio (VR) for NYSE listings increases from 1.14 (t=3.33) in the 
pre-listing period to 1.32 (t=8.89) in the post-listing period. The respective medians 
are 1.09 (p=0.006) and 1.27 (p=0.000). The results show that the VR of London and 
NASDAQ listings is lower in the post-listing period than in the pre-listing period. 
While the median (1.07) and the mean (1.06) volume ratio for London listings in the 
pre-listing period is significantly different from 1, the post-listing period does not 
seem to be associated with abnormal volume effects. NASDAQ listings appear to 
have lower volume ratios in the post-listing period. 
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To investigate whether our long-term trading volume results are biased by abnormal 
short-term trading activity around the time of listing, we examine the listing week, 
and the 16-week period before and after the listing. Table 7.4. shows that NYSE 
listings experience high abnormal trading volume in the listing week (mean VR=1.79 
and median VR=1.45) which is statistically significant (t=2.75 and p=0.001). But the 
VR for London and NASDAQ listings is not statistically different from 1. NYSE listings 
(mean VR=1.34 and median VR=1.33) and London listings (VR=1.13 and median 
VR=1.12) experience significantly positive abnormal volume effects in the 16-week 
period preceding the listing week. The mean VR for NASDAQ listings is 0.89 but not 
significantly from 1 (t=-1.52). However, the median VR is 0.76 with a p-value of 
0.028. 
Table 7.4. 
Market-adjusted short-term trading volume effects of international listings 
This Table shows market-adjusted short-term trading volume effects of NYSE 
London, and NASDAQ listings. It shows the volume ratio (VR; t) which is a 
standardised measure of security i trading in period t. t-statistics are calculate 
whether the observed ratio differs from its expected ratio, which is 1. Wilcoxon 
Mann-Whitney tests are performed to test whether the median is different from 1 
with p-values shown in brackets. 
NYSE listings London listings NASDAQ listings 
Event period Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
(in weeks) 
-16 to -1 1.34 1.33 1.13 1.12 0.89 0.76 (7.03) (0.000) (7.81) (0.000) (-1.52) (0.028) 
0 1.79 1.45 1.00 0.98 1.17 1.10 
(2.75) (0.001) (-0.04) (0.723) (0.51) (0.045) 
+1 to +16 1.62 1.55 0.98 1.00 1.05 0.91 
(8.49) (0.000) (-0.96) (0.754) (0.56) (0.118) 
The positive abnormal volume effects for NYSE and London listings may be an 
indication that domestic investors sell off part of their holdings in the pre-listing period 
when the listing decision is announced. The sold-off shares are taken up by the 
sponsor to sell them in the foreign market when trading starts in the listing week. 
This process is exemplified for ADRs. In order to create ADRs, underlying shares 
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must be deposited with a depository bank, or the depository's custodian bank in the 
issuer's home country. The depository then issues depository receipts to the US 
investors. These transactions, which involve some portfolio rebalancing from 
previous domestic shareholders to the sponsoring investment bank, create additional 
trading volume in the pre-listing period. Table 7.4. also shows differences between 
NYSE, NASDAQ, and London listings for the 16-week period following the listing 
week. While NYSE listings experience significantly positive abnormal volume effects 
(mean VR=1.46 and median VR=1.38), the results for London and NASDAQ listings 
are not significantly different from 1. Possible explanations for these differences will 
be examined in the following section. 
7.3.2 Impact of the method of listing on liquidity 
Our previous results showed different abnormal volume effects of NYSE-listed, 
London-listed, and NASDAQ-listed companies. Since a number of companies raised 
capital with their NYSE listing, we partition our sample of NYSE-listings into two 
subsamples according to their method of listing. Table 7.5. shows distinctively 
different results for companies that conducted a public offering with their listing and 
firms that accessed the US market without raising new capital (introductions). The 
VR for introductions in the pre-listing period is 1.22 (median VR=1.17) but only 1.09 
(median VR=1.07) for public offerings. While introductions exhibit a moderate 
increase in the trading volume in the post-listing period (mean VR=1.33 and median 
VR=1.29), the VR of public offerings increases to 1.75 (median VR=1.45). The mean 
and median volume ratios for the post-listing period are highly significant. This is an 
indication that public offerings also have a stronger long-term impact on the liquidity 
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of a stock. The differences between public offerings and introductions partly help to 
explain the differences between London-listed and NYSE-listed companies. 
Table 7.5. 
Market-adjusted trading volume effects of different methods of listing on NYSE 
This Table compares market-adjusted volume effects of different methods of listing on the 
NYSE. It shows the volume ratio (VRA) which is a standardised measure of security i trading 
in period t. Under the null hypothesis of no change its expected value is 1. Panel A shows 
the changes in the VR from the pre- to the post-listing period for introductions and public 
offerings. Panel B shows the VR for the 16-week period around the listing week for 
introductions and public offerings. t-statistics are calculated whether the observed ratio 
differs from its expected value, which is 1. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are performed to 
test whether the median is different from 1 with p-values shown in brackets. 
Event period (in 
weeks) 
Introductions Public offerings 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Trading volume effects 
-52 to -1 1.22 1.17 1.09 1.07 (7.33) (0.000) (2.03) (0.362) 
+1 to +52 1.33 1.29 1.75 1.45 
(7.58) (0.000) (6.38) (0.000) 
Panel B: Short-term trading volume effects of different methods of listing 
-16 to -1 1.45 1.40 1.12 1.21 (9.39) (0.000) (1.54) (0.118) 
+1 to +16 1.50 1.52 1.86 1.73 
(10.91) (0.000) (5.31) (0.000) 
Panel B examines the immediate periods around the listing week. While 
introductions experience a highly significant abnormal trading activity (mean 
VR=1.45 and median VR=1.40) in the pre-listing period (t=-16 to 
-1), the VR of public 
offerings is 1.12 (median VR=1.21) and is not significantly different from one (t=1.54 
and p=O. 118). The difference can be explained by the fact that no pre-listing buying 
activity takes place in the case of public offerings because the expected demand for 
foreign shares is met by issuing new shares instead of converting part of the existing 
underlying shares into ADRs. Consistent with our expectations public offerings 
experience much higher abnormal volume effects in the post-listing period. The high 
mean VR of 1.86 (t=5.31) and median VR of 1.73 (p=0.000) in the immediate period 
following the listing can be partly explained by probable market stabilisation during 
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the 4-6 weeks following the listing week. However, the VR of introductions in the 
post-listing period (t=1 to 16) is still 1.50 (median VR=1.52) and highly significant 
(t=10.91 and p=0.000). 
7.3.3 Microstructure-related characteristics of listed and control firms 
To investigate whether our results are merely a reflection of a grown volume effect168 
over time, as pointed out by Harris and Gurel (1986), we match our listed firms with a 
sample of control firms. Table 7.6. compares some microstructure-related 
characteristics of listed sample firms and control firms. In general internationally 
listed firms are bigger, on average, than control firms in the same industry. The 
mean market capitalisation of NYSE listings, as measured in the listing week, is US$ 
3,515 million while the mean market capitalisation of the control firms is US$ 2,245 
million. However, the difference is not significant (t=1.94) at the 5 percent level. The 
mean market value of London listings is US$ 5,534 million while the market value of 
control firms is US$ 2,862 million. NASDAQ-listed firms are smaller than London and 
NYSE listings, as expected, and their mean market capitalisation is US$ 867 million. 
The market value of their control firms is US$ 781 million but the difference is not 
statistically significant (t=0.20). 
The differences in size between listing and control firms is mainly due to the problem, 
as described above, that in a number of cases we cannot find a control firm in the 
same industry which is approximately similar in size. However, this fact also explains 
to some degree the listing decision of companies which have "outgrown" their 
domestic capital market. This finding is consistent with Saudagaran (1988) who 
Asa Harris and Gurel (1986) note that total trading volume has increased over time. 
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suggests that multinational companies from smaller domestic markets need to go 
international because this mitigates their disadvantage in raising capital compared to 
their international competitors. 
Listed firms and control firms, on average, have the same variance of return. The 
results for listed and control firms are not significantly different across all three 
exchanges. An international listing does not seem to have an effect on the variance 
of return as the variance of return remains unchanged in the pre- and post-listing 
period. There are also no statistically significant differences in the price per share, as 
measured by weekly closing prices, between listed and control firms for any of the 
three stock exchanges in the pre- and post-listing period. 
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Internationally listed firms, on average, have a higher trading volume on the domestic 
stock exchange than control firms. The weekly mean trading volume for NYSE listed 
companies is US$ 69.75 million in the pre-listing period and US$ 84.76 million in the 
post-listing period. The respective values for control firms are US$ 37.52 million and 
US$ 46.31 million. But the t-statistics reveal that the difference in the mean values of 
listed and control firms is not statistically significant indicating that the mean volume 
for listed firms is biased upwards by a few companies with very high trading volume. 
The weekly mean trading volume for London listings is US$ 79.62 million in the pre- 
listing period and US$ 87.77 million in the post-listing period. Control firms have a 
trading volume of US$ 30.46 million in the pre-listing period and US$ 30.32 million in 
the post-listing period. The weekly average trading volume in the pre-listing period 
for NASDAQ listings is US$ 8.11 million compared to US $9.31 million for control 
firms, however, the difference is not statistically significant (t=-0.22). NASDAQ 
control firms also have a higher trading volume in the post-listing period (US$ 13.16 
million) than listed firms (US$ 10.70 million) but the difference is not significant (t=- 
0.33). 
Table 7.7. reports the abnormal volume results for listing firms which could be 
matched with a control firm. While the results for the listing firms are qualitatively 
very similar to those reported in Tables 7.3. and 7.4., the results for the control firms 
show some remarkable differences. In general the VR for the control firms oscillates 
around 1, as expected. Since the pre-listing period may be biased by short-term 
abnormal volume effects of the period prior to the listing week, we split the pre-listing 
period into two sub-periods. Panel A shows that the VR of London listings (mean 
VR=1.04) is not significantly different from the VR for control firms (VR=1.01) in the 
early pre-listing period (t=-52 to -17 weeks). While the VR increases for listed firms 
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(mean VR=1.18 and median VR=1.16) in the immediate pre-listing period (t=-16 to 
-1 
week), the VR drops for control firms (mean VR=0.83 and median VR=0.81). This 
gives rise to the assumption that in the immediate pre-listing period prospective 
listing firms obtain more attention at the expense of other firms in the same industry. 
Although the VR of London listings (mean VR=1.02 and median VR=1.00) is lower in 
the post-listing than in the pre-listing period, it is still larger than the VR for control 
firms (mean VR=0.77 and median VR=0.80). The differences between listed firms 
and control firms are highly statistically significant when performing a paired t-test for 
the means (t=12.41) and a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the medians (t=8.39). 
Panel B reports similar results for NYSE listings. However, the magnitude of the 
difference between listed and control firms is far more pronounced. NYSE listed firms 
also show positive abnormal volume effects in the early pre-listing period. This may 
be an indication that listed firms receive more attention than control firms and then 
try to take advantage of some "windows of opportunity", as put forward by the timing 
literature. This effect is magnified in the immediate pre-listing period, where the VR 
for listed firms (mean VR=1.43 and median VR=1.39) is highly significantly different 
from control firms (mean VR=1.00 and median VR=1.02). Listing appears to have a 
strong long-term impact on liquidity since the VR for NYSE firms (mean VR=1.39 and 
median VR=1.28) is significantly higher than for control firms (mean VR=1.04 and 
median VR=0.99). 
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Table 7.7. 
Abnormal volume effects of listed and control firms 
This Table compares abnormal volume effects of internationally listed and control firms around 
the time of the listing. It shows the volume ratio (VRO) which is a standardised measure of 
security i trading in period t. Under the null hypothesis of no change its expected value is 1. t- 
statistics are performed as a paired t-test of differences between the estimates of listed firms 
and its control firms for each particular subperiod. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are 
performed to test whether there is a difference in the medians of the control and the listed 
firms. Panel A shows the results for London listings and their control firms. Panel B shows the 
results for NYSE listings and their control firms. Panel C shows the results for NASDAQ 
listings and their control firms. 
Listed firms Control firms Difference tests 
Event Mean Median Mean Median Paired t WMW 
period test 
(in weeks) 
Panel A: London listed firms and corresponding control firms 
-52 to -17 1.04 1.04 1.01 1.01 1.48 0.74 
-16 to -1 1.18 1.16 0.83 0.81 14.05 4.98 
1 to 52 1.02 1.00 0.77 0.80 12.41 8.39 
Panel B: NYSE listed firms and corresponding control firms 
-52 to -17 1.12 1.07 0.97 0.91 3.43 3.19 
-16 to -1 1.43 1.39 1.00 1.02 5.96 4.49 
1 to 52 1.39 1.28 1.04 0.99 5.16 6.10 
Panel C: NASDAQ listed firms and corresponding control firms 
-52 to -17 1.12 1.07 0.97 0.79 1.05 3.34 
-16 to -1 0.98 0.89 0.87 0.80 0.97 1.53 
1 to 52 0.93 0.85 0.93 0.89 0.03 
-0.42 
The results reported in Panel C for NASDAQ listings differ from previous results 
since there is no difference between listed and control firms for any of the 
subperiods. The VR for listed firms is 1.12 compared to 0.97 for control firms in the 
early pre-listing period (t=-52 to 
-17) but the difference is not statistically significant 
(t=1.05). However, there appears to be a significant difference when comparing the 
medians. In contrast to NYSE and London listings, we do not find an increase in 
trading activity in the immediate pre-listing period (t=-16 to -1 week). The values are 
0.98 (median VR=0.89) for listings and 0.87 (median VR=0.80) for control firms. 
Moreover, there is also no difference in the post-listing period between listings and 
control firms with the mean VR being 0.93 for both groups. 
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7.3.4 Order flow effects of ADR listings 
Since we are also interested how trading on the domestic and the foreign stock 
exchange are related, we conduct an order flow analysis. Following Foerster and 
Karolyi (1994), we examine the gains in domestic and total order flow, and the US 
order flow. The percentage gain in domestic order flow is calculated as the ratio of 
average weekly post-listing dollar volume to weekly pre-listing dollar volume, less 
one. US order flow shows the relative size of the pre-listing domestic market to the 
ADR market in the US. It is calculated as the ratio of the average weekly ADR dollar 
volume to the average weekly domestic volume, less one. Total order flow is 
calculated as the ratio of the sum of the weekly post-listing domestic dollar volume 
and the weekly ADR dollar volume to the pre-listing domestic dollar volume, less 
one. 
Table 7.8. shows that 68.29 percent of all firms that listed ADRs experienced an 
increase in their domestic order flow. This effect is slightly stronger on NASDAQ 
where 73.33 percent of the listing firms show a gain in their domestic order flow. This 
compares to 65.38 percent of all NYSE firms. The figures for the US order flow show 
that for 29.27 percent of all firms the foreign market is larger than their pre-listing 
domestic market. These figures are similar to the findings of Domowitz, Glen, and 
Madhavan (1995) who show that the ADR market of Mexican firms is relatively large 
compared to their pre-listing domestic market. Our results show, that in particular 
NYSE listings have a very active foreign market because 38.46 percent trade in 
higher volumes abroad. This compares to only 13.33 percent of NASDAQ firms. The 
total order flow has increased for 82.93 percent of all firms. The results for NYSE 
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and NASDAQ listings are very similar. These findings are also consistent with a 
conjecture that international listing increases liquidity. 
Table 7.8. 
Change in order flow after an ADR listing 
This Table reports changes in order flow for companies that listed ADRs on NYSE or 
NASDAQ. The column domestic order flow contains the number of firms, and the percentage 
of firms, that experienced an increase in their domestic order flow after their listing. The 
domestic order flow is calculated as the ratio of the average weekly post-listing dollar volume 
to the average dollar volume in the pre-listing period, less one. The column US flow contains 
the number of firms, and the percentage of firms, that trade in a higher volume on NYSE or 
NASDAQ than they experienced in their domestic market in the pre-listing period. The US flow 
is calculated as the ratio of the average weekly ADR dollar volume to the average domestic 
dollar volume in the pre-listing period, less one. The column total order flow contains the 
number of firms, and the percentage of firms, that experienced an increase in their total order 
flow after their listing. The total order flow is calculated as the ratio of the-sum of the post- 
listing period domestic dollar volume and the ADR dollar volume to the pre-listing domestic 
dollar volume, less one. 
Number of Domestic order US flow Total order 
firms flow flow 
All firms 41 28 12 34 
% of increase 68.29 29.27 82.92 
NYSE 26 17 10 22 
% of increase 65.38 38.46 84.62 
NASDAQ 15 11 2 12 
% of increase 73.33 13.33 80.00 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that firms experience an increase in liquidity once they become 
internationally listed. While the results for NYSE listings are very robust, when we 
adjust for market-wide changes in volume, the evidence for NASDAQ and London 
listings is less clear. However, a comparison of trading volume effects for 
internationally listed firms and control firms matched by nationality, size, and industry 
shows that NYSE and London listings experience persistent positive volume effects. 
NASDAQ listings do not experience any significantly different volume effects than 
their matched control firms. We also find highly significant short-term trading effects 
for London and NYSE listings. These effects are much stronger in the pre-listing 
period for firms which list their stock using an introduction. Our comparison of 
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microstructure-related characteristics of internationally listed and control firms 
indicates that the listing decision on NYSE and on the London Stock Exchange is 
influenced to some degree by the size of the firm. Moreover, listing firms also appear 
to have been more liquid in the pre-listing period. An order flow analysis confirms our 
findings that international listing leads to an increase in liquidity. It shows that the 
total order flow increases for approximately 83 percent of our sample firms. 
Moreover, 38 percent of NYSE listings have a larger order flow on the NYSE than 
they had in their domestic market prior to the international listing. 
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8. Chapter: Alternative international equity offering methods 
and their impact on Iiquidity* 
Although ADRs have developed into an important instrument to raise capital 
internationally, existing research remains limited. Previous research has mainly 
looked at the efficiency of the ADR market, and the integration effects of international 
equity offerings. The international cross-listing literature as well as the domestic 
exchange listing literature provides evidence on changes in liquidity upon listing. 
Differences in liquidity across financial assets can arise because of differences in the 
market-microstructure in which securities are traded. Previous studies169 have shown 
that the bid-ask spread of a company is related to the number of shareholders 
holding the asset which reflects the public availability of information about the asset. 
This forms the link between Merton's (1987) model, in which expected returns 
increase with systematic risk, firm specific risk, and relative market value and 
decrease with the relative size of the firm's investor base10 (or as characterised by 
Merton "the degree of investor recognition"), and Amihud and Mendelson's (1989) 
spread effect. 
However, the relevance of liquidity aspects for the capital raising decision has been 
overlooked by previous studies. The purpose of this study is to provide further 
empirical evidence of the impact of international listings on liquidity, and hence on 
the cost of capital. It is implicitly assumed that the decision to raise equity capital in 
the US market is motivated by a desire to lower financing costs. To examine the 
Parts of this chapter are based on Arauner and Levis (1996). 
169 Bagehot (1971) and Copeland and Galai (1983). 
170 The relative size of a firm's investor base can be expressed by dividing the effective number of shareholders of a 
firm by the aggregate number of investors in the market as a whole. 
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impact on the cost of capital requires an evaluation of private placements and public 
offerings in a cost-benefit framework and an analysis of the trade-offs involved. 
Previous research analysing domestic exchange listings and international cross- 
listings only examines changes in the liquidity from the pre-listing period to the post- 
listing period. Our approach to assess the liquidity impact of international listings is 
different from previous research. We choose a three-year data period (from January 
1992 to December 1994) for all international equity offerings to calculate bid/ask- 
spreads based on the method of George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991). 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 2 describes the sample and the methodology. This 
section is split into three parts explaining the sample selection procedure, the data 
period, and the estimation of bid-ask spreads. Our empirical findings are presented 
in Section 3. The first part of this section explains the estimation of the 
autocorrelation coefficient which is used to estimate bid-ask spreads. The second 
part provides evidence of differences in bid-ask spreads for listed and internationally 
unlisted firms. The third part examines the factors influencing bid-ask spreads. Part 4 
evaluates the trade-off between the costs and benefits associated with each offering 
method. Part 5 investigates the determinants of foreign and domestic trading 
volume. Section 6 concludes the article. 
8.1 Hypotheses tested 
Foreign issuers can use two alternative methods to raise equity capital in the US 
market (as discussed in 3.2.1. ). The decision between a public offering and a private 
placement under Rule 144A bears important policy implications since it affects the 
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investor base, liquidity, and disclosure requirements of the company. Such changes 
may have a direct effect on the value of the firm and its cost of capital. 
The issuing firm must also consider the possible trade-off between the costs and the 
benefits of a public offering. Public offerings involve higher initial costs because the 
SEC does not recognise a company's compliance with the regulations of its domestic 
stock exchange 171 
. 
The "full disclosure" approach often forces foreign companies to 
disclose more comprehensive information than required under their home country 
regulations. Therefore, monitoring and transaction costs for investors may be lower 
since a listed company is treated under US law as any other US company and 
trading takes place on an organised stock exchange which provides more active 
trading and superior trade reporting. 
Hypothesis: 
Companies offering equity internationally experience bigger liquidity benefits 
if they are listed on a foreign stock exchange. The decision to conduct a public 
offering instead of a private placement leads to a reduction in the cost of 
capital. 
'" This approach towards regulating foreign securities is in contrast to the principle of mutual recognition, pursued 
by the London Stock Exchange, which acknowledges the validity of other countries' laws, regulations, and standards 
as long as certain minimum standards are met (see 3.1. ). 
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8.2 Sample and Methodology 
8.2.1 Sample selection 
To identify international equity offerings from non-US companies which included a 
US tranche, we search two data sources: a) the ADR data base of The Bank of New 
York, and b) Omnibase, a data base for international securities issues from Security 
Data Company (SDC). We obtain an initial sample of 465 international companies 
that made an international equity offering between 1984 and 1994. In a next step we 
split our preliminary sample of international equity offerings into two subsamples: 
1. ) Internationally listed firms; 
2. ) Internationally unlisted firms. 
To be included in the sample of internationally listed firms, a company had to be 
listed on the NYSE or the NASDAQ by December 1994. Information concerning a 
firm's listing status and their date of listing is obtained from the NYSE and NASDAQ. 
We obtain an initial sample of 187 internationally listed firms (115 NYSE and 72 
NASDAQ listings) and 278 internationally unlisted firms. We require for all 
international equity offerings that at least 50 historical daily closing prices are 
available on Datastream and that trading volume is not zero for two consecutive 
weeks which are part of the sample period 12. These criteria eliminate 54 
internationally listed companies 173 and 133 not internationally listed firms from our 
sample. This high rate of exclusion for not internationally listed firms is mainly due to 
non-availability of daily stock price data of companies from emerging markets (e. g. 
172 Since we calculate spreads from transaction prices, this selection criterion is necessary to avoid obtaining 
downward biased spread estimates which are caused by "zero" transaction returns due to non trading. 
173 The elimination of 54 companies appears to be a very high percentage of the total population. However, this can 
be explained by the fact that ca. 25 companies obtained a listing on the NYSE only in the last quarter of 1994 and 
could therefore not be considered. 
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23 Chinese companies, 28 Indian companies, 19 Indonesian companies, 16 Israeli 
companies, and 10 Hungarian companies). This leaves us with a final sub-sample of 
145 internationally unlisted companies. 
Our preliminary sample of 133 internationally listed firms (84 NYSE and 49 NASDAQ 
listings) is reduced further because we only consider international cross-listings. This 
particular criterion, which requires an internationally listed firm to be also listed in its 
country of origin (or as referred to in the following on its "domestic stock exchange"), 
eliminates 47 companies (18 on the NYSE and 29 on NASDAQ). Thus, our final sub- 
sample of internationally listed firms includes 86 companies. 
Table 8.1. shows the distribution of our final total sample of 231 companies that 
issued equity internationally between 1984 and 1994 by country of origin. The wide 
geographic distribution across 33 countries has been driven by two main factors. The 
first factor is privatisations that have taken place all over the world from the mid-80's 
onwards. The second wave of international offerings has been fuelled by companies 
from emerging markets which have been assisted by international institutions, such 
as the IFC (International Finance Corporation) for example, to tap international 
markets. The subsample of internationally listed companies comprises 66 listed on 
the NYSE and 20 listed on NASDAQ. This subsample is compared to our subsample 
of internationally unlisted equity offerings which consists of 145 companies. 
Table 8.1. also reports the average offering size of the US tranche which is 
US$143.10m for the total sample. But the offering size of internationally listed 
companies is larger (US$230.12m), on average, than of private placements 
(US$106.10m). The larger offering size of public offerings is due to the offering size 
of NYSE-listed companies (US$280.54m) compared to NASDAQ-listings 
(US$58.69m). 
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Table 8.1. 
Distribution of sample firms that issued equity internationally between 1984- 
1994 by country of origin and offering size of US tranche: 
Internationally listed vs. internationally unlisted companies 
The sample consists of 231 international equity offerings from 33 countries world- 
wide. All 231 international equity offerings are from non-US companies but included 
a US tranche. All firms are listed on their domestic stock exchange. 86 companies 
from 21 different countries are listed on a US stock exchange whereby 20 
companies are listed on NASDAQ and 66 on NYSE. The sample of internationally 
unlisted firms consists of 145 companies from 28 different countries. The last row of 
the table reports the average size of the US tranche in US$ million. 
Country of origin Internationally listed firms 
All listings NYSE NASDAQ 
Internationally 
unlisted firms 
Total sample 
Argentina 43 1 5 9 
Australia 21 1 5 7 
Austria 1 1 
Belgium 2 2 
Brazil 11 1 
Canada 73 4 7 14 
Chile 88 2 10 
Columbia 11 1 
Denmark 33 1 4 
Finland 21 1 7 9 
France 54 1 13 18 
Germany 11 4 5 
Greece 2 2 
Hong Kong 11 6 7 
Indonesia 7 7 
Ireland 21 1 2 
Italy 22 4 6 
Japan 44 4 
Korea 22 7 9 
Mexico 88 5 13 
Netherlands 2 2 
New Zealand 11 1 
Norway 32 1 7 10 
Philippines 7 7 
Singapore 3 3 
Spain 66 5 11 
Sweden 3 3 11 14 
Switzerland 2 2 
Taiwan 7 7 
Thailand 7 7 
Turkey 1 1 
UK 20 13 7 14 34 
Venezuela 1 1 
Total 86 66 20 145 231 
Average offering 
size (in US$ m) 
Mean 230.12 280.54 58.69 106.40 143.10 
Median 114.05 157.25 50.75 48.80 65.12 
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8.2.2 Data period 
For all international equity offerings, our data covers the period between January 
1992 and December 1994. The choice of our data period to calculate spreads and 
their related variables is influenced by two considerations. Firstly, our aim is to 
provide recent evidence of how the choice of the offering method influences the 
liquidity of the stock in its domestic market. Our two subsamples differ in that 40 
percent of the internationally listed firms were listed before 1991 but none of the 
internationally unlisted equity offerings in our sample took place before mid-1 990174 
Hence, we believe that an alternative approach investigating bid/ask-spreads for a 
subsequent period (e. g. 1 or 2 years) after the respective listing or offering date 
could bias the results. This is due to the fact that many markets have improved their 
trading systems since the beginning of the 90s, and thus possibly increased the 
liquidity of their market. But Barry and Brown (1984) find an association between the 
period of listing and security returns. Since the period of listing could also influence 
bid-ask spreads, we test the robustness of our results taking account of the period of 
listing. However, we find that the differences in the period since listing or since 
offering equity (for internationally unlisted firms) between our two samples do not 
bias our results175. Secondly, this approach enables us to include international initial 
public offerings (IPOs)176 in our sample for which no pre-listing period data is 
available. 
All our calculations for companies listing (listed sample) or offering equity 
(internationally unlisted sample) before the beginning of our data period (January 
174 This is mainly a reflection of the introduction of Rule 144A in 1990 as described in the institutional aspects (see 
3.1.2. ). 
175 See Table 8.5. for more details. 
176 Approximately, 25 companies of our NYSE-listed companies and 80 of our not internationally listed offerings are 
IPOs. 
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1992) are based on 3-years data. Due to our approach to use only post-listing data, 
as explained above, the calculations for companies that were listed between 1992 
and 1994 are based on data from their listing date onwards through to the end of 
1994. This exclusion of pre-listing period data ensures that we do not bias our results 
if an international cross-listing changes the market-microstructure of a stock as 
suggested by Freedman (1991). The calculations for internationally unlisted 
companies that raised equity between 1992 and 1994 are based on the same 
principles as applied to internationally listed companies. Hence, we only use data 
from their offering date onwards through to the end of 1994 (the post-offering period) 
because an international equity offering, although unlisted, is expected to have an 
effect on the microstructure of a stock. 
The data on prices and microstructure-related variables used in this study were 
collected from Datastream. Our data consists of daily observations on stock prices, 
which are used to calculate bid-ask spreads, and weekly observations on domestic 
trading volume, foreign trading volume, variance of returns, and closing prices. 
Domestic trading volume is calculated from the weekly closing price times the weekly 
number of shares traded, and then converted into US dollar at the corresponding 
weekly exchange rate. Foreign trading volume is calculated by multiplying the 
number of foreign shares traded and the weekly price (in US$). Weekly closing 
prices are converted into US dollar at the corresponding exchange rate. In order to 
avoid the problem of a positive spurious correlation between the spread and 
volatility, as pointed out by Neal (1987), we use variances calculated from weekly 
returns. Data on the amount of equity issued in the foreign market and the gross- 
underwriting spread were obtained from the ADR data base of The Bank of New 
York. 
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8.2.3 Estimation of bid-ask spreads 
Since our sample 177 includes a large number of stocks which are traded under an 
auction market system in their domestic market, and therefore quoted bid/ask 
spreads cannot be observed, we need to employ a method estimating bid/ask 
spreads from transaction returns. 
Roll (1984) derives a simple measure of the spread which is based on two main 
assumptions: (i) that markets are informationally efficient; (ii) that the probability 
distribution of observed price changes is stationary. Roll (1984) also assumes for 
simplicity that all transactions are with the market maker and that the spread is held 
constant over time. The intuition behind Roll's spread measure is that price changes 
will only occur if unanticipated information is received by market participants. If no 
new information arrives it is reasonable to assume that successive transactions are 
equally likely to be purchases or sales as traders arrive randomly on both sides of 
the market. However, if the last transaction is at the bid (ask) price, the next price 
change cannot be negative (positive) because there is no new information. 
Therefore, the observed price changes are no longer independent and the effective 
individual spread s; can be inferred from the first-order serial covariance of price 
changes 
si = 200 *ý 
-Cov(RjTt, RiTt-1) (8.1. ) 
where R; Tt is the difference in daily log prices In(Pt/Pt_1). 
177 Approximately 70% of our sample firms are traded in auction markets or a hybrid version of an auction market. 
Only UK companies (ca. 14% of our sample firms) and Chilean companies (ca. 4% of our sample firms) are traded in 
a "pure" dealership market. For further details, see Euromoney (1994). 
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Previous papers, however, have argued that Roll's estimator provides downward 
biased spread estimates because it only measures the order processing costs. Order 
processing costs reflect the market makers' compensation for handling the 
transaction. Glosten (1987) and Stoll (1989) show that adverse selection and/ or 
inventory costs are two potential sources of a downward bias in Roll's spread 
estimates. Adverse selection costs arise from the presence of asymmetric 
information between the market maker and his counterparties. Inventory holding 
costs are due to the risk of price fluctuations faced by the market maker if he holds a 
high level of inventory. 
George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) show that time variation in expected returns 
may lead to an additional downward bias in spread estimates and propose two 
alternative estimators. Their estimators are based on the findings of Conrad and Kaul 
(1988,1989) who show that expected returns of portfolios of stocks vary through 
time and are positively autocorrelated. Moreover, Conrad, Kaul, and Nimalendran 
(1991) find that individual security returns contain a positively expected return 
component, although they are negatively autocorrelated. This positive 
autocovariance will lead to a downward bias in the spread estimates. In order to take 
account of time variation in expected returns, George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) 
propose the following estimator 
Si = 200 *4 
-Cov(EiTi, EiTt-1) (s. 2. ) 
where Et is the (time varying) expected return. Kofman and Moser (1995) use this 
estimator which employs a model for the conditional expectation of Et. Based on the 
evidence in Conrad and Kaul (1988) they impose a first order autoregressive process 
to estimate the expected return from the transaction price series 
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Et= Rt-Pp*Rt-1 (8.3. ) 
where pp is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient, which reflects the portfolio 
component in individual returns. In order to estimate the autocorrelation coefficient, 
we employ a similar technique as Kofman and Moser (1995)18. All the spread 
estimates are calculated using the autocorrelation coefficient obtained from our 
preliminary analysis. 
178 They use LIFFE (London International Financial Futures Exchange) data, for which bid/ask quotes are available, 
to make inferences for the DTB (Deutsche Terminboerse) where only transaction data is available. 
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8.3 Empirical results 
8.3.1 Estimation of autocorrelation coefficient 
To adjust for the bias in Roll's estimator, requires an estimate of the autocorrelation 
coefficient. We construct an equally-weighted "market portfolio" to calculate daily 
portfolio returns from bid quotes for the 1990 to 1994 period. According to George, 
Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) returns based on bid-to-bid prices reflect the effects of 
time varying expected returns. Our "market portfolio" is comprised of 100 randomly 
selected UK companies, drawn from the FTSE-350 list, because bid quotes are only 
available for UK companies. These "market portfolio" returns are used to estimate 
the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. Our results show that the assumption of an 
AR(1) process for expected returns appears to describe the behaviour of portfolio 
returns very well. We obtain an estimate of the autocorrelation coefficient of 0.28"s 
and assume that this is the same for all the stocks in our sample. Hence, all our 
spread estimates are calculated using an autocorrelation coefficient equally to 0.28. 
8.3.2 Relation of bid-ask spreads and market value 
Table 8.2. reports average daily estimates of the bid-ask spread for listed companies 
and unlisted companies. Each spread estimate is calculated for individual firms 
during the observation period and then averaged across firms. Since spreads are 
negatively related to firm size, we split each subsample into four portfolios based on 
market value. This enables us to verify the validity of our spread estimates and to 
179 This result is consistent with previous studies examining portfolio return autocorrelations across different 
international markets. Reinganum (1981) finds daily autocorrelations in the magnitude of 0.37 for the highest market 
value portfolio of US stocks and Keim (1983) reports 0.35. Poon and Taylor (1992) find similar results for the 
Financial Times All Share Index (0.19). 
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compare our resulting estimates across different size classes. The average 
estimates are all positive and range between 1.36 percent for portfolio 1 (largest) of 
the listed firms and 2.77 percent for portfolio 4 (smallest) of the internationally 
unlisted firms. The fact that we obtain positive average estimates180, even for the 
largest firms (portfolio 1), indicates that our adjustment for positive autocorrelation in 
portfolio returns reduces the downward bias in spread estimates substantially. 
Table 8.2. 
Spread estimates of internationally listed vs. internationally unlisted equity 
offerings 
The Table below shows the average spread estimates of the sample of 
internationally listed firms and the sample of internationally unlisted firms. Each 
sample is split into four portfolios based on market value. The test-statistics (t-stat. ) 
are performed as a paired t-test of the difference in the estimates for each group. 
The spread estimates are calculated using a variant of the GKN-estimator which 
adjusts for autocorrelation in portfolio returns. A percentage spread is calculated as 
si = 200 *4 
-Cov(E; T;, E; Tt_1) where Et is the (time varying) expected return. 
Internationally listed companies Internationally unlisted companies 
Portfolio Sample Average Bid/ask Sample Average Bid/ask t-stat. 
size market value spread size market value spread 
(in US$ (in US$ 
million) million) 
1 (largest) 21 17151.28 1.36 37 16640.09 1.77 
-3.06 
2 22 4956.17 1.46 36 1962.96 1.62 
-0.98 
3 22 1484.58 1.62 36 644.28 1.96 
-1.64 
4 (smallest) 21 376.98 2.22 36 219.92 2.77 
-1.97 
All firms 86 5927.79 1.65 145 4927.56 2.02 
-2.35 
Our results show that listed companies have significantly lower bid-ask spreads (1.65 
percent) than unlisted companies (2.03 percent). This is verified by performing a 
paired t-test of the difference in the two estimates. A t-value of 
-2.35 indicates that 
the spread estimates for listed companies are significantly lower than for unlisted 
equity offerings. Table 8.2. also shows that this finding is robust when we split each 
subsample into four equal size-based portfolios181 and compare the means of the 
corresponding portfolios (see column 4 for internationally listed companies and 
180 Roll (1984) finds that about 50 percent of his individual firm spread estimates are negative. We obtain even 
higher numbers of negative spread estimates. In order to test for the robustness of our estimates, we estimate 
spreads using arbitrary values for the autocorrelation coefficient (between 0 and 0.28). Although the magnitude of 
the individual estimates declines, the difference between internationally listed and unlisted estimates remains the 
same. 
181 Using a different procedure to size-match the portfolios does not alter the magnitude in the differences 
between 
listed and unlisted companies for each portfolio. 
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column 8 for unlisted companies). In addition Table 8.2. confirms the negative 
relationship between size and bid-ask spreads, as found by previous studies, 
showing that bid-ask spreads increase from portfolio 1 to 4 for listed companies 
(1.36 percent vs. 2.22 percent) as well as for internationally unlisted firms (1.77 
percent vs. 2.77 percent). 
To further examine the relationship between firm size and bid-ask spread and the 
influence of a listing on the liquidity of international equity offerings, we regress the 
estimated bid-ask spread of each company (SPREAD; ) on the log of size (as 
measured by the market value) of each individual company (LNSIZE; ), and on a 
listing dummy variable (DLIST; ) which is assigned a value of one in the case of an 
internationally listed company and a value of zero for not internationally listed equity 
offerings. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity of the residuals by 
White's (1978) consistent covariance estimator. 
Our regression results in Table 8.3. corroborate our previous findings. The coefficient 
for LNSIZEi is negative (-0.2045) and highly significant (t = 
-5.01) confirming the 
strong negative relationship between firm size and bid-ask spread found in previous 
studies. The coefficient for (DLIST) is negative (-0.2358) and significant (t = -2.07) 
indicating that listed firm have lower bid-ask spreads than unlisted companies after 
controlling for firm size. 
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Table 8.3. 
Impact of international listing on liquidity of international equity offerings 
The Table below gives the OLS estimates of the following equation: 
SPREAD; = Bo + B, LNSIZE; + B2 DLIST; 
The dependent variable is the individual spread estimate (SPREAD; ). The 
independent variables are: LNSIZE;, the natural logarithm of the market value; 
DLIST; 
,a 
dummy variable which is 1 if a company is internationally listed and 0 
otherwise. t-statistics for OLS regressions are adjusted for heteroscedasticity of 
the residuals by White's consistent covariance estimator. 
Variable Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 3.4704 11.38 
LNSIZE; 
-0.2045 -5.01 
DLIST; 
-0.2358 -2.07 
Adjusted-R2 0.19 
8.3.3 Factors influencing bid-ask spreads 
Table 8.4. presents summary statistics182 of the variables which are assumed to 
influence bid-ask spreads. Whereas the price level and variance do not differ 
substantially between listed and unlisted companies, the former group has on 
average a much higher trading volume. Although the difference between the mean 
and the median values for the weekly trading volume on the domestic stock 
exchange suggest the presence of positive skewness, the differences between the 
two groups remain sizeable. 
182 The summary statistics only comprise companies for which volume data is available. 
This eliminates 20 
companies in the internationally listed sample for which no foreign and/or domestic volume 
is available, and 9 
companies in the not internationally listed sample for which no domestic volume is available. 
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Table 8.4. 
Sample statistics. Bid/ask spread, weekly closing price (in US$), and weekly 
return variance. Market value, domestic trading volume, and foreign trading 
volume (all in US$million). 
The Table below shows summary statistics of all our sample firms for which data on trading volume (domestic and/or foreign trading volume) were available. Bid-ask 
spreads are reported in percent. Market value, domestic trading volume, and foreign trading volume are reported in US$ million. Weekly closing prices are reported in US$. Weekly return variances are reported in percent. The test statistics (t-statistics) are 
reported for a standard t-test for equality in means for the internationally listed sample 
and the internationally unlisted sample. 
Internationally 
Variables Combined Internationally unlisted t-stat. 
sample listed sample sample 
Sample size 202 66 136 
Bid/ask spread 
Mean 1.89 1.60 2.03 
-3.60 Median 1.73 1.46 1.94 
Market value (in US$m) 
Mean 5713.39 6755.19 5207.82 0.90 
Median 1678.65 3309.73 1367.95 
Weekly closing price (in 
US$) 
Mean 64.10 56.83 67.63 
-0.27 Median 9.49 10.30 8.98 
Weekly return variance 
Mean 0.002660 0.002575 0.002702 
-0.32 Median 0.001947 0.001841 0.002026 
Weekly trading volume 
(in US$m) on domestic 
stock exchange 
Mean 58.37 91.58 42.25 1.60 
Median 14.05 29.05 12.68 
Average weekly trading 
volume (in US$m) on 
foreign stock exchange 
Mean 31.18 
Median 9.82 
Internationally listed stocks are also traded in substantial amounts on the foreign 
stock exchange. The weekly average volume traded on the foreign stock exchange 
is US$31.18 million compared to US$91.58 million on the domestic stock exchange, 
and therefore reaches about 33 percent of the domestic volume. These results, the 
substantially higher domestic trading volume and the additional high foreign volume 
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for internationally listed firms, are consistent with Freedman's (1991) model which 
predicts an increase in total trading volume (foreign + domestic volume) for 
internationally listed stocks. The increase in total trading could also be due to 
arbitrage opportunities between the domestic and foreign stock exchange. Kim, 
Mathur, and Szakmary (1995) find that changes in the exchange rate have become 
more important as a pricing factor for ADRs in recent years. 
To examine the impact of foreign trading volume on bid-ask spreads, we have to 
control for a number of factors that are assumed to influence bid-ask spreads. We 
use a similar specification to Neal (1987), which relates the bid-ask spread to trading 
volume, price level, volatility, and competition. Our competition variable, however, is 
constructed as an interactive listing dummy which consists of a dummy variable 
(DLIST; ) for internationally listed companies multiplied by their trading volume on the 
foreign stock exchange (LNFVOL; ). We omit firm size (see Table 8.3. ) from our 
specification since trading volume and variance proxy for firm size. Hence, an 
inclusion of firm size would lead to severe multicolinearity problems in our model 
specification. This results to the following regression: 
SPREAD; = Bo + B, LNVAR; + B2 LNVOL; + B3 LNPRICE; + B4 LNFVOL; * 
niici- 10 A\ 
Symbol Definition 
SPREAD; Estimated bid-ask spread for each company 
LNVAR; Natural logarithm of the weekly return variance 
LNVOL; Natural logarithm of the weekly trading volume on the respective 
domestic stock exchange 
LNPRICE; Natural logarithm of the weekly closing price 
LNFVOL; Natural logarithm of the weekly trading volume on the foreign stock 
exchange (NYSE or NASDAQ) 
DLIST; Listing dummy which is assigned a value of 1 for listed and a value of 0 
for internationally unlisted companies 
Table 8.5. shows the estimated coefficients of our regression model. The signs of the 
coefficients for variance (LNVAR; ), volume (LNVOL), and price (LNPRICE) are 
consistent with previous studies. Variance (LNVAR; ) has a very strong positive 
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relationship with bid-ask spreads (t = 7.89). The high level of significance of the 
coefficient of the variance (LNVAR; ) is consistent with the findings of Jegadeesh and 
Subrahmanyam (1993)983. Trading volume on the domestic stock exchange 
(LNVOL; ) has a negative effect on bid-ask spreads (t = 
-1.77). The price level 
(LNPRICE; ) also has a negative effect on bid-ask spreads, as predicted by theory but 
the t-statistics (t = 
-0.62) indicate that the price level does not have the same strong 
influence on bid-ask spreads as found in previous papers. This is probably due to 
very large differences in the average price level across countries irrespective of their 
liquidity characteristics184. The coefficient for the interactive listing dummy (DLIST; * 
LNFVOL; ) is negative and significant (t = 
-2.20). The negative sign is consistent with 
our expectation suggesting that an increased volume on the foreign stock exchange 
for internationally listed stocks lowers bid-ask spreads on the domestic stock 
exchange. The trading on the foreign stock exchange represents potential 
competition to market makers on the domestic stock exchange leading to an 
improvement in the liquidity of internationally listed stocks. 
To take account of a potential bias imposed by the differences in the period of listing 
(see 8.2.2. Data period), we perform an additional test. We include a period of listing 
dummy variable (DPERL; ) into regression (8.4. ) which is 1 for companies listing 
before 1991 and 0 for companies listing after 1991. 
SPREAD; = Bo + B1 LNVAR; + B2 LNVOL; + B3 LNPRICE; + B4 LNFVOL; * (8.5. ) 
DLIST; + B5 DPERL; 
Table 8.5., column 3 shows that the listing dummy variable for the period of listing 
(DPERL; ) is not significant (t = 1.44) at the five-percent level. The estimated 
183With respect to Amihud and Mendelson (1987) who point out that the return variance is itself a 
function of the bid- 
ask spread and thus a biased estimator of the "true" variance we calculate return variances 
from weekly returns. 
Conroy, Harris, and Benet (1990) note that using weekly instead of daily returns diminishes the role of spreads 
because bid-ask spreads become less influential as the length of the holding period 
increases. 
184 In our sample German and Swiss stocks have very high price 
levels (US$500-4000) and Hong Kong, 
Singaporian, and Chilean stocks have price levels below one US$. 
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coefficients for the other variables are virtually the same as for regression (8.4. ) 
showing that our results are not biased by comparing samples of different life cycles 
as international companies. 
Table 8.5. 
Effect of international listing on liquidity of international equity offerings 
adjusted for price, volume and variance 
The Table below gives the OLS estimates of the following equation: 
SPREAD; = Bo + B1LNVAR; + B2 LNVOL; + B3LNPRICE; + B4 LNFVOL; *DLIST; 
(column 2) 
SPREAD; = Bo + B, LNVAR; + B2 LNVOL; + B3LNPRICE; + B4 LNFVOL; * DLIST; 
+ B5 DPERL; (column 3) 
The dependent variable is the individual spread estimate (SPREAD; ). The 
independent variables are: LNVAR; 
, 
the natural logarithm of the weekly return 
variance; LNVOL; 
, 
the natural logarithm of the weekly trading volume on the 
domestic stock exchange; LNPRICE; 
, 
the natural logarithm of the weekly 
closing price; LNFVOL; 
, 
the natural logarithm of the weekly trading volume on 
the foreign stock exchange (NYSE or NASDAQ); DLIST;, a listing dummy which 
is 1 for internationally listed and 0 for internationally unlisted companies; 
DPERLi is a dummy variable for the period of listing which is 1 for companies 
offering equity before 1991 and 0 for companies offering equity after 1991. 
Column 2 shows the results for our total sample. Column 3 tests the robustness 
of our results for the period after 1991. The t-statistics for each coefficient are in 
brackets. t-statistics for OLS regressions are adjusted for heteroscedasticity of 
the residuals by White's consistent covariance estimator. 
Independent 
variable 
Estimated coefficient Estimated coefficient 
Intercept 6.9724 7.0440 
(12.00) (11.92) 
LNPRICE 
-0.0176 -0.0144 (-0.62) (-0.50) 
LNVAR 0.7839 0.7956 
(7.89) (7.88) 
LNVOL 
-0.0617 -0.0678 (-1.77) (-1.89) 
LNFVOL* DLIST 
-0.0675 -0.0768 (-2.20) (-2.34) 
DPERL 0.1362 
(1.44) 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.44 
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8.3.4 Cost-benefit analysis of different offering methods 
In this section we present a quantitative evaluation of the costs and benefits of a 
public offering and a private placement based on the methodology of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986). Using the size-adjusted difference in bid/ask spreads of 0.24% 
(see Table 8.3. ) the weekly saving in transaction costs for trading the average 
weekly volume of US$58.37 million185 would amount to US$140,112 (0.24% x 
US$58.37 million). The present value of this weekly saving, assuming a 10% 
discount rate (or a weekly rate of 0.183%), is equal to a perpetuity 
US$140,112 million / 0.00183 = US$76.56 million. 
The costs for a NYSE-listed firm consist of the gross-underwriting spread, the other 
total expenses, the initial listing fee on the NYSE, and the annual fees for a NYSE- 
listing (for details, see 3.2.1. ). Taking the average gross-underwriting spread for a 
public offering of 4.62%, which we estimated, the commission paid to the investment 
bank amounts to US$6.61 million assuming an average offering size of US$143.10 
million (see Table 8.1. ). The other direct expenses are US$1 million and the initial 
listing fee is US$100,000. Discounting the annual fee of US$500,000 for a NYSE- 
listing at 10% provides us with a present value of U$5m. Hence, the total costs are: 
US$6.61 m+ US$1 m+ US$0.1 m+ US$5m = US$12.71 M. 
Subtracting the total costs from the total benefits provides a net present value of 
US$63.85 million for a public offering. We proceed in calculating the reduction in the 
cost of capital. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) calculate the reduction in the cost of 
capital by the following equation: 
185 See Table 8.4. The volume figure used for our calculations is based on "sell-side-only" volume. 
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NPV = (E/R) * (AR/R) (g g) 
where NPV is the net present value of the public offering, (E/R) the present value of 
the firm's cash flow without the liquidity-enhancing project (or simply the market 
value of the firm), and AR =R- R1 the change in the cost of capital. We assume, as 
above, that R, the old discount rate, is 10%. Hence, the reduction in the cost of 
capital for our average sample firm which has a market value of US$5713.39 million 
(see Table 8.4. ) is equal to 
(US$63.85m * 10%)/ US$5713.39m = 0.11 % (or 11 basis pionts). 
The reduction in the cost of capital, however, could be even bigger if we included the 
trading volume on the foreign stock exchange into our calculations. 
8.3.5 Determinants of domestic and foreign trading volume 
As shown in Table 8.4. internationally listed stocks have a much higher domestic 
trading volume than internationally unlisted stocks. If the interaction between the 
foreign stock exchange and the domestic stock exchange creates new volume we 
would expect the foreign trading volume to have an effect on the domestic trading 
volume. To examine the interaction between the foreign and the domestic volume in 
more depth we estimate the following regression: 
LNVOL; = Bo + B, LNVAR; + B2 LNPRICE; + B3 LNFVOL; 
* DLIST; (8.7. ) 
Table 8.6. reports the determinants of domestic trading volume (LNVOL) for the total 
sample (internationally listed and internationally unlisted companies) in column 2 and 
3 and for the internationally listed firms in column 4 and 5. The coefficients for the 
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variance (LNVAR; ) and the price level (LNPRICE; ) are significant and their signs are 
consistent with our expectations. 
Table 8.6. 
Determinants of domestic trading volume 
The Table below gives the OLS estimates of the following equation: 
LNVOL; = Bo + B, LNVAR; + B2 LNPRICE; + B3 LNFVOL; * DLIST; 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the weekly trading volume on the 
domestic stock exchange (LNVOL; ). The independent variables are: LNVAR; 
, 
the 
natural logarithm of the weekly return variance.; LNPRICE; 
, 
the natural logarithm of 
the weekly closing price; LNFVOL; 
, 
the natural logarithm of the weekly trading 
volume on the foreign stock exchange (NYSE or NASDAQ); DLIST; is a listing 
dummy which is 1 for internationally listed and 0 for internationally unlisted 
companies. The t-statistics for each coefficient are in brackets. 
Total Sample Internationally listed firms 
Independent Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated 
variable coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Intercept 
-1.6391 -1.8949 -6.2731 -7.1235 (-1.46) (-1.74) (-3.70) (-4.46) 
LNPRICE 0.1455 0.1137 0.2385 0.2023 
(1.97) (1.61) (1.93) (1.75) 
LNVAR 
-0.6445 -0.6622 -1.4196 -1.4631 (-3.39) (-3.61) (-5.22) (-5.78) 
LNFVOL* 0.3161 0.3231 
DUST (3.89) (3.29) 
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.16 0.33 0.42 
The comparison of the results of the total sample in column 2 and 3 shows that the 
inclusion of the interactive listing dummy variable (LNFVOL; * DLIST; ) in our 
regression improves the explanatory power of our model. The coefficient for the 
interactive listing dummy variable (LNFVOL; * DLIST) has the expected positive sign 
and is highly significant (t = 3.89) suggesting that foreign trading volume generates 
additional trading volume on the domestic exchange. The results in column 4 and 5 
for the internationally listed companies also show that the inclusion of the interactive 
listing dummy variable (LNFVOL; * DLIST) improves our adjusted R2 from 33 percent 
to 42 percent. The increased negative relationship between domestic volume and 
variance for internationally listed firms explains the increase in the adjusted R2 from 
10 percent (column 2) to 33 percent (column 4) and from 16 percent (column 3) to 42 
percent (column 5). 
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The analysis of the determinants of the foreign trading volume should take account 
of an additional factor, the percentage of equity issued (FOREQ; ) by each company 
in the foreign market, as pointed out by Mittoo (1992). The percentage of equity 
issued (FOREQ) is calculated by summing up the amount raised by each company 
in the first offering and in subsequent offerings186 and then dividing it by the market 
value of the company. In order to gauge the effect of the percentage of equity issued 
in the foreign market on the foreign trading volume, we estimate the following 
regression: 
LNFVOL; = Bo + B, LNVAR; + B2 LNPRICE; + B3 LNVOL; + B4 
FOREQ; (8.7. ) 
Table 8.7. shows that the determinants of the foreign trading volume differ from the 
determinants of the domestic trading volume. The coefficient of the percentage of 
equity issued (FOREQ; ) in the foreign market is significant and the positive sign is 
consistent with our hypothesis. Firms that issued more equity in the foreign market 
have a much higher trading volume on the foreign stock exchange. The price level 
(LNPRICE; ) appears to have no impact on the foreign volume. The usual price 
volume relationship may not hold because our price level is calculated from the 
underlying stock in the domestic market. But the price level of the foreign stock 
differs from its underlying stock as the price level of the foreign stocks is adjusted 
upon listing to conform to a price level which is similar to US stocks'87 in the same 
industry. 
186 Most companies only make one equity offering. However, some companies make several subsequent equity 
offerings. 
187 Most ADRs represent either a multiple or a fraction of one underlying share. A 1: 1 conversion hardly exists. 
According to Citibank (1995) current ADRs have ratios ranging from 100000: 1 to 1: 100 (underlying shares to 
depositary shares). 
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Table 8.7. 
Determinants of foreign trading volume 
The Table below gives the OLS estimates of the following equation: LNFVOL; = Bo 
+ B, LNVAR; + B2 LNPRICE; + B3 LNVOL; + B4 FOREQ; The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the weekly trading volume (LNFVOL; ) on the foreign stock 
exchange (NYSE or NASDAQ). The independent variables are: LNVAR;, the 
natural logarithm of the weekly return variance; LNVOL;, the natural logarithm of 
the weekly trading volume on the domestic stock exchange; LNPRICE;, the natural 
logarithm of the weekly closing price; FOREQ; 
, 
the percentage of equity issued in 
the foreign market. The t-statistics for each coefficient are in brackets. 
Independent 
variable 
Estimated coefficient Estimated coefficient 
Intercept 5.5617 3.7359 
(2.66) (1.66) 
LNPRICE 6.97E-04 
-0.0709 (0.01) 
-0.49 LNVAR 0.7977 0.5235 
(2.19) (1.37) 
LNVOL 0.4670 0.4811 
(3.29) (3.47) 
FOREQ 2.0378 
(1.96) 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.16 
Some interesting results emerge for the relationship between the variance (LNVAR; ) 
and foreign trading volume (LNFVOL; ). In contrast to the negative relationship 
between the domestic trading volume and the variance, foreign trading volume 
(LNFVOL; ) and variance (LNVAR; ) are positively related, suggesting that companies 
with a higher variance have a higher trading volume in the foreign market. This could 
be an indication that prices of stocks with a relatively large shareholder base in the 
US are more driven by US market factors than others. Therefore, a change in the 
exchange rate has a stronger impact on the domestic stock price leading to a higher 
variance. However, a change in the exchange rate may also create arbitrage 
opportunities between the foreign and the domestic stock price. In order to exploit 
these arbitrage opportunities, transactions have to be undertaken on the foreign and 
the domestic stock exchange generating additional trading volume. Thus, the 
positive relationship between the foreign trading volume and the variance reflects a 
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higher dependence from US market factors because of a bigger US shareholder 
base. However, in order to investigate this issue further a time-series analysis would 
be necessary examining the sensitivity of domestic and foreign trading volume to 
currency fluctuations. 
8.4 Conclusion 
Using a sample of 231 international equity offerings from 1984-1994, this study 
documents that internationally listed firms have a liquidity advantage over firms that 
choose a private placement in the US instead of a full listing on NASDAQ or NYSE. 
Results indicate that companies which choose to comply with the stringent 
registration requirements of the SEC, and thus incur the substantial costs associated 
with this procedure, are "rewarded" by having lower bid-ask spreads. This result 
holds when comparing bid-ask spreads corrected for size effects. The lower bid-ask 
spread is explained by a larger potential shareholder base and by the permission to 
be traded on a recognised stock exchange. Trading on a regulated marketplace 
provides timely trade reporting and increases market efficiency. We show that the 
benefits generated by lower bid-ask spreads for internationally listed firms outweigh 
the higher costs of a public offering leading to a 0.11 % reduction in the cost of 
capital. This study also contributes to the microstructure literature as it shows that 
bid-ask spreads of internationally listed stocks are influenced by the competition of 
an additional trading location. Consistent with previous theoretical implications, we 
provide evidence that listing on a foreign stock exchange generates additional 
trading volume. The percentage of equity issued in the foreign market appears to be 
one of the main determinants of foreign trading volume. The increase in total trading 
volume could be due to increased arbitrage between the underlying stock and the 
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ADR, caused by currency fluctuations. In order to shed further light on the interaction 
of currency fluctuations, underlying stock prices, ADR prices, and trading volume 
effects, a time-series analysis examining the effect of changes in the exchange rate 
on trading volume and prices would be required. 
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9. Chapter: Price interactions of cross-border IPOs 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in recent years an increasing number of equity issues 
has been structured as global offerings whereby ADRs and underlying shares were 
offered simultaneously. Global offerings have been used to sell initial public offerings 
(IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings alike. Although research on IPOs has 
generated a large international literature and ADRs have developed into an 
important instrument to raise capital internationally, evidence on global IPOs hardly 
exists. 
While the results of Doukas and Yung (1992) and Marr, Trimble, and Varma (1991) 
suggest that foreign capital markets are not fully integrated with the US market (see 
5.3. ), other ADR studies have examined the linkage and the transfer of pricing 
information between the ADR market and the market in the underlying stock (see 
5.1.5). It has generally been shown that the ADR market and the underlying share 
market appear to be efficient since one market responds to innovations in the other 
market. The transfer of pricing information seems to run from the domestic market to 
the ADR market which is not surprising, since these firms are headquarterd in their 
home market (Lau and Diltz, 1994). Moreover, it appears to be likely that the 
majority of company-relevant information and news concerning the economic 
developments are produced in the home market. However, the stock prices of global 
IPOs may follow a different lead-lag relationship. 
The issue of price leadership and the speed of price convergence is of importance 
for a number of reasons. The speed of price convergence provides evidence on the 
degree of integration between both markets which is of relevance, as shown 
previously, for the cost of capital of a firm. It also allows inferences concerning 
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differences in transaction costs in the two markets since the trading cost hypothesis 
predicts that the market with the lowest overall trading costs will react most quickly 
to new information (Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley, 1996). The issue of price 
leadership bears important managerial implications since the stock may become 
more aligned to the US market, and hence more driven by US market factors. It is 
also relevant for the question of information disclosure to the market. Questions 
concerning what is an appropriate time to announce company news and what is the 
right way to communicate with shareholders arise. It can even affect strategic 
decisions of companies. While US companies have traditionally pursued an 
approach geared towards enhancing "shareholder value", in particular Continental 
European companies were more interested in capital maintenance leading to huge 
hidden reserves (see also 3.1.3.1. ). Hence, if a stock is more driven by US market 
factors the management may be forced to adopt an "US style" approach. However, 
this could possibly change its long-term policies and leave its "old" domestic 
shareholders discontented. These problems may possibly be considered as some 
form of "costs of international listing". 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 2 describes the sample and the methodology. The 
empirical findings are presented in Section 3. The first part reports first day returns 
and trading activity. The second part conducts unit root tests, and part 3 describes 
the results of cointegration tests. Part 4 examines the direction of information flows 
between ADRs and underlying shares. Section 4 concludes this chapter. 
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9.1 Hypotheses tested 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the lead-lag relationship for non-US 
companies which conducted a simultaneous initial public offering on the NYSE and 
on their domestic stock exchange. While it appears plausible that underlying share 
prices of seasoned firms lead ADR prices, it may be different for global IPOs which 
were offered to the public in two markets simultaneously. Seasoned firms, which list 
internationally, are likely to be established in their domestic market and to be mainly 
held by domestic investors. In most cases, their order flow has solely been traded on 
the domestic stock exchange. This is, however, not the case for global IPOs which 
have not build up an investor base in one particular market. 
The results of Chapter 7 have shown that the issue of trading activity is of 
importance since international listings experience a substantial increase in their total 
order flow. This seems to be of particular relevance for international equity offerings, 
which have an ADR tranche, since trading is not concentrated in the domestic 
market but also takes place on the NYSE. Hence, the link between trading volume 
and transfer of pricing information186 may explain the differences between seasoned 
firms and cross-border IPOs. 
The findings of Chapter 6 have suggested that cross-listing has a different impact for 
emerging market companies. Hence, we also examine whether the price discovery 
role of the NYSE differs for emerging market and developed market firms. The price 
leadership of ADRs may be even more pronounced for emerging market firms 
186 Several models provide a theoretical basis for a linkage between information arrival, trading volume, and the 
variance of return on a security (see Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)). Freedman (1991) extends these 
models to internationally cross-listed stocks. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see 
5.1.3. 
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because trading in their domestic markets may involve special problems due to 
illiquidity, slow settlements, and poor custodial services. 
This chapter also contributes to the IPO literature by examining first day returns and 
issue day trading activity for international IPOs. Although previous research has 
argued that ADR IPOs should be less underpriced, since US investors possess less 
information about foreign companies, empirical evidence is only weak. Moreover, the 
reasons why US investors should be less informed are not clear. The majority of 
foreign issues are conducted by global US investment banks which also have a 
strong presence in foreign markets. Hence, we would not expect significant 
differences. For the same reasons, there should be no differences in first day returns 
between emerging market and developed market firms. 
Hypothesis: 
1. ) Global IPOs experience a special price discovery since the ADR price leads 
the underlying share price. However, this effect may differ between emerging 
market and developed market firms. 
2. ) First day returns of ADR IPOs are similar to "normal" IPOs. There is no 
difference between emerging and developed market firms. 
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9.2 Sample and Methodology 
Our initial sample consists of all foreign firms that conducted an initial public offering 
(IPO) of ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) between 1991 and July 
1994. During that period 24 companies, which were not traded in their home market 
or in the US market prior to their offering, conducted an initial public offering. 
Table 9.1. 
Description of IPO sample 
This table lists 23 ADR IPOs which listed between 1991 and July 1994. It shows the 
offering date, country of origin, the ADR gross proceeds (in US$m), and the offer price 
(in US$). 
Offer 
Date 
Issuer Country ADR-Gross 
proceeds 
(US$ M) 
Offer 
Price 
(US$) 
14/05/91 Telmex Mexico 1090.00 27.25 
17/07/91 Telecom Corp. of New New Zealand 545.30 22.58 
Zealand 
07/04/92 Waste Management UK 329.75 20.48 
09/04/92 ICA Mexico 326.50 17.00 
31/03/93 Dina Mexico 173.10 16.00 
12/05/93 Zeneca UK 150.35 29.48 
12/05/93 Argentaria Spain 147.80 16.07 
13/05/93 Fila Italy 135.00 18.00 
13/05/93 Industrie Natuzzi Italy 144.90 15.00 
29/06/93 YPF Argentina 2375.00 19.00 
01/07/93 Radio Centro Mexico 45.60 15.00 
26/07/93 Shanghai Petrochemical Hong Kong 137.70 20.39 
14/09/93 Coca Cola Femsa Mexico 151.40 20.50 
22/09/93 Tribasa Mexico 210.80 15.50 
04/11/93 Bufete Mexico 95.80 23.00 
14/12/93 Televisa Mexico 874.90 64.00 
14/12/93 Grupo Mexicao de Mexico 248.50 17.00 
Desarrollo 
25/01/94 Cristaleris Chile 96.00 23.88 
09/02/94 IMI Italy 133.20 19.24 
28/04/94 Tele Danmark Denmark 1172.00 23.53 
15/06/94 lusacell Mexico 155.70 27.25 
30/06/94 Banpais Mexico 102.70 10.00 
15/07/94 Durango Mexico 67.50 18.00 
Table 9.1. lists the 23 firms in the sample for which stock price data was available. It 
can be seen that approximately 60 percent of the IPOs are emerging market firms 
with the majority from Mexico. Moreover, two different type of firms can be 
distinguished: primary IPOs and dual IPOs. While 19 companies were 
simultaneously offered in their home market and on the NYSE (dual IPOs), 4 
238 
companies were only offered on the NYSE but were not listed on their domestic 
stock exchange (primary IPOs). Hence, our empirical analysis examines the price 
behaviour of 17 international dual IPOs for which stock prices (ADR prices and 
domestic prices) and trading volume data (ADR volume and domestic volume) are 
available187. The data sources are the ADR database of the Bank of New York, the 
New York Stock Exchange, and Datastream. 
The first day adjusted return for each IPO is defined as the percentage change in 
the ADR offering price to the closing price on the first day of trading (r) less the 
equivalent change in the S&P 500 which serves as a benchmark (rm). 
ar; =r; 
-rm (9.1. ) 
Before examining the price discovery role of ADRs and underlying shares, it has to 
be determined if there is a long-run stable relationship between them (see Quan 
(1992) on the price discovery role of futures and spot prices). Hence, the 
methodology used to examine the long-run relationship between ADR prices and 
underlying share prices, and their short-run dynamics, involves three steps: 1. ) 
testing for the order of integration; 2. ) cointegration tests; and 3. ) causality tests. 
The first step is to test whether the time series under examination are stationary. If a 
time series is integrated (or non-stationary) any shock to the series is permanent. 
Hence, an integrated series will not revert back to its mean after a shock. To find the 
order of integration of a time series is very important from a modelling perspective, 
since Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) and Balke (1991) have shown that any 
econometric model with an integrated time series will be misspecified. Therefore, 
187 This eliminates Telecom Corp. of New Zealand, since Datastream does not provide trading volume 
data for New 
Zealand, and YPF of Argentina. 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are conducted to find the unit root of each 
series. The ADF tests are based on the following regression: 
AXt = ao + a1Xt-1 + Z2j=1 bj AXt-j + vt (9.2. ) 
where Xt is each price series, A the first difference operator, and vt the error term. To 
ensure that the residual series is approximately white noise, a sufficient number of 
lagged differences has to be included. Previous research, that has examined the 
order of integration for equity prices, has found that they are integrated of order one. 
Hence, we expect to find a similar result. 
Once the order of integration is determined, the second step is to test for 
cointegration between the ADR price and the underlying share price. The 
cointegration test aims to detect whether certain linear combinations of the series 
may be stationary, although each individual series is non-stationary. The tests for 
cointegration have been developed by Johansen (1988,1991) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990,1992). It is based on maximum-likelihood estimation, and is 
designed to test for the number of linearly indpendent cointegrating vectors among 
the variables. Since we have two variables, the null hypothesis tests that there is no 
cointegrating relationship (r = 0). If this is rejected, we test that at most one 
cointegrating vector (r. 1) exists. Two commonly used test statistics are computed: 
the trace test and the maximal eigenvalue test. The first tests the restriction r<_q 
(q<n) against the the completely unrestricted model r<_n. The trace test is defined as 
Trace Test = 
-T Ini_q+1 In(1 -^p; ). (9.3. ) 
where T is the number of time periods. In the maximal eigenvalue test, the null 
hypothesis is that at. most q cointegrating vectors exist. The alternative hypothesis is 
that only one additional cointegrating vector exists (r<_q+1). It is defined as 
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Maximal Eigenvalue Test = 
-T In (1 - Apq+1). (9.4. ) 
The critical values for these tests are provided by Johansen and Juselius (1990). 
Kasa (1992) discusses the differences between both tests. Since the the trace test 
takes account of all n-q of the smallest eigenvalues, it will tend to have greater 
power than the maximal eigenvalue test when the 2 are evenly distributed. 
However, the maximal eigenvalue test will most likely give better results when the X 
are either large or small. In practice, both tests should be jointly considered. 
The third step which examines the direction of the information flow depends on the 
results of the previous two tests. Only if the first two criteria are satisfied the analysis 
can be continued. In the following, two approaches will be used to examine the 
short-run dynamics of prices: 1. ) the Garbade and Silber approach; and 2. ) error- 
correction tests. 
Garbade and Silber (1979) develop a model that analyses the short-run behaviour of 
prices on identical assets trading in different market centres. The Garbade and 
Silber approach provides a framework to examine whether the adjustment between 
prices in market A and B is symmetrical, or one-sided in which case a "dominant- 
satellite" relationship exists. Similar to Pagano and Roell (1991), we estimate the 
following equations to test for the existence of this relationship between the ADR 
market and the respective domestic market: 
At 9.5. 
- 
At-1 7- a+ PADR \Dt-1 - 
At-1 
Dt 
- 
Dt-1 =Y+ IDOM (At-, 
- 
Dt-1) (9.6. ) 
where At and Dt are the logarithms of the ADR price for day t and the underlying 
share price for the same day. a and y are constants. The coefficients IADR and I3DOM 
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measure the influence of the lagged price from one market on the current price in 
the other market. The ratio I3DOM /(3ADR + I3DOM ) measures the relative dominance of 
the ADR market compared to the domestic market in the price discovery process. 
Moreover, we also measure the speed of convergence between ADR and domestic 
market prices by the following equation: 
Dt 
- 
At = a+b(Dt-, 
-At-, )+Et (9.7. ) 
where 6 measures the rate of convergence. If 6 is small, prices converge quickly 
because a small fraction of the price difference on day t 
-1 will persist to day t. 
To further investigate the intermarket relationship between the NYSE and the 
domestic market, Granger causality tests are conducted. Engle and Granger (1987) 
have shown that, if two price series are cointegrated, an error correction term should 
be incorporated since a pure VAR (vector autoregression) representation could be 
misspecified. A common interpretation of the error-correction model for cointegrating 
variables is that they reflect the partial adjustment of one variable to another. The 
error-correction representation is a vector autoregression of first differences of the 
variables augmented by one lag of the equilibrium error term. The error correction 
model is estimated by the following equations: 
DYjt = 
-a1 Zt-1 + Emi=1 b1 i AYj, t-i + Emi=1 c i, 6Xj, t-i + Ft (9.8. ) 
OXjt 
-- 
-a2Zt_1 + Emi=0 b2i AYj, t-i + Zmi- 
-1 c2i AXi, t-i + 6t (9.9. ) 
where is AYjt (AXit) is the differenced dependent variable, and AYE, t_; (AXj, t_1) is the 
differenced lagged idependent variable. The equilibrium error is obtained from the 
cointegrating regression Xt=a+bYt+Zt 
. 
AYjt and LXXýt can be affected by two different 
channels. The conventional way to explain causality is to examine the 
impact of the 
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differenced lagged variables. Another causal channel in the error-correction model is 
through the residual term from the cointegrating regression. The coefficients of the 
error-correction term a, and a2 capture the single period response of the dependent 
variable to departures from equilibrium. The intuition for the error-correction term is 
that differences between the ADR price and the underlying price at time t-1 will tend 
to get smaller at time t due to arbitrage activity (Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley, 
1996). 
Table 9.2 
Market time tables 
This table shows the opening hours of the respective stock markets in local time and 
in New York time. 
Stock Markets Hours (Local Time) Hours (New York Time) 
Chile 9.30am 
- 
1.45pm/ 
4.00pm 
- 
5.15pm 
Denmark 9.00am 
- 
3.30pm 
Hong Kong 10.00am 
- 
12.30pm/ 
2.30pm 
- 
3.30pm 
Italy 10.00am 
- 
1.45pm 
Mexico 8.30am 
- 
2.00pm 
Spain 11.00am 
- 
5.00pm 
UK 8.30am 
- 
4.30pm 
9.30am 
- 
1.45pm/ 
4.00pm 
- 
5.15pm 
3.00am 
- 
9.30am 
9.00pm 
- 
11.30pm/ 
1.30am 
- 
2.30am 
4.00am 
- 
7.45am 
9.30am 
- 
3.00pm 
5.00am 
- 
11.00am 
3.30am 
- 
11.30am 
US 9.30am 
- 
4.00pm 9.30am 
- 
4.00pm 
Source: Euromoney Handbook of World Stock Echanges 1993 
Similar to Malliaris and Urrutia (1992) and Eun and Jang (1996), this model 
incorporates the effect of time zone differences into the causality tests. In general, if 
the domestic price precedes (in terms of time zone) the US market, equation (9.9. ) is 
used which includes the contemporaneous price from the preceding market as an 
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independent variable. Table 9.2 shows the market time tables of the stock markets 
in our sample. It can be seen that Hong Kong and Europe precede the US market. 
For example, the domestic closing price for a Spanish firm is established at 11.00am 
New York time, while the corresponding ADR closing price is recorded 5 hours later 
at 4.00pm New York time. Chile is in the same time zone as New York. Mexico 
follows the NYSE by one hour but its stock exchange closes only one hour earlier 
than the NYSE in local NYSE time. Hence, equation (9.9. ) is used to test whether 
prices of firms from Europe (Denmark, Italy, Spain, and UK) and from Asia (Hong 
Kong) cause ADR prices. Equation (9.8. ) is used for Mexican and Chilean stocks 
since they are in the same time zone as the US. To test whether the ADR price 
causes the domestic price, equation (9.8. ) is used for all countries since the US time 
zone follows the other time zones. 
The optimal lag length for each model is defined by using Akaike's information 
criterion (AIC). Following Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993), we allow the lag length to 
vary. The AIC is calculated for each lag and the order with the lowest AIC is chosen 
as the optimal. 
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9.3 Empirical results 
The empirical tests comprise four parts. Part 1 provides descriptive statistics. Part 2 
examines the order of integration. Part 3 tests whether ADR and underlying share 
prices are cointegrated. The tests in Part 4 hinge on the results of Part 2 and 3. If 
the ADR price and the underlying price are cointegrated we study the lead-lag 
relationship and the nature of the adjustment process by using the Garbade and 
Silber approach and error-correction tests. 
9.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 9.3. reports descriptive statistics for the ADRs. It appears that the gross 
proceeds of ADR IPOs (US$ 387.37 m) are comparatively large when compared to 
other IPO studies188. This finding is consistent with Doukas and Yung (1992) who 
report US$111.34m for ADR IPOs and US$16.53m for domestic IPOs. However, it 
can be seen that a big difference exists between the largest offering (US$2375.00m) 
and the smallest offering (US$45.60m). 
The average first day return for all ADR IPOs is 7.16 percent. The level appears to 
be lower than the findings of previous studies. For example, Ritter (1991) reports 
14.1 percent for the US and Levis (1993) finds 14.3 percent for the UK. Loughran, 
Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) provide international insights for 25 different countries 
and show that initial returns range between 80.3 percent (Malaysia) and 4.2 percent 
(France). However, Doukas and Yung (1992) find that ADR IPOs are less 
underpriced (0.96 percent) than normal IPOs. They argue that this is consistent with 
188 Ritter (1991) reports average gross proceeds of US$ 24.76 m for US IPOs and Levis (1993) reports £ 26.78 m 
(including privatisations). 
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Rock's (1986) model since US investors are likely to be less informed about foreign 
firms than US firms. Moreover, in their view this finding also suggests that foreign 
capital markets are not fully integrated with the US capital market. 
Table 9.3. 
Descriptive statistics and price performance of ADR IPOs on the NYSE between 1991- 
1994 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the ADR IPO sample. The offer size is shown in 
US$m and underpricing is expressed in percent. 
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Median 
deviation 
Panel A: All IPOs (N=23) 
Offer size 387.37 538.03 45.60 2375.00 151.40 
Underpricing 7.16 7.31 
-1.33 22.71 6.26 
Panel B: Primary IPOs (N=4) vs. dual IPOs (N=19) 
Offer size 
- 
Primary IPOs 169.95 52.80 135.00 248.50 148.15 
- 
Dual IPOs 433.14 583.63 45.60 2375.00 155.70 
Underpricing 
- 
Primary IPOs 7.54 3.00 4.04 10.86 7.63 
- 
Dual IPOs 7.08 2.51 
-1.33 22.71 7.99 
Panel C: Emerging market IPOs (N=15) vs. developed market IPOs (N=8) 
Offer size 
- 
Emerging 409.78 622.13 45.60 2375.00 155.70 
- 
Developed 345.35 364.14 135.00 1172.00 149.08 
Underpricing 
- 
Emerging 7.22 8.37 
-1.33 22.71 2.22 
- 
Developed 7.04 5.29 0.10 16.92 6.26 
To examine international IPOs in more detail, we compare primary with dual IPOs 
(Panel B) and emerging market with developed market IPOs (Panel C). Panel B 
suggests that there are no substantial differences between primary IPOs and dual 
IPOs. While primary IPOs (US$169.95m) seem to have a lower offer size than dual 
IPOs (US$433.14m), the medians hardly differ. First day returns are also very 
similar for primary IPOs (7.54 percent) and dual IPOs (7.08 percent). Panel C 
provides similar results for emerging market and developed market firms. There do 
not appear to be major differences in offer size and first day returns between 
emerging market and developed market firms. 
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Table 9.4. provides information concerning the trading activity of international IPOs. 
It compares first day trading volume on the NYSE and in the domestic market and 
contrasts it with the average trading volume in the post-listing period. It can be seen 
that first day trading volume exceeds by far the average daily trading volume in the 
one year post-listing period. While the ADR volume is US$85.31 m on average, the 
post-listing volume is only US$8.12m. The difference is not so pronounced for the 
domestic market but the first day volume (US$38.27m) is still approximately four 
times the post-listing period volume (US$9.81 m). 
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The table also shows the percentage of ADR volume of total order flow on the first 
day and for the post-listing period. It is calculated by dividing the ADR volume by the 
sum of the total volume (ADR+domestic) on the same day. The results show that the 
NYSE comprises 76.34 percent, on average, of the total order flow on the first day. 
This percentage differs across companies with a minimum of 33.37 percent for 
Telmex and a maximum of 97.94 percent for Banpais, but yet 12 companies have a 
higher trading activity on NYSE than in their domestic market. Although the share of 
the ADR volume of the total order flow declines to 52.18 percent'in the post-offering 
period, the ADR volume is still higher than the domestic volume in the case of 9 
companies. The ADR market seems to be of particular importance for emerging 
market firms. These results are in line with the findings of Chapter 7 for NYSE and 
NASDAQ, and Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1995) for Mexican firms who show 
that the ADR market is relatively large compared to the domestic market. These 
results indicate that a substantial amount of information and demand in these stocks 
originates from the US market. 
To compare first day trading activity for ADR IPOs to the results of previous IPO 
studies, we calculate the daily trading volume as a percentage of the ADR offering 
size. The results show that on the first day about 32.70 percent of the newly issued 
stock changed hands, on average. This finding is similar to Barry and Jennings 
(1993), who report 35 percent for a sample of US IPOs, and Miller and Reilly (1987) 
with 22.1 percent. Such a proportion for the first day appears enormous since a 
normal secondary market turnover averages about 30-40 percent a year (see Miller 
and Reilly, 1987). Moreover, the average daily proportion of shares traded 
subsequent to the offering seems to be very high. While Miller and Reilly's (1987) 
findings indicate that daily trading volume of IPOs gradually declines to about 1.3 
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percent of the offering size after 20 days, our findings show that ADR IPOs average 
3 percent throughout the 1-year post-listing period. This high trading activity may be 
caused by the arbitrage activity which is necessary to keep the ADR price and the 
underlying share price in line. 
Table 9.5. 
Cross-correlations 
This table shows cross-correlations between the ADR return and the Standard & Poor 500 
index (S&P), the return on the underlying share and the return on the domestic index, and 
the domestic index return and the Standard and Poor 500 return for each company during 
the 1-year post-listing period. 
Company Country ADR 
- 
S&P Underlying 
- 
Domestic index 
Domestic index 
- 
S&P 
Cristaleris Chile 0.084 0.331 0.309 
Tele Danmark Denmark 0.168 0.505 0.035 
Shanghai Hong Kong 0.274 0.469 0.048 
Petrochemical 
IMI Italy 0.179 0.596 0.104 
Banpais Mexico 0.091 
-0.070 0.202 Bufete Mexico 0.211 0.466 0.257 
Dina Mexico 0.234 0.527 0.126 
Durango Mexico 0.117 0.095 0.200 
ICA Mexico 0.300 0.718 0.300 
lusacell Mexico 0.192 0.078 0.231 
Radio Centro Mexico 0.159 0.175 0.268 
Televisa Mexico 0.325 0.702 0.218 
Telmex Mexico 0.440 0.819 0.416 
Tribasa Mexico 0.302 0.659 0.245 
Argentaria Spain 0.247 0.709 0.173 
Waste UK 0.184 0.367 0.302 
Management 
Zeneca UK 0.329 0.440 0.229 
Table 9.5. reports return (first difference in the log-level) cross-correlations. The 
results show that in 14 cases underlying share returns are more highly correlated 
with the domestic index than ADR returns with the S&P 500 index. However, we 
cannot discern a clear pattern that ADRs from one particular country have a higher 
correlation with the S&P 500 than from other countries. Moreover, there appear to 
be no differences concerning the magnitude of return correlations between various 
domestic indices and the S&P 500 index189. This results indicate that any findings of 
189 The differences in correlation between the domestic index and the S&P 500 for companies from the same 
country is due to different time periods since the 1-year post-listing period of each company is considered. 
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a lead-lag relationship between ADR prices and underlying share prices are not 
simply caused by cross-correlations among different indices. 
9.3.2 Unit root tests 
Previous empirical research has generally shown that many economic and financial 
time series require differencing to obtain stationarity. Stationarity of ADR prices and 
the corresponding underlying share prices is examined by conducting Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests around a constant mean. They test the null hypothesis of a 
unit root against the alternative hypothesis that the series does not have a unit root. 
In all cases, we include two lags to account for serial correlation in the error term190 
Table 9.6. reports similar ADF results for ADRs and their underlying shares for price 
levels and stock returns likewise. The results show that the null hypothesis of a unit 
root (that all the series are nonstationary) cannot be rejected for stock prices at the 5 
percent significance level. However, the null hypothesis of a unit root is strongly 
rejected for stock returns. Hence, ADR prices and their corresponding underlying 
share prices appear to be integrated of order one, /(1). As expected ADRs and their 
underlying shares have similar temporal properties because in a frictionless market 
they will be priced identically (Kim, Mathur, and Szakmary, 1995). This finding is 
consistent with previous research (e. g. see Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) and 
Taylor and Tonks (1989)) which examines stationarity for equity prices. 
190 We also conducted tests using a higher number of lags but the results appear 
to be insensitive to the number of 
lags. 
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Table 9.6. 
ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) unit root testsa 
This table shows the t-statistics for Ho: a1=0 (see equation). ADF tests are conducted 
using two lags. 
Company Country ADR Underlying 
Levels Differences Levels Differences 
Cristaleris Chile 
-2.71 -8.90 -2.56 
-8.46 Tele Danmark Denmark 
-2.06 -9.01 -1.96 
-8.71 Shanghai Hong Kong 
-1.78 -8.94 -1.68 
-8.97 Petrochemical 
IMI Italy 
-1.39 -9.79 -1.48 -9.97 Banpais Mexico 
-1.16 -9.02 -0.85 -8.84 Bufete Mexico 
-2.15 -7.57 -2.25 -7.98 Dina Mexico 
-1.45 -9.55 -1.45 -9.93 Durango Mexico 
-0.85 -8.03 -0.74 -8.79 ICA Mexico 
-2.80 -10.26 -2.80 -10.35 lusacell Mexico 
-0.21 -8.91 -0.66 -8.34 Radio Centro Mexico 
-1.86 -8.25 -1.80 -7.63 Televisa Mexico 
-1.12 -8.89 -1.15 -8.43 
Telmex Mexico 
-0.80 -8.74 -0.65 -8.72 
Tribasa Mexico 
-1.52 -8.91 -1.50 -8.98 
Argentaria Spain 
-1.93 -9.17 -2.09 -9.04 
Waste UK 
-0.74 -8.90 -0.82 -8.47 
Management 
Zeneca UK 
-1.49 -8.31 -1.47 -8.39 
a The 95% critical v alue is 
-2.87 
9.3.3 Cointegration tests 
In a next step, we perform Johansen cointegration tests on two variables: ADR 
prices and underlying share prices. We convert underlying share prices into real US 
dollar prices using daily spot exchange rates. To make ADR prices and underlying 
share prices comparable, we adjust them according to their conversion ratio, since 
one ADR can represent a multiple or a fraction of the underlying shares191. The 
analysis is carried out by performing Johansen tests without a trend and a lag length 
of 3. 
191 This transformation is exemplified for Zeneca which has an ADR to underlying share ratio of 1: 3. If we assume 
that the price of one ADR is US$ 30 and the price of one underlying share is US$ 10, then the underlying share 
price is multiplied by three. 
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Table 9.7. 
Johansen cointegration tests 
The table shows the results of Johansen cointegration tests which is based on two 
variables: the ADR price and the underlying share price. Two test statistics are shown: 
Trace Test and Maximal Eigenvalue Test. All tests are estimated without a trend and 
using 3 lags. 
Traces 
r=0 r=1 
Eigenvalue 
r=0 r=1 
Cristaleris Chile 54.16 8.99 45.17 8.99 
Tele Danmark Denmark 72.18 4.18 68.00 4.18 
Shanghai Hong 54.83 4.26 50.58 4.26 
Petrochemical Kong 
IMI Italy 33.73 2.41 31.32 2.41 
Banpais Mexico 14.47 6.73 7.74 6.73 
Bufete Mexico 38.51 6.47 32.04 6.47 
Dina Mexico 50.47 1.87 48.60 1.87 
Durango Mexico 29.96 1.52 25.44 1.52 
ICA Mexico 23.85 9.01 14.84 9.01 
lusacell Mexico 18.27 2.22 16.05 2.22 
Radio Centro Mexico 24.36 4.81 19.55 4.81 
Televisa Mexico 60.70 2.23 58.47 2.23 
Telmex Mexico 39.05 6.32 32.74 6.32 
Tribasa Mexico 21.25 5.36 15.89 5.36 
Argentaria Spain 50.14 4.35 45.79 4.35 
Waste Management UK 41.41 1.15 40.26 1.15 
Zeneca UK 55.91 2.03 53.88 2.03 
a The critical values for r=0 are 19.96 ( 95% level) and 17.85 (90% level ). The critical values for 
r=1 are 9.24 (95% level ) and 7.52 (90% level). 
b The critical values for r=0 are 15.67 (95% level) and 13.75 (90% level). The critical values for 
r=1 are 9.24 (95% level ) and 7.52 (90% level). 
Table 9.7. shows the results of the cointegration tests for ADRs and their underlying 
shares. Trace and eigenvalue tests indicate that ADR prices and underlying share 
prices are cointegrated. In the case of 16 (out of 17 ) sample firms, the hypothesis of 
no cointegrating relationship (r=0) can be rejected at the 5 percent level since trace 
and eigenvalue tests exceed their respective critical values of 19.96 and 15.67. For 
Banpais the eigenvalue (7.74) does not exceed the required value. But the trace 
statistic (14.47) is significant at the 10 percent level. To be cointegrated, we also 
need to show that no more than one cointegrating relationship exists since we have 
only two variables. The results show that the hypothesis, that only one or less 
cointegrating relationships exist, cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level because 
none of the firms exceeds the critical value of 9.24 (trace and eigenvalue likewise). 
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9.3.4 Direction of information flows between ADRs and underlying shares 
After establishing that a long-run stable relationship of prices exists we now analyse 
the short-run behaviour of ADR prices and underlying share prices. Therefore, we 
conduct the "Garbade and Silber approach" and test the causality using an error- 
correction model. 
Table 9.8. shows the results of the lead-lag relationship between NYSE prices and 
domestic market prices. The coefficients ßdom and ßADR measure the influence of the 
lagged price from one market price on the current price in the other market. If the 
estimated value of I3dom is positive and significant, then the ADR price leads the 
underlying share price. Vice versa, the domestic price leads the ADR price if the 
estimated value of ßADR is positive and significant. If both values are positive and 
significant a mutual feedback relationship exists. 
The relationship between both prices can also be measured by calculating the ratio 
ßdom / (IADR + ßdom ). It is important to note that there is no theoretical reason to 
expect negative values192. Hence, negative estimates of JADR and ßdom are set to 
zero before calculating this ratio. If the ratio is unity (so that I3ADR = 0), convergence 
of ADR and underlying share prices occurs because the domestic price moves 
towards the ADR price. In this case, the domestic market is a pure satellite of the 
NYSE market. If this ratio equals zero (so that ßdom = 0), the ADR price always 
adjusts towards the domestic market price and the NYSE market is a pure satellite. 
The coefficient 6 measures the speed of convergence between ADR and underlying 
192 For a mathematical explanation, see Garbade and Silber (1983). 
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share prices. A small value indicates that prices converge quickly because only a 
small fraction of the price difference on day t-1 will persist to day t. 
The results in Table 9.8. provide some interesting insight into the mutual adjustment 
and feedback effects from the ADR market to the respective domestic market. It 
emerges that NYSE prices seem to lead domestic prices in a great number of 
instances. In the case of 6 firms (Cristaleris, Bufete, Durango, lusacell, Tribasa, and 
Waste Management), the ADR market contributes 100 percent to the price discovery 
process since the above specified ratio equals 1. Hence, in these cases the 
domestic market appears to be a pure satellite of the NYSE market. The presence of 
highly significant values of ßaom for Cristaleris (t = 8.21), Bufete (t = 6.81), Durango (t 
= 5.56), lusacell (t = 4.49), and Tribasa (t = 5.70) corroborates this finding. This 
suggests that strong feedback occurs from the ADR price to the underlying share 
price. 
The fact that Cristaleris, Bufete, Durango, lusacell, and Tribasa originate from an 
emerging market (Chile and Mexico respectively) suggests that NYSE trading may 
play a special role for the price discovery of emerging market firms. Moreover, the 
ratio also appears to be comparatively high for the remaining Mexican firms. The 
estimated values for the ratio range between 0.663 (Televisa) and 0.914 (Banpais). 
This suggests that the ADR price contributes between 66 to 91 percent to the price 
discovery of emerging market firms. Moreover, highly significant values of ßdom, only 
Banpais193 has an insignificant I3dom (t = 1.54), indicate strong feedback effects from 
the NYSE to the domestic market. On the other hand, developed market firms seem 
to have lower ratios. In particular, the estimated values of IMI (0.322) and Argentaria 
(0.484) are below 0.5 which suggests that the domestic market has a more 
193 However, the inclusion of Banpais in the analysis appears questionable since the condition of cointegration is 
hardly fulfilled (see Table 5). 
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important role in the price discovery process. While the ADR market contributes 32 
percent (IMI) and 48 percent (Argentaria) for the price discovery respectively, the 
domestic market's contribution is higher with 68 percent for IMI and 52 percent for 
Argentaria. Since ßADR as well as ßdom are positive and significant for Argentaria, 
IMI, Zeneca, and Shanghai Petrochemical a mutual feedback relationship exists 
between the ADR and the domestic market in these stocks. Interestingly, the 
estimated values of ßADR are only significant for firms which experience a mutual 
feedback relationship with the NYSE. 
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Table 9.8. 
Lead-lag relationship between NYSE prices and domestic market prices 
The table shows the results of the Garbade and Silber approach. t-statistics for the 
significance of ßADR and ßdom are shown in brackets. 
Company Country ßdom PADR Ratio 6 
Cristaleris Chile 0.489 
-0.052 1 0.563 (8.21) (-0.84) 
Tele Danmark Denmark 0.706 0.089 0.888 0.205 
(12.89) (1.14) 
Shanghai Hong Kong 0.395 0.232 0.630 0.373 
Petrochemical (5.25) (3.08) 
IMI Italy 0.120 0.253 0.322 0.547 
(2.51) (3.14) 
Banpais Mexico 0.032 0.003 0.914 0.965 
(1.54) (0.18) 
Bufete Mexico 0.334 
-0.067 1 0.733 (6.81) (-1.50) 
Dina Mexico 0.559 0.185 0.751 0.256 
(5.59) (1.56) 
Durango Mexico 0.197 
-0.002 1 0.805 (5.56) (-0.05) 
ICA Mexico 0.243 0.039 0.862 0.718 
(4.25) (0.62) 
lusacell Mexico 0.079 
-0.024 1 0.945 (4.49) (-1.56) 
Radio Centro Mexico 0.117 0.046 0.718 0.837 
(3.87) (1.20) 
Televisa Mexico 0.791 0.402 0.663 0.205 
(6.40) (0.03) 
Telmex Mexico 0.518 0.094 0.846 0.388 
(6.40) (1.11) 
Tribasa Mexico 0.285 
-0.057 1 0.772 (5.70) (-1.02) 
Argentaria Spain 0.379 0.404 0.484 0.216 
(3.82) (3.93) 
Waste UK 0.723 
-0.145 1 0.422 
Management (0.66) (-1.89) 
Zeneca UK 0.414 0.339 0.550 0.247 
(3.75) (2.82) 
Notes: 
Odom easures the influence of ADR prices on the domestic price. 
RADR measures the influence of the domestic price on the ADR price. 
"Ratio" represents the relative contribution of the ADR price to the price discovery process and is 
calculated as follows: Room / (RADR + Rdom )-
S measures the speed of convergence between the ADR and the domestic price. 
The estimates of 6 show a wide range between 0.205 (Tele Danmark and Televisa) 
and 0.965 (Banpais). This means that in the case of Tele Danmark only 20 percent 
of the differential between the ADR price and the underlying price on day t persists 
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to day t 
-1, while 90 percent of the differential persists for Banpais prices. This 
implies that arbitrage in Tele Danmark is undertaken more quickly than, for example, 
in Banpais. The results in Table 9.8. suggest that developed market firms seem to 
have lower 6-estimates than emerging market firms. However, the estimates of 
Televisa (0.205), Dina (0.256), and Telmex (0.388) are of similar magnitude. This 
indicates that the trading activity in a stock is of importance for the speed of 
convergence, since trading volume in these three stocks is comparatively high (see 
also Table 9.4. ). Although the Garbade and Silber approach provides a good 
estimation of the lead-lag relationship and the speed of convergence, sufficient 
statistical tests for the significance of the ratio and the speed of convergence are not 
provided. To overcome this problem, a cointegration approach will be used in the 
following. 
Table 9.9. presents the results of Granger causality tests. It includes estimates of 
the error correction term and F-values for the significance of the lagged price 
changes. The optimal number of lags for each company is obtained using the AIC 
criterion and is shown in brackets. The error correction model test two causal forces. 
The lagged price changes provide information about the short-run influence from the 
change in one market on the other market. They indicate whether causality between 
the two markets or a mutual feedback relationship exists. The error correction 
coefficients reflect the degree to which prices adjust to correct the last-period 
equilibrium error. They help to identify the direction of the causal flows and show the 
speed with which departures from the equilibrium are corrected. In an efficient 
market, the magnitude of the error correction coefficient should be unity because 
100 percent of the price differential between the ADRs and the underlying shares 
should be corrected within one day. However, we could not infer market inefficiency 
if the coefficients are significantly lower than 1 since markets are not frictionless. 
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Moreover, the error correction coefficients allow inferences concerning the 
transaction costs in both markets because the trading cost hypothesis predicts that 
the market with the lowest overall trading costs will react most quickly to new 
information. 
Table 9.9. shows that the lagged price changes of 16 companies are significant 
when the first-order difference of the underlying price is the dependent variable. 
Hence, there are causal flows running from the ADR market to the domestic market. 
On the other hand, when the first-order difference of the ADR price is the dependent 
variable, the lagged price changes of only 11 companies are significant. This 
indicates that for 11 companies (Tele Danmark, Shanghai Petrochemical, IMI, 
Bufete, Dina, Durango, ICA, Radio Centro, Argentaria, Waste Management, Zeneca) 
a mutual feedback relationship exists since ADR prices react to price changes in the 
underlying shares and vice versa. The results for Tele Danmark, Shanghai 
Petrochemical, IMI, Argentaria, Waste Management, and Zeneca suggest stronger 
causal flows from the domestic to the ADR market because the first causal channel 
(lagged differenced variables) is highly significant. However, in the case of 5 
companies the ADR price seems to lead the domestic price. In particular, these 
results confirm the findings of the Garbade and Silber approach for Cristaleris, 
lusacell, and Tribasa that the domestic market is a pure satellite of the ADR market. 
The results in Table 9.9. show that the error correction term (a2) has a significant 
impact on the domestic price for 15 companies. Only in the case of IMI and 
Argentaria it is insignficant. The error correction coefficient a, is only significant for 6 
companies (Tele Danmark, Shanghai Petrochemical, IMI, Argentaria, Waste 
Management, and Zeneca). As described above, this allows us to make inferences 
about the direction and the speed of the price adjustments towards the equilibrium. 
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In the case of 4 firms (Tele Danmark, Shanghai Petrochemical, Waste Management, 
and Zeneca), adjustments seem to be accomplished in both markets since al and a2 
are significantly different from both zero and unity. While for Waste Management the 
speed of adjustment is higher in the ADR market than in the domestic market (0.418 
vs. 0.385), this is reversed for Tele Danmark, Shanghai Petrochemical, and Zeneca. 
This is exemplified for Zeneca: 62.7 percent of the price differential between the 
ADR and the underlying share price is corrected within one day on the London Stock 
Exchange. Price adjustments also take place on the NYSE, however, only 32.2 
percent are corrected within one day. It shows that arbitrage activities will bring the 
ADR price down (up) by selling (buying) ADRs and buying (selling) underlying 
shares if prices differ. However, this also suggests that a transaction cost-advantage 
exists on the London Stock Exchange since a higher proportion of the equilibrium 
error is eliminated within one day. 
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Table 9.9. 
Causality tests from one market to the other 
The table shows the results of Granger causality tests using the following model: 
1. DYjt = 
-a1Zt-t + Emi=1b1i DYj, t-i + -mi=t C1i AXj, t-i + Et 
2. AXjt = 
-a2Zt-t + Emi=o b2, AYj, t-i + Emi=1 C2i OXj, t-i + Et 
Causality from the domestic price to the ADR price for Denmark, Hong Kong, Italy, Spain, 
and UK uses equation 2. Causality from the domestic price to the ADR price for Chile and 
Mexico uses equation 1. Causality from the ADR price to the domestic price uses equation 
1. a, and a2 show the results for the error correction term. t-statistics are shown in 
brackets. The null hypotheses of no causality are EAYj =0 or E AXE =0 for equations 1 and 
2 respectively. The test for causality is based on a F-statistic calculated by estimating 
equations 1 and 2 in both unconstrained and constrained forms. 
F= [(SSEc 
- 
SSEu)/m] / [SSEu/ (T-2m-1)] 
The F-statistic follows a Chi-square distribution. The computed Fs are reported in the 
table. The lag length differs for each estimation and is shown in brackets. 
Company Country Domestic price to ADR 
(XI EDYj 
ADR to domestic price 
a2 E OXj 
Cristaleris Chile 0.032 1.35(2) 0.284 19.77*(2) 
(0.41) (5.52)* 
Tele Danmark Denmark 
-0.597 29.76*(3) -0.556 27.57*(4) (-4.90)* (-4.80)* 
Shanghai Hong Kong 
-0.549 81.07*(2) 0.251 7.67*(2) 
Petrochemical (-6.97)* (2.06)* 
IMI Italy 
-0.332 85.73*(3) 0.121 2.85*(3) (-5.02)* (1.05) 
Banpais Mexico 0.026 1.99 (3) 0.066 1.86 (4) 
(1.33) (2.91)* 
Bufete Mexico 0.064 4.89*(2) 0.273 18.22*(2) 
(1.16) (4.85)* 
Dina Mexico 
-0.221 5.89*(2) 0.438 19.01 *(2) (-1.14) (2.66)* 
Durango Mexico 
-0.025 3.64*(3) 0.243 7.11 *(3) (-0.44) (4.04)* 
ICA Mexico 
-0.011 3.88*(2) 0.150 14.09*(2) (-0.16) (2.43)* 
lusacell Mexico 0.019 0.45 (4) 0.087 5.91 *(4) 
(1.11) (3.65)* 
Radio Centro Mexico 
-0.065 3.45*(2) 0.086 6.60*(2) (-1.65) (2.79)* 
Televisa Mexico 0.102 2.25 (2) 0.744 13.84'`(2) 
(0.52) (4.10)* 
Telmex Mexico 
-0.151 0.08 (2) 0.304 16.87*(2) (-1.24) (2.64)* 
Tribasa Mexico 0.022 2.05 (4) 0.140 6.01 *(4) 
(0.27) (1.98)* 
Argentaria Spain 
-0.559 112.55*(2) 0.254 5.10*(2) (-6.59)* (1.75) 
Waste UK 
-0.385 47.20*(2) 0.418 27.10*(4) 
Management (-3.93)* (4.21)* 
Zeneca UK 
-0.627 153.64*(2) 0.322 5.40"'(2) (-7.23)* (2.04)* 
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These results also show that for emerging market firms the price adjustment towards 
the equilibrium price takes place in the ADR market since a, is insignificant and a2 is 
significant. The speed of adjustment shows strong variations across companies. 
While only 6.6 percent of the price differential is corrected within one day for 
Banpais, 74.4 percent of the difference between the ADR price and the underlying 
price is corrected for Televisa in the same period. Taking account of the trading 
volume in these stocks, as reported in Table 9.4., it can be inferred that arbitrage is 
carried out more quickly in higher volume stocks. The results also show that 
transaction costs appear to be much lower on the NYSE than in the domestic market 
for emerging market firms since a2 is lower than a, for all firms. Hence, due to the 
transaction-cost advantage of the NYSE price differentials between the ADR price 
and the underlying price are corrected by trading on the NYSE. Other factors as 
settlement problems, limited depth, or poor custodial services may also contribute to 
this finding. 
9.4 Conclusion 
This paper shows that initial public offerings (IPOs) which are simultaneously offered 
on the NYSE and on their domestic stock exchange seem to experience a different 
price discovery than other companies which have listed ADRs. Our results suggest 
that ADR prices lead underlying share prices in many cases. This finding is 
particularly pronounced for emerging market firms which in the case of 5 firms 
appear to be pure satellites of the NYSE. We also find a higher speed of 
convergence for developed market firms. This implies that arbitrage between the 
NYSE and the domestic market is undertaken more quickly. The dominance of the 
NYSE for many firms is corroborated by the findings of our comparative order flow 
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analysis. It shows that NYSE trading comprises a high percentage of the total order 
flow. In contrast to previous research our results do not support the finding that ADR 
IPOs are less underpriced. Moreover, we do not find differences in first day returns 
of emerging market and developed market firms. Consistent with previous literature 
we also document a high first day trading activity for IPOs in their domestic market 
as well as on the NYSE. 
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10. Chapter: Conclusion 
The first part of the final chapter summarises the findings of the study and presents 
the main conclusions from the previous analysis. The second part makes some 
suggestions for further research in this field. 
10.1 Main conclusions from analysis 
This thesis has attempted to address the questions whether international listing has 
an impact on liquidity, investor recognition, and international market segmentation, 
and hence on the cost of capital of a firm. More especially, it has been aimed to 
compare these effects across the three major stock exchanges for international 
listings 
- 
the London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the NYSE 
- 
since our analysis 
of the structure of both markets has revealed significant differences. 
The link between international listing and these factors has been suggested by a 
number of previous studies. It has been shown that international listing is perceived 
by managers to increase the liquidity of their stock, give greater access to foreign 
capital markets, increase the exposure for the products of the firm, and lead to a 
growth in the shareholder base. Early studies on international listing have shown that 
international listing represents an effective mechanism to dismantle barriers to 
international investment, and hence reduce international market segmentation. 
Based on the implications of models of multiple market trading, empirical research 
has found that international listing leads to an increase in the liquidity of a stock. 
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These findings have lead us to assume that international listing may be linked to 
liquidity and international market segmentation. Following these implications we 
expected that companies base their listing decision on the potential benefits offered 
by a particular stock exchange. However, the benefits have to be balanced by the 
costs of listing which are a function of the listing requirements of the host stock 
exchange and the standard of the reporting requirements in the domestic country of 
the listing firm. This implied two directions of research: firstly, since foreign firms face 
higher hurdles to gain access to the US market than to the UK market,, they may 
experience larger benefits upon listing; secondly, these barriers are even higher for 
emerging market firms, hence their benefits could be larger. Moreover, in recent 
years a great number of firms have made use of the trend towards globalisation of 
capital markets to raise equity internationally. Hence, this raised questions whether 
international listings may also be subject to market conditions as suggested by the 
domestic equity offering literature. 
Seasoned equity offerings and initial public offerings alike have been structured as 
global offerings to take account of the demand of foreign investors. Since the US 
capital market is the largest in the world, the majority of international equity offerings 
has included a significant US tranche. This has raised questions concerning the best 
structure for an international offering since the offering method affects the investor 
base, liquidity, and disclosure requirements of the company. In general, companies 
have to decide whether to access the US market using a private placement or a 
public offering. If a company decides to conduct an initial public offering, which is 
sold simultaneously in the US market and in its domestic market, additional 
questions arise. The analysis of the price interaction between ADR prices and 
underlying share prices offers inferences concerning the integration between both 
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markets and differences in transaction costs on the NYSE and on the domestic stock 
exchange. 
The issue of price leadership may also be influenced by the order flow in both 
markets since several models provide a theoretical basis for the linkage between 
information arrival and trading volume. Internationally cross-listed stocks experience 
an increase in their trading volume since multiplemarket trading may create arbitrage 
opportunities between the ADR market and the domestic market. The increased 
competition among market makers improves the price discovery for these stocks. 
This suggests that trading volume is of importance for analysing changes in liquidity 
upon listing and the transfer of pricing information between both markets. 
The empirical work reported in this thesis has attempted to take account of the 
institutional differences between the various markets and the theoretical propositions 
suggested by previous literature. To compare the impact of a listing on the London 
Stock Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, and on NASDAQ, changes in 
liquidity and in expected returns from the pre- to the post-listing period have been 
analysed. To obtain further evidence on the impact of listing on liquidity, we have 
examined whether the decision between a public offering or a private placement in 
the US affects bid-ask spreads in the respective home market. Following previous 
literature, which provided a framework to evaluate listing as a "liquidity-enhancing 
project", these differences in bid-ask spreads have enabled us to quantify the impact 
of international listing on the cost of capital. Since market segmentation influences 
the cost of capital, we have also examined the linkage between the ADR market on 
the NYSE and the respective underlying share market for a sample of simultaneously 
sold IPOs. 
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Chapter 2 has distinguished various aspects of international listing. The majority of 
firms are internationally cross-listed since they obtain a dual listing on the foreign 
stock exchange in addition to a primary listing on their domestic stock exchange. 
Companies can access the market using an introduction or raise capital with their 
listing (public offering). Another difference is the type of foreign shares listed. While 
most companies list ordinary shares on the London Stock Exchange, ADRs are used 
to list in the US. The examination of recent trends in the international listing area has 
revealed significant differences between the US and the UK market. It has been 
shown that an increasing number of foreign firms decided to list in the US from 1990 
onwards. Moreover, the majority of US listings conducted a public offering with their 
listing. In particular, emerging market firms raised capital with their NYSE listing. 
Chapter 3 has discussed some institutional details of the international equities 
market. In particular, differences in regulating the issuance and trading of foreign 
securities in the US and the UK were examined. While the UK approach is based on 
the principle of mutual recognition of other countries standards, the US regulations 
are based on national treatment for foreign issuers. The compliance with US GAAP 
appears to be the major hurdle for foreign firms that seek a listing in the US. The 
decision between a private placement or a public offering bears important 
implications because it influences the marketability of an issue and the costs of 
raising capital. Moreover, the importance of trading in international equities was also 
highlighted by discussing the differences in the trading systems of the London Stock 
Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. 
Previous literature that examined the impact of international listing on the cost of 
capital has been reviewed in Chapter 4. Theoretical research found that liquidity, 
investor recognition, and international market segmentation have an effect on the 
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cost of capital. Previous studies that examined the impact of international listing on 
international market segmentation have argued that positive abnormal returns in the 
pre-listing period and negative abnormal returns in the post-listing period are 
consistent with the theoretical propositions. However, the new issues and domestic 
exchange listing literature reports similar findings but provides different explanations. 
Chapter 5 has discussed the determinants of the listing decision. The review of the 
literature has shown that liquidity represents the main motivation of companies to 
obtain an international listing. The liquidity proposition is backed up by theoretical 
models and empirical studies on international listings and domestic exchange listings 
alike. Previous literature has also shown that various other forms of listing are related 
to liquidity which is generally proxied by bid-ask spreads or trading volume. It has 
also been found that the examination of price interactions between different markets 
allows important inferences concerning the integration of markets and differences in 
transaction costs. The analysis of the institutional factors revealed that the exchange 
choice is influenced by financial disclosure levels. Previous research argued that 
firms are less likely to list on foreign stock exchanges with higher disclosure level 
than their domestic exchange, however, none of the studies examined differences in 
the stock price reaction upon listing. Although access to foreign capital markets was 
seen as the main reason for an international listing, empirical evidence did hardly 
examine the link between raising capital and international listing. Moreover, the 
importance of market conditions for raising equity capital has been discussed since 
previous research has shown that firms try to take advantage of "windows of 
opportunity" when investors are overoptimistic about their future. The summary of 
this chapter and the previous chapter has provided the main implications for the 
empirical research in this thesis. 
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Chapter 6 has shown that US listings experience positive abnormal returns in the 
pre-listing period and a decline in expected returns in the post-listing period. London 
listings, however, do not experience significant changes. These findings have 
suggested that the institutional differences between both markets can explain the 
price reaction since foreign firms face higher hurdles to access the US market. 
These results are consistent with the theoretical implications as proposed by models 
of international market segmentation. Moreover, we have found significant 
differences between emerging market firms and developed market firms since 
emerging market firms experience even bigger integration effects. Although it has 
been shown that market conditions influence the timing of international listings, they 
failed to explain the negative post-listing period returns since the negative 
performance is not concentrated among capital raising ADR-listings. Only in the case 
of emerging market firms, some form of "emerging market sentiment" could not be 
fully ruled out. Moreover, the substantial positive abnormal return on the listing day 
for firms that upgrade their OTC-traded ADR programme to a "full" listing has 
provided additional evidence of the benefits that firms experience with their listing. 
Chapter 7 has examined the changes in liquidity once firms become internationally 
listed. It has been shown that internationally listed firms experience positive trading 
volume effects. These effects have been found to be more pronounced for NYSE 
listings than for London and NASDAQ listings, even after adjusting for market-wide 
changes in volume and controlling for nationality, size, and industry effects. This has 
suggested that a NYSE listing offers bigger liquidity benefits which helps to explain 
why firms incur the higher costs associated with it. Moreover, significant short-term 
trading effects have been found for London and NYSE-listings. While introductions 
experience stronger short-term effects in the pre-listing period, the effect for public 
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offerings is stronger in the post-listing period. The comparison of microstucture- 
related characteristics of internationally listed firms and control firms has indicated 
that larger firms are more likely to list on the NYSE and on the London Stock 
Exchange. An order flow analysis has corroborated the previous findings that listing 
increases liquidity since a high percentage of the sample firms experienced an 
increase in their total order flow. 
Chapter 8 has provided further evidence that international listing influences liquidity. 
Using a sample of firms which conducted an international equity offering with an US 
tranche, it has been shown that public offerings have a liquidity advantage over 
private placements in the 144A market. This has suggested that internationally listed 
firms are rewarded for complying with the stringent registration requirements of the 
SEC. It has been shown that internationally listed firms have lower bid-ask spreads, 
which holds when adjusting for size effects and controlling for other spread 
determinants. The lower bid-ask spread for listed firms has been explained by a 
larger potential shareholder base and the permission to be traded on a regulated 
marketplace. It has also been shown that the liquidity benefits outweigh the higher 
costs of a public offering which leads to a reduction in the cost of capital. 
The evidence in Chapter 9 has shown that simultaneously offered international IPOs 
experience a different price discovery than seasoned firms. The results have 
suggested that in many cases ADR prices lead underlying share prices. While a 
mutual feedback relationship exists for developed market firms, some emerging 
market firms have appeared to be pure satellites of the NYSE market. It has also 
been found that price differentials between the ADR price and the underlying share 
price are corrected more quickly for developed market firms since the adjustment is 
undertaken in both markets. However, the NYSE seems to have a transaction cost- 
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advantage for trading in emerging market firms since the price differential is 
corrected more quickly on the NYSE. A comparative trading volume analysis has 
suggested that the lead-lag relationship may partly be explained by the ADR order 
flow. The results have not supported previous evidence that ADR IPOs are less 
underpriced. Moreover, no differences have been found in first day returns of 
emerging market and developed market firms. 
10.2 Suggestions for further research 
Although this thesis has provided important new evidence on the effects of 
international listing, it has also raised many new questions. To shed more light on 
this topic, the following areas of further research appear to be fruitful. While we have 
argued that international listings experience a decline in their expected returns, the 
magnitude of the negative post-listing period performance still remains a puzzle. 
Similar to previous research on IPOs and seasoned equity offerings other firm- 
specific characteristics as the operating performance or the use of the issue 
proceeds could be considered. In this context, it also appears interesting whether the 
issue proceeds are used to pursue other strategic goals as acquisitions or financing 
of subsidiaries in the host country. 
Previous research has also documented cycles in the volume of equity issuing 
activity and their relationship to the business cycle. Two alternative ways are 
suggested to examine this issue in an international context since the issue volume of 
foreign firms may be related to the business cycle of the host country or to the 
business cycle of the home country. Very often it is argued that foreign firms, for 
example, issue equity in the US because comparable firms in the same industry 
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trade at higher P/E-multiples than firms in its domestic market. A comparison of 
industry P/E-ratios between the domestic and the foreign market at the time of issue 
may provide more evidence on the issue of whether firms can take advantage of 
windows of opportunity. 
Future research could also investigate whether the international equity offering 
method (private placement or public offering) has an impact on the pricing of the 
issue (in particular for IPOs) and on the long-run performance. In this context, it 
would also be interesting to measure the impact of changes in the US shareholder 
base by comparing the initial amount placed with US investors and the amount held 
by them a few years after the issue. This would test whether public offerings lead to 
a stronger increase in the shareholder base than private placements. Moreover, a 
provisional look at our data has indicated that a number of companies return to the 
market to raise additional equity capital. This provides the opportunity to examine the 
issue of subsequent equity offerings in an international setting. 
While data unavailability has been one of the major limitations of the study, the 
continuing growth of international listings and international equity offerings from the 
end of 1994 to date should offer ample opportunities to conduct more research in 
that area in the future. 
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Appendix: 
Comparison between raw and log returns 
Panel A. 
Pre-listing 
period 
Average CAR t-statistics Raw returns t-statistics 
London 4.66 1.50 8.24 2.66 
NASDAQ 10.67 1.86 15.15 2.61 
NYSE 10.29 2.76 15.33 4.09 
- 
Emerging 14.19 1.29 20.34 1.82 
- 
Developed 9.37 2.41 14.15 3.63 
ADR listings 11.07 2.24 15.25 3.05 
- 
Introductions 11.06 2.73 15.82 3.85 
- 
Public 
offerings 
11.09 1.84 14.91 2.52 
Panel B: 
Post-listing 
period 
Average CAR t-statistics Raw returns t-statistics 
London 0.87 0.20 6.78 1.53 
NASDAQ 
-7.61 -0.90 2.14 0.25 
NYSE 
-18.63 -3.09 -10.10 -1.67 
- 
Emerging 
-61.17 -1.99 -44.23 -1.41 
- 
Developed 
-14.77 -2.45 -6.61 -1.09 
ADR listings 
-13.53 -1.68 -3.59 -1.12 
- 
Introductions 
-10.81 -1.74 -3.27 -0.52 
- 
Public 
offerings 
-18.01 -1.56 -11.74 -1.04 
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